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The following dissertation presents an integrated military history of combat and killing, as experienced and conducted by soldiers of the Imperial German army from 1914-1918.  Its general argument is that the practice of killing in the German army was dominated by a ‘Taylorisation’ of the battlefield that placed killing and its attendant psychological trauma and risk disproportionately on picked troops, while assigning the vast majority of soldiers a supporting role in combat as labourers and defensive specialists.  By emphasising the role of weapon and the numerous chance encounters that took place as German troops moved through the trenches and bunkers of positional war, this dissertation argues that peculiar organisational practices and specialised weapons managed individual risk while providing psychological and physical space between killers and killed.  The consequences of the killing act were therefore subsumed within less traumatic actions.
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Break-in	The phase of an attack where the attacking force has entered the defenders’ positions.

Breakthrough	The phase of an attack where the attacking force has demolished the defender’s fortifications, killed, captured or routed its garrisons, and also killed, captured or routed all nearby reserve troops.  

Aufrollen	‘Rolling up.’ When an attacker enters an enemy trench, and proceeds down its length behind a shower of grenades.  Known to the British as ‘Bombing down’ a trench.

Elastic Defense	A defensive doctrine adopted in December, 1916, which replaced defensive lines composed of trenches [Linienverteidigung] with a defensive zone composed of outposts, bunkers, forts and specialist counter-attack troops[Flachenverteidigung].  In the older, linear system, the front-line trench was contested to the death, and was to be recaptured at any cost if taken.  Defensive zones instead ‘invited the attacker to walk on through’. Within the defensive system, attacking units would be pulled apart by topography, fire-power and the need to engage bunkers and forts at irregular intervals.  Now thoroughly disorganised and probably lost, attacking troops were mopped up by counter-attacks and artillery.  Defenders were permitted to move forward, backward or laterally within their zone, on the understanding that they were moving from disadvantageous to advantageous positions from which to continue fighting. 

Sauberung	‘Cleansing’. The process of killing or subduing any defenders remaining in a captured position.  Referred to by the British as ‘mopping up’ and the French as Nettoyage, or ‘cleaning’.












Also known as the Field army, it was composed of the most qualified half of each year’s conscription
class.  Soldiers were 20-22 years old, and served two-year terms.  By tradition recruits
were overwhelmingly single, from rural backgrounds and centre-right in their politics.

Reserve army
After completing service in the Active army, soldiers passed into the Reserve army.  Reserve army
soldiers received annual training, and lived as civilians under the obligation to report for service
 upon the Declaration of a State of Siege. 

Unit and Rank Structure in the Imperial German Army

OHL: Army Supreme Command
The OHL oversaw the entire Imperial German military except for the Navy, and is divided
chronologically by the 1st Supreme Command of Helmuth von Moltke the Younger,
the 2nd Supreme Command of former Prussian War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn, 
and the 3rd Supreme Command, referred to as the ‘Silent Dictatorship’ 
of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.

Army Group
Consisting of three or more armies, led by a member of one of the German Empire’s royal families.  The 
Kingdom of Saxony was the exception to this convention.

The three most prominent Army Groups (AGs) on the Western Front were:
AG German Crown Prince	AG Crown Prince Rupprecht	AG Grand Duke Albrecht
However, the Imperial German army’s habit was to throw together new formations in times of crisis or for special tasks.  Therefore, additional Army Groups, ‘Army Detachments’, and ad hoc, army-sized units appeared and disappeared over the course of the war.  They were usually named after their commanders, or the area in which they were first organised, or simply designated with a letter of the alphabet.

Army
Consisting of three or more corps, led by a Field Marshal or Lieutenant General. Armies were also responsible for collecting and disseminating information on training courses offered, the subjects covered, and the dates they took place.

Assault battalion, Assault company (est. Summer, 1916)
Assault battalions and Assault companies were independent units used at the discretion of Army Group
and Army commanders for training purposes, as well as raids and attacks with limited objectives if no
locally raised storm troops were available.

Machinegun Marksman battalion (est. Autumn, 1917)
Known by their German acronym of MGSs, these units were composed entirely of elite machinegun
squads with specialist training and equipment to fire indirectly.  Like the Assault battalions, they held at
the discretion of Army Group and Army commanders.  During the Spring Offensives, MGSs units were
either used on their own or attached to Assault divisions.

Corps
Consisting of two divisions, led by a Major General.  Each Corps was tied to a region of the German Empire, and maintained an Administrative Staff [stellvertretendes Generalkommando] there which oversaw organisation and training of replacements, among other duties.  

Division
Consisting of one infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment, one regiment of field artillery, and one regiment of field howitzers, led by a Major General.  Divisions were also responsible for operating Field Recruit Depots, and sometimes established their own ‘Assault schools’ for training storm troops.  Divisions initially contained two Brigades, each with two regiments, but in 1915 this was generally altered to one brigade of three regiments.  

Divisions initially came with four designations, Active, Reserve, Landwehr and Landsturm, corresponding to professional troops, reservists, garrison troops and home guards respectively.
In 1916, the designations of Eingreifsdivision [‘Intervention’ division] and Stellungsdivision [‘Positional’ or ‘Holding’ division] were added, to locate units within the existing system of ‘Elastic Defense’, by identifying units equipped and trained for large-scale counter attacks and occupying defensive lines, respectively.  In the Winter of 1917-1918, the designation of Mobildivision was added, indicating a division of the highest quality and singling it out for extra rations, rest, training and replacements in preparation for the Spring Offensives.  The Allies referred to Mobildivisions as ‘Assault divisions’.   

Brigade
A group of three regiments, led by a Brigadier General.  Brigades initially contained two regiments, but in 1915 this number increased to three, while the number of brigades per division was reduced to one.

Regiment
A group of three battalions, led by a Colonel.  Regimental names could be quite long, including a numerical designation, the region where it was recruited, a classification in the Reserve or Landwehr, a title or other honourific, and finally the regiment’s number in the Imperial German army’s order of battle.

Battalion
A group of four companies, three Infantry companies, and one Machinegun company, led by a Major or Lieutenant Colonel.  Battalions were numbered with roman numerals.

Company
A group of three or four platoons, with as many as 16 squads, led by a 1st Lieutenant or Captain.  In 1917, companies were reduced from four platoons to three.  

Platoon
A group of four to six squads, led by a 2nd Lieutenant or senior Sergeant. 

Squad






Table 4.1: Assault Group Assignments for Operation Strandfest



























This study investigates the organisational framing and organisational significance of mass violence to address a historiographical gap in the organization and deployment of lethal violence in war, first identified by German scholars in the 1920s, and raised again by literary scholars in the 1980s.​[2]​  Klaus Theweleit’s psychoanalysis of autobiographical materials from soldiers and Freikorps members investigated the nihilistic mentalities and Freudian selves that grounded his subjects’ motivation to kill.​[3]​  Similarly, the extraordinary levels of violence, manifested by the Freikorps, particularly against women, were an attempt to annihilate a threat to both physical and psychological well being.​[4]​  Anglophone scholars, including Eric J. Leed and Paul Fussell investigated changes in individuals wrought by war, and the influence of fictionalized soldiers’ memoirs on contemporary literature and memory.​[5]​  
Championing an approach grounded on individual experience and literary theory, Alltagsgeschichte challenged the Bielefeld approach of History-as-Social Science on the grounds of neglected individual agency.​[6]​  As part of an attack on historical Structuralism aided by the recent refutation of the Sonderweg, cultural paradigms gained increasing influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The primacy of Social History ended, and in the Germany Social and Cultural methodologies began a tentative integration.​[7]​  At the same time, pioneering works in First World War studies by George Mosse and Jay Winter embraced the linguistic turn to establish or question the origins of modernity and demonstrate the importance of myth and representation in post-war culture. ​[8]​  Focus on victimization, mass death, mourning, mythologized war experience and possible brutalization laid the groundwork for an investigation of killing.  
In 1995, Michael Geyer made the following observation on the study of war, observing: ‘Was jedoch fehlt, ist die Reflexion über das Wesen der modernen europäischen Kriege, was sie von anderen Formen kriegerischen Handelns und anderen Formen physischer Gewalt unterscheidet.’​[9]​   The arc of Geyer’s arguments grounded in the concept that a military history of killing [Töten], and the process of being killed [Getötet-Werden] would erase the boundaries between the history of combat and the history of military operations, the latter having reduced lethal violence [Tötungsgewalt] to a ‘distant and abstract observation’ by General Staff officers.​[10]​  Though lethal violence in war as a historical problem has been addressed by Omer Bartov, Christopher Browning, Joanna Bourke and Isabel Hull, the history of ‘Töten’ and ‘Getötet-Werden’ remains incomplete. ​[11]​   
Lethal violence, the experience of killing, and mass death appeared in English language literature in the early 1990s, addressing salient issues of the Second World War.  In studies of the Final Solution, and the conduct of the German army on the Eastern Front, the works of Omer Bartov and Christopher Browning investigated the consequences of mass death and face-to-face killing.  In describing the transformation of the Wehrmacht from a professional to an ideologically motivated force, Bartov also offers a powerful critique of unit cohesion based on ‘primary group’ theory which informs this study.​[12]​  Browning’s inquiry into Reserve Police Battalion 101 determined that men can become killers through the application of general principles of military culture and soldierly masculinity.​[13]​  However, these trends did not transfer into First World War studies, until the turn of the millennium brought renewed interest in the exploration of the fundamental forces enabling lethal violence and sustaining mass killing.  
Joanna Bourke’s study of ‘face to face’ killing brought the analysis of killing to Anglophone historiography in 1999.​[14]​   Stating that killing had gone out of military history, Bourke’s subjects are English speaking soldiers from the World Wars and Vietnam.  Bourke concedes the ‘statistical insignificance’​[15]​ of face to face killing in these conflicts.  However, Bourke’s study shows the importance of face to face killing in the training process and its value to the self image of individual combatants.  In doing so, it locates killing’s importance both in the minds of common soldiers and amongst the institutional norms of national armies, determining that soldiers come to derive pleasure from the killing act.  Germany’s omission from a work on killing in the twentieth century aside, space is also left for an analysis of killing on a collective basis, rather than on the importance of representation of a specific mode.  
The observed absence of a history of killing in combat, and a historicization of both extreme violence and the experience of physical as well as psychological pain, were central issues raised in French in the year 2000, and in English in 2002, by Stépháne Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker.​[16]​   These scholars argued that a pursuit of absolute historical accuracy in the context of victimhood rendered First World War studies unable to answer central questions regarding the war itself.  Great War sacrifices provided the only legitimate point of comparison for determining a just level of reparations, and when the time came, France’s political leadership could not satisfy the demands of their citizens.   With concepts of victimhood that neatly sanitized the nation from having to face the idea of fallen soldiers or live veterans as killers, the war itself became more palatable to public memory.​[17]​  The France that emerged from the Great War was a victorious but deeply scarred and fundamentally brutalised polity, one which held the inherent flaws of the German nation as responsible for the war. ​[18]​ The therefore proposed a three part investigation around the themes of ‘violence’, ‘crusade’ and ‘mourning’, to explain the critical importance of continued support in the face of mass death alongside French society’s inability to recover from the Great War experience.​[19]​
Recently, highly specialized research into various forms of violence and mass killing stands at the forefront of the study of the First World War.   Alan Kramer has identified a ‘Dynamic of Destruction’ arising both from mass killing, and ‘cultural destruction’ as a consequence of battle and as the result of deliberate policy decisions.​[20]​   Moreover, Isabel Hull identified a ‘dynamic of extremism’ within the organizational culture of the Imperial German Army, growing from a ‘dogmatic pursuit of annihilation’ achieved through ‘immediate, extreme violence’ for the purpose of total destruction or absolute obedience from an enemy.​[21]​  Heather Jones’ recent work on violence against prisoners of war has provided critical findings on the extent to which civilian populations responded to and ultimately approved of increasing levels of violence toward captured enemy combatants. ​[22]​   But while these studies make ample and necessary contributions to the field of lethal violence in the Great War, they do not address violence in combat, inflicted by soldiers against soldiers.
Such a fundamental question has largely defied historians’ attempts at illumination.  The consensus view so far is that soldiers practiced rigorous self-censorship when recording their actions on the battlefield.  A tendency identified by Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker in 2003, it seems to have carried on throughout the  twentieth century, as researchers of Second World War have confirmed.  In personal interviews or candid conversations overheard by intelligence officers, soldiers largely ignore the subject of killing other soldiers, or linked their feelings and motivations for fighting and killing to the circumstances of each event.  In essence, the thoughts and forces which arose in the instant of fighting and killing are inseparable from the act and the instant in which it takes place.  Personal documents were not the place for deep reflection but rather narration of the act, and as Len Smith has demonstrated, soldiers’ narratives were inextricably linked both to feelings of guilt and the passage of time.  There is little doubt that some soldiers took pride or pleasure from acts of killing, particularly if the acts were framed as revenge or reprisal.  However, the majority sought to distance themselves from participation, and as this dissertation will illuminate, the way in which soldiers of the German army at least were organised and trained to fight positional war provided ample opportunity for doing so.
German military historians had begun the project of creating an experiential history of soldiers.  Inspired by Alltagsgeschicte, Klaus Latzel, Bernd Ulrich, Anne Lipp and Benjamin Ziemann provided pieces of this puzzle.​[23]​  Ziemann, citing the absence of an experiential history addressing 1914-1918, began to fill the gap with his study of soldiers and society in rural Bavaria.  Ziemann shows a very narrow gap between agrarian soldiers and the agrarian home front, and finds little joy among rural soldiers at the prospect of killing, though the killing process itself is absent from his work.​[24]​  Ziemann instead discusses for what, and why soldiers continued to fight, concluding that soldiers did not fight so much for a cause, as for a point in the future where they could return in peace to their pre-war lives.​[25]​  Peace was the desired outcome, whether from negotiations or victory, and though the will to fight began eroding in 1916-17, it was the sense of hopelessness in the wake of the Spring Offensives that pushed the German Army into collapse.​[26]​  Though they felt themselves victimized by the war, peasant soldiers were not brutalised.  Ziemann concludes by noting there was little paramilitary violence in rural Bavaria, and the organization and activity of local veterans, gun clubs and militias was lackadaisical at best.  This study sees itself in a similar light, seeking to clarify the complicated interactions between life, death and the formation of meaning in a distinct social and cultural context, but with the emphasis on placed on the battlefield, rather than the home front.
The history of killing in war is therefore a history of the management and deployment of lethal mass violence, and of the individual and collective responses to its aftermath.   We now have an understanding of the assumptions, beliefs and morals that soldiers carried with them into battle, utilized to make sense of the environments they found themselves in, and the violence they witnessed.  Dennis Winter’s examination of war diaries, letters and memoirs found that the combination of pain and abandonment was the greatest worry of British soldiers, apart from the prospect of hand-to-hand combat.​[27]​  In pursuing the subject, John Keegan warned against the ‘pornography of violence’ in historical writing, and sociologist Wolgang Sofsky’s characterisations of extreme violence were criticised similarly as ‘meat inspection.’ ​[28]​  But most relevant to this study is the work of Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, who raised two additional, and uncomfortable, considerations for historians:  first, that an investigation of extreme violence raises worrying questions about the moral and ethical foundations of ‘Western’ selves; second, that studying extreme violence reveals the ‘porous boundary’ between soldiers and civilians, a boundary that grew evermore flimsy as the 20th century went on, and in World War II, disappeared altogether. ​[29]​  Four years later,  Bernd Weisbrod and Alf Lüdtke argued that while the debate over extreme violence had yielded valuable findings, they had ‘marginalized war’, and overemphasised the view of soldiers as ‘victims of hierarchy and wartime constraints.’​[30]​ Writing  
In their revision of the Battle of the Somme, the historians Prior and Wilson determined that artillery was the fulcrum about which successful attack and defence turned.​[31]​   They carry this argument forward, and contend, through an analysis of individual divisions and their objectives, that artillery created the space required for soldier’s individual skill and tactical expertise to influence the outcome of battles. ​[32]​   That soldiers fighting in trenches felt a sense of victimization when under prolonged bombardment is indisputable.   However, such accounts of sustained shelling must be matched against the facts of deployment on the Western Front, differentiated by the experience of national armies, and scrutinized by the increased integration between combat arms.   Given clearly defined and observable targets, every army eventually contained enough weapons of heavy enough calibre to destroy them.  A defensive scheme based around camouflaged, fortified areas rather than trench lines, later refined into ‘Elastic Defense’ was adopted in wake of the Battle of the Somme for this reason.​[33]​  Instead, front lines were replaced with a network of mutually supporting strong points, with the areas in between covered by fire rather than physically occupied.  Each strong point contained its own supplies and small garrison, and was held regardless of losses.  As will be seen, such a system mitigates the destructive effects of artillery, while taking advantage of the easier half of military training, convincing soldiers to die.
 	Jay Winter observed that 60 per cent of casualties were caused by artillery, and that ‘for this reason, and this reason alone’ victimization is still a ‘valid’, perhaps ‘essential’ component of soldier’s experience and of any explanation of soldier’s endurance of combat.​[34]​  Explanations of soldierly endurance have focused on shared experience and close contact with comrades in explaining the generation of a special community of front line veterans.​[35]​  However, these approaches have neglected the military systems which organized and directed violence in combat, and developed the tactics and doctrines governing battlefield action.   Moreover, if soldier’s fears revolved around abandonment, physical pain, and lasting bodily mutilation, does it not also follow that most soldiers expected to live.​[36]​  
In order to ameliorate the problems inherent with soldiers’ testimony and to avoid recounting the battles of materiel, each already the source of numerous monographs, it seems necessary to deconstruct the war of position.  Essential to this approach is the idea of ‘bounded rationality’, or the concept that the decision-making process is undertaken with incomplete information and under sharp time constraints.  Military hierarchies, while imperfect in their control over people and events to say the least, serve to amplify the importance of relatively minor events when viewed through the prism of ‘bounded rationality’, opening a space for both a microhistorical approach to combat and placing a renewed importance on case studies as a means of capturing the German army in operation.​[37]​




The German army is known for three things, extraordinary combat effectiveness, extraordinary brutality and a singular will to fight long after any reasonable expectation of victory had passed.  Taken together, those qualities made the German army into an unmatched killing machine on the battlefield, extracting a terrible toll from vastly superior enemy coalitions.  But furthermore, it is an expertise in mass violence which binds together those characteristics, and so stands at the heart of this investigation.  It was the emphasis on mass violence and collective action that prompted the first central question of this dissertation: did the army view killing a collective act, or the responsibility of individual soldiers?  Very quickly it became clear that that the answer was both; strong units made for a better fighting force, while soldiers’ belief in their superiority man-to-man buoyed morale. Bridging the gap between soldiers and units lent itself to a study of training, of the programmes devised for preparing soldiers’ bodies and minds.  Not to mention, directing soldiers’ battlefield activities through an education in tactics.
The German army’s system of military instruction provided an answer to a second key question; how did the German army attempt to access soldiers’ minds and bodies so as to prepare them to fight? Querrying Anglophone scholarship gave a clear answer, that the German army was excellent at communicating lessons learned on the battlefield to soldiers and officers, and in fostering a meritocratic atmosphere among officers.  But between the lines there lies something of a paradox:  that armies improve in performance the longer they fight.  So was it possible to extract a benefit from combat beyond the inflicting of disproportionate losses on the enemy?  The answer was yes, particularly in an army that increasingly relied upon experience rather than skill at man-management to ameliorate a declining officer corps, and to provide not just elite leaders but elite instructors for replacement soldiers.  Carefully trained veterans became indispensable in the final reckoning, blending with an increasingly complicated military division-of-labour that ensured a small number of the best soldiers got the worst jobs.  In essence, to become a veteran was to become a supplemental leader, a close-combat specialist, and most importantly a buffer between the war’s most dangerous tasks and the balance of soldiers, who did not meet such lofty standards of conduct.
	Veteran’s centrality to both training and combat provided a solution the final question of this dissertation, is there a relationship between skill in combat and survival, and if so what is it? In the course of the following chapters, it will be argued that mass violence in the Imperial German army is best characterised as ‘regenerative’, in light of a purposeful blending of combat and training, and the emphasis placed on a soldiers’ veteran status.  The German army harnessed the battlefield in order to sustain itself in a war dominated by mass killing and mass violence, by transmitting frontline experiences to new recruits not just in print, but through the example of experienced leaders. 
		 
Categories of Analysis and Methodology

The short distance between home front and battlefield, and the former’s importance in supporting the latter, has produced a volumous literature.  Most recently, and controversially, Michael Roper’s study argued that soldier’s family life provided necessary training for life in the Trenches, while soldier’s relationships with their mothers were the most important single attachment in sustaining morale.​[48]​  Mothers seized on the chance provided by letters and parcels to continue in a traditional maternal role from a distance by sending familiar creature comforts, themselves reminders of civilian life and rectifiers of shortcomings in army supplies.​[49]​  Roper raises the issue of soldier’s selves, formed in peacetime by class and occupation, and how these selves prepared men from diverse backgrounds to overcome the stress of war.  Specifically, Roper briefly discusses men’s adaptation to the role of company subaltern which demanded a self-sacrificial attitude.​[50]​  My purpose will expand upon this approach to incorporate endurance and lethal violence in a logical progression from these arguments.  Roper rightly acknowledges a change in self cause by military role, but views that this role must include the ability to take life alongside the need to preserve life, and the willingness to die in order to do both.
In pursuit of this analysis, I seek to  integrate sociological and psychological methods into the a view ‘from below’,  whereby the scope of investigation expands to encompass both the ‘bottom up’ nature of German military reform, and the ‘top down’ mechanisms for implementing that reform and governing a hierarchical military system.   The purpose is to combine these factors with the military functionalism that increasingly informed the structure, tactics and organization of the German Army.   Military problems were identified, and the task of finding a solution was delegated to lower ranking officers, who were given time and resources to devise a solution and test the results.  Higher ranking officers observed the tests, and if satisfactory results were achieved, modified the army’s doctrine appropriately.   
These institutional peculiarities, and questions of unit cohesion, military reform, and individual readiness and responses to killing, underpin a modified ‘history from below.’​[51]​  The German Army’s approach towards military reform valued the quality of contribution over the rank or bureaucratic position of the contributor.  We therefore find that relatively modest officer ranks of Colonel or Captain are given responsibility for resolving the questions of positional warfare on behalf of an army of millions.​[52]​  Similarly, the Chief-of-Staff system elevated mid level officers to positions of extraordinary influence, with effective responsibility for whole armies under the most extreme circumstances.  Attempts during the Weimar era to deduce a ‘typical’ individual Great War experience, after the establishment of a similar collective experience, have been justly criticized by Bernd Ulrich, and are more than substantiated by specialisation.​[53]​  
Military units are by nature hierarchical organizations, and the organizational biases of the peace trained German Army demanded an overrepresentation of the nobility amongst the officer corps.​[54]​  This picture is further complicated by wartime attrition, and a recognizable shift in the demands of wartime leadership, ably tracked by Wenke Meteling.​[55]​   While not contesting these findings regarding small units, this study seeks to expand upon them, by incorporating into the survival equation those elements that existed outside the battalion or company command structure.  Even when new courses of action were agreed upon, their implementation was neither general nor uniform.  Units could, and did, reject or modify changes in doctrine, placing a great deal of influence in the hands of small unit commanders, resulting in tensions in the chain of command. From November, 1916 onward, the storm troop programme structured the army’s training regime, as well as its expectations from various categories of soldier, categories which the storm troop programme largely determined.  This critical organisational role in ordering tactics and training blends with a role as raiding and close combat specialists.  As such, the storm troops play a central role in this dissertation, for the above reasons and also because tactics placed them in a unique position to weigh ‘military necessity’ against humanitarian concerns in positional war.​[56]​    
After the retreat from the Marne, the German Army recognized the fundamental shift from maneuver to fortress warfare, and the need for specialisation. Initial experiments featured the deployment of flame throwers and infantry portable artillery pieces, but they proved ineffective.  In August, 1915, Bavarian captain Wilhelm Röhr was placed in charge of developing the new tactics, and he settled on three fundamental concepts:  first, the replacement of skirmish lines with squad sized units; second, the integration of machine guns, artillery, mortars and flame throwers at the smallest possible organizational level; and last, the use of infiltration tactics and grenades to isolate and ‘roll up’ opposing trenches, rather than storming them frontally.​[57]​  Before attacking an enemy line or strong point, the Storm Troops undertook thorough reconnaissance and observation, meticulously coordinating their attacks with supporting arms to achieve maximum surprise and shock effects.  The first waves of Storm Troops advanced directly behind their own artillery, risking friendly fire losses for a ‘safe’ advance across No Man’s Land.  In following battles of materiel, storm troops were utilized in deliberate counterattacks [Gegenangriff] as opposed to quick counterattacks by local troops, or Gegenstoβ, where their expertise and local knowledge could be used to limit losses and swiftly capture small areas.  The basic unit of these advances was die Gruppe , of seven or eight enlisted men and an NCO, as opposed to the platoon or company columns preferred by strict adherence to the 1906 drill regulations.  Non commissioned officers and men had been told to act independently and be self motivated before 1915, but after 1915, these virtues were transformed into doctrine, and the process began of spreading them through the Army.   This ‘individualization’ of the war was undertaken as a process I will elaborate on in Chapter II as ‘battlefield Taylorism’, an effort to categorise individual potential through adherence to a rationalised value set, then fuse it with new technologies and modes of organisation.
A history of killing does not confine itself to killing alone.  Alongside Geyer’s formulation of killing and the process of being killed, the weight of arguments compounded by Paul Fussell, Jay Winter, George Mosse, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Anette Becker also demand the inclusion of survival.   This proceeds from the assumption that survival is both an individual struggle, based on training, experience and motivation, and also a collective struggle, rooted in small units, and increasingly, a network of specialists bound together by tactics, doctrine and hence, with collective responsibility to each other and a higher military authority.  Though Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Anette Becker have rightly observed that the prevalence of artillery minimized the impact of training and individual skill, it will be my contention that individual powerlessness gave way to collective empowerment. ​[58]​  The vehicle for this empowerment was the continuous entailment of the responsibility for organizing and deploying lethal violence on lower and lower ranks of soldier, and to place those soldiers smaller and smaller units.  At the same time tha the responsibility for organizing and deploying lethal violence descended through the military hierarchy, the individual quality of soldier desired to undertake the task of killing increased.   The most elite examples of the new tactical system were storm troop units formed at the level of army group, army or corps and distinguishable from other soldiers by the leather reinforcement at the knees and elbows of their uniforms, and helmets painted with camouflage.​[59]​  
Therefore, commanders established an ‘offensive norm’ which structured relations between combatant armies around ‘conflict and unmitigated hostility.’​[60]​  As historians will agree, adherence to this ‘norm’ was far from general among those in their front line rotations.  Toward this end, AE Ashworth argued that deep rifts existed between frontline troops and general staffs, between those required to kill and those who demanded killing, as the taking of life constituted a rupture with socially constructed views of a soldier’s role and with societies that hold persons to be inviolable.​[61]​   The result was mutual sham aggression, constituting the ‘ritiualization of the offensive norm’ hinged on the cooperation of supposed enemies, ‘dissolving’ the ‘we’ and ‘they.’ ​[62]​  Though hardly an unfamiliar interpretation, Ashworth’s work demonstrates a negotiated relationship between soldier’s concepts of war and definitions of self, and the dictates of military hierarchies demanding efficient implementation of institutional values.
Combat has been the subject of study for military psychologists for decades following the Great War.  Their conclusions support the hypothesis that combat is always harmful to a soldier’s mental health, and that partaking in acts of lethal violence offers no relief from its strain.​[63]​  Swank and Marchand showed that 60 days of continuous action are enough to produce a 100 per cent psychological casualty rate, though it is unclear how many of these casualties are rendered unfit for frontline service, either permanently or temporarily.​[64]​ A pattern of psychiatric losses emerges as inexperienced units are subjected to extended periods of combat.  Psychiatric casualties peak after initial action, fall away as cases are hospitalized and survivors gain experience, then rise gradually as the duration of combat increases.​[65]​  More concretely, after 60 days of continuous action, 98 per cent of combatants are rendered psychiatric casualties to some degree, and 2 per cent are revealed as aggressive sociopaths.​[66]​   Recent Second World War historiography also informs this study, as it has been claimed, that community allows for the dispersion of responsibility for killing across a number of individuals or an imagined collectivity.​[67]​  
The deployment of lethal violence by militaries against militaries is the foundation of Dave Grossman’s psychological examination of killing in the US army.  Based on a comprehensive study of the work of military psychiatrists, Grossman concludes that human beings have strong, instinctive inhibitions against killing other humans.​[68]​  This does not translate into moral cowardice on the battlefield, where Grossman argues persuasively that soldiers will risk their lives performing necessary tasks, and will expose themselves to mortal danger for extended periods.  However, soldiers will deliberately miss or refuse to shoot, even under the most dire circumstances.  The military’s answer to soldiers’ aversion to taking human life is not so much training as ‘conditioning’ them to kill, so that from a Second World War ‘firing rate’ of 25 per cent, some 55 per cent of soldiers shot at the enemy during the Korean War, and 90 per cent shot at the enemy in Vietnam.​[69]​
Grossman’s work also illustrates the effects of military organizations on group psychology.   Critical to Grossman are the figures of S.L.A Marshall, who observed that while 75 per cent of riflemen failed to fire, the rate of engagement for crew-served weapons stood near 100 per cent.​[70]​   Emotional bonding with a collective, combined with distance (defined not only as physical, but also as social, cultural, and ‘moral’ distinctions between enemies), blended with carefully constructed training regimes to enable men to kill.​[71]​  Though derived primarily from American and Israeli research in the post World War era, with little attention paid to the First World War, Grossman’s work nonetheless provides numerous testable hypotheses foe the historical investigation of killing.  Soldiers do not need to hate their enemies at all times, or derive pleasure from the killing act.  They must ‘merely’ maintain enough psychological stability to maintain the efficient deployment of lethal violence on behalf of the militaries they serve.   
The category of ‘endurance’ therefore serves two functions.  In the first part, endurance describes the ability of soldiers to sustain their psychological health in the face of industrialized mass warfare.  In the second part, ‘endurance’ reflects the ability of soldiers to balance increasing psychological trauma with efficient execution of the duties put upon them by their military specialisation.  This second consideration also bears with it the responsibility to friends and comrades, where failure to support them is expressed in feelings of grief, shame and regret, as opposed to failure in official duties, punished through military justice.  Alexander Watson has observed that while maneuver warfare was a test of physical strength, positional war was ‘a contest of nerves’, where soldiers would gladly exchange an increased chance of wounds or death for specious acts of control over their surroundings.​[72]​  This war of endurance echoes the earlier findings of historians, where Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Leonard V. Smith agree that France’s will to resist is best described as ‘grim determination’ rather than ‘nihilistic nationalism.’​[73]​  
With this in mind, I focus only partially focused on the service of common soldiers.   Special preference will be given two categories of infantry soldier -those who formed assault detachments-  whom I have termed ‘violence specialists’, and common soldiers whose task was dominated by defensive fighting and construction.  Through these categorizations, the interactions between military role and psychological factors enabling men to kill become clear.   Storm troops, as specialists in close quarters combat, best illustrate the unequal burden of risk which permeated the German army’s organisational practice.  Common soldiers, however, were the core of the army and as such were constantly compared to the idealised, pre-war force when the army addressed issues of morale, skill and motivation.   It is in the interaction between these two groups and the OHL’s management of the army as a whole ultimately adopted a ‘division-of-risk’ system, which embraced the battlefield wholeheartedly as the true school of positional war.  This embrace of war itself to teach soldiers how to fight and kill I have characterised as ‘regenerative’ violence, wherein the army sought out experienced soldiers for conversion into violence specialists, who then led common soldiers in training but also into the most dangerous but important phase of battle: Nahkampf, or close combat. 
Furthermore, advances in military technology and military organization meant that the infantry existed as part of constantly evolving German Army.  Increasing specialisation in positional warfare, alongside rising casualties, brought innovation and reform.  Here, the guiding principle was division of labour amongst a system of specialists, assigned separate tasks and equipped to fulfil them as efficiently as possible.​[74]​  By building units designed to remove specific threats or provide special services, the responsibility for individual survival was diffused across squads, platoons, divisions or corps, and subject to the execution of well-known routines applied, ideally, in sympathy with local circumstances.  The degree of efficiency with which a complete stranger completed his assigned role translated directly into increased or decreased chances of survival for units and individuals.  Ties between squad- or platoon mates, and between Officers, NCOs and men, were still important, but survival in the Frontgemeinschaft depended a great deal on killers who never saw those they killed.  However, the nature of close combat in positional war proves that where killing is concerned, the ‘violence specialist’, the common soldier, those who took part in the invasion of France and Belgium in August 1914, and the artilleryman had much more in common than might be believed.
Neither should we believe that soldiers persisted in killing because they came to enjoy taking life.  Such an explanation removes far too much complexity from the historical purview and neglects the findings of generations of military psychologists. The work of American and British social scientists has determined that combat provides predominantly negative psychiatric effects, and killing only damages overall mental health.  Much more important to psychological health is the absence of combat and the expectation of the absence of combat.  Through a comparative analysis with German sources, the defensive character of Germany’s war in the West may come to be a key component in explaining the German Army’s moral resilience.   
Investigating the relationship between various levels of the army hierarchy and the importance of raids, patrols and attacks with limited objectives places significant emphasis on divisional, corps, and army level records.  Amongst these three levels of organization, the resources of ‘small’ positional war, namely artillery and assault troops, were broadly available at the divisional level and as will be demonstrated. When higher levels of command instituted more aggressive standing orders towards small positional war, divisions were chosen as executors.  ‘Small’ positional war was waged at their discretion and with their resources in accordance with the practice of directive command. Critically analysing the conduct of raids but more importantly the conduct of raiders required some additional selection bias.  In choosing operations for scrutiny, they had to take place from late 1916 to late 1917 in order to incorporate the mature tactics derived from storm troop experiments.  They also had to include extensive testimony either from the raiders themselves concerning not just a positive or negative outcomes and ‘lessons learned’ [Erfahrungen], but detailed narrative of events citing successes, failures, unexpected events and how these were overcome (or not).  
Divisional resources entailed the use of personnel trained in assault troop methods, or of assault companies raised under divisional orders for their own use.  Independent assault units held by corps or armies were subject to the demands of external authorities and were highly sought after by units in frontline garrisons.  But in practical terms, the greater proportion of independent assault units was raised by the Prussian army and their records were destroyed in the Potsdam fire of April 1945.  Independent assault units from Baden and Württemberg largely escaped the loss of their records, so their reports figure instead.  An additional caveat must be made regarding the divisional records sampled, as divisions raised in the Grand Duchy of Baden and the Kingdom of Württemberg were generally held in much higher regard by Entente intelligence than a ‘typical’ German army division.
Finally and most importantly, in the vein of Terrence Zuber, Prior and Wilson and most notably Paul Jankowski, this dissertation seeks to reevaluate combat on the western front in order to measure the impact of circumstances on systems for organising and deploying mass violence, but also to reassess received wisdom.​[75]​  Therefore, the ‘Battles of Materiel’ are not addressed as singular events, but rather the smaller attacks, raids and other operations which punctuated the experiences of the units involved. From 1916 onward, battles of materiel were rarely conducted by uniform advances across broad fronts, but rather by carefully constructed local attacks to establish or regain a superior position.  This is precisely the same goal as the ‘operations’ that characterised ‘small’ positional war.  By focusing on detailed reports of local events, it is possible to establish a relative preponderance between battlefield norms and the increasing demands on physical and psychological resources by the military establishment.  Here lies a middle ground between the individual’s struggle to master events and the army’s struggle to balance external peer competition with rationalised internal standards of motivation and skill.
Bernd Ulrich’s evaluation of Feldpostbriefe in the post war period demonstrates the difficulty of arriving at general conclusions, even when those conclusions are ideologically predetermined.​[76]​   But, as Ulrich notes, a strong case for letters as historical sources is found in the investigation of individual ‘self-motivation from below’, rather than in the search for a typical history.​[77]​  This strength corresponds directly to the most sought after characteristic of elite troops.   However, further studies of soldiers’ letters and personal diaries has revealed a strong bias against detailed recollections of combat.​[78]​  Instead, soldiers contemplated their actions then rationalised what they had done, linking acts of killing and brutality with the circumstances of individual situations.  Such rationalising processes combined with the passage of time render personal papers an uncertain source base regarding the act of killing, weighing against an approach that places ego documents at its heart.  Furthermore, soldiers’ violence is shaped and structured not just by their emotional state, or personal and cultural biases, but also by the army which trains them and locates them within a system for the production of lethal violence.  To this we must as well add their own determinations of important or superfluous skills and weapons in the changing circumstances of war. Individual motivation has great value, but violence as waged by militaries is a fundamentally collective act, subject far more to interpersonal than intrapersonal dynamics.  Instead of seeking out those soldiers who freely recounted their acts of violence, this study instead accepted that most ego-documents would reflect a taboo against recording individual participation in, or reflection on, the act of killing.  Personal papers aid in the reconstruction of combat in the First World War, but other materials proved necessary to centrally locate the dynamics of combat between three armies in a constant state of adaptation relative to eachother.
This dissertation therefore rests primarily on official records from the divisional level upwards, and on the corps administrative staffs (stellvertretendes Generalkommandos) of Baden, Württemberg and Saxony.  Given the right to maintain quasi-independent armies in peacetime, with a declaration of war the armies of Baden, Württemberg and Royal Saxony were subordinated to the Prussian War Ministry, and became corps in the Imperial German army, each with a corps command (Generalkommando).  Corps represent a linkage between frontline units, rear-area administrators and the highest organs of Imperial Germany’s military and political leadership.  Though not as influential over the course of events as other actors or organisations, the records of corps and corps administrative staffs reflect a wealth of inputs from all over the German war machine, providing a workaround necessary due to the destruction of the Prussian War Archives in April 1945.  Local archives were also consulted for Selbstzeugnisse, or soldiers’ personal papers.  In selecting such materials the accounts of Junior Officers, senior NCOs and members of the Active army were taken in preference to others, given the organisational biases in the German army’s peculiar way of organising violence.  The Württembergisches Landesbibliothek Stuttgart’s Bibliothek für Zeitgeschicte was particular helpful in framing the organisational aspect of this work, providing access to key wartime publications on tactics and training, alongside its extensive collection of secondary source material.
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg-im-Breisgau, and the National Archives and Records Administration College Park Maryland were also consulted, primarily for their holdings from the military’s highest echelons.  In the former case, research monographs from the Militärgeschictliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres found in group RH-61 proved an invaluable resource for exploring the army’s shifting priorities.  In the latter case, the records of various collections, most of all the American Military Mission to Germany (1919-1940) provided a wealth of material on the German army from 1917-1918.  Furthermore, a surprisingly detailed and terribly underutilised microfilm series from 1914-1918 regarding organisation, troop replacement, the formation of new units and training was located, forming the basis of Chapters 1 and 2.  Finally, BA/MA holds the records of the Marine corps in its naval ministry files.  In these records were the war diary entries and after-action reports of the Marine assault battalion, which form the basis for the extended case study of Operation Strandfest (Beach Party) in Ch. 4.




The five body chapters of this work are organised thematically, each chapter dealing with a particular aspect of the German army’s modes of organising training and combat from 1914 to 1918.  While Chapter I is concerned primarily with the war of movement, Chapters II and III are devoted to the two systems developed by the German army to managed soldiers’ behaviour: the storm troop programme and the Field Recruit Depots, or FRDs.  The roots of these two institutions do not have starting points in the wars’ most notable events, but for both, the Battles of the Somme and Verdun exerted a profound effect in determining their goals: the regeneration of idealised values ascribed to the Active army.  To do so was a two-step process: first convincing soldiers that the war was survivable and its stresses were manageable, the theme of Chapter II.  Secondly, that survival and management of stress depended on their participation in the fighting, the theme of Chapter III.  Chapter IV then explores how trench combat was conducted, beginning with the German offensive at Verdun before taking on the under-researched and immensely important practices of trench raiding, small-scale attacks, and counter-attacks from 1916-1917.  Finally, Chapter V, takes a broad view of 1918, a which includes 1917’s battles of Riga, Caporetto and Cambrai, before moving through the Spring Offensives to Germany’s defeat in the ‘100 Days’.  Chapter V is the story of how the German army successfully rebuilt its confidence, if not entirely its competence, made a final bid for victory, and how German soldiers responded to the fact that their army was being smashed and the skills and values they were educated in were worth less and less.  
	In each case, each chapter is intended to give as complete a picture of the institution under study as possible so as to provide context for the following chapter.  Within the context of each chapter, though, the impact of the war’s events is dealt with case-by-case and in the context of its effect on the army and the organisation in question.  In Chapter I, covering the period from 1871 to January 1915, provides a brief summary of German military thought in the pre-war period, before investigating the effects of mass killing on the field army. The critical events are twofold. The first is not an event, but a long process of identity formation concerning tactics, and whether the army would prize superior motivation over a combination of motivation and cultivated technical ability.  The second is the experience of the war of movement from August 1914 until the Battle of Langemarck, which by dint of military necessity, brought the pendulum swinging back in the favour of motivation.  Here, I begin to outline the effects of mass killing on the army as an institution, and the steps taken to mitigate the decline in numbers and quality.   But in the background, the seemingly perpetual positional fight in the Vosges Mountains cultivated an alternative way of fighting whose consequences were far-reaching in terms of the army’s organisational and combat practice.  Finally, I analyse the specific improvisations put to use in the German army to replace both officers and men, and the concurrent rise of combat experience as the most important single quality of a soldier or small unit leader.  Chapter I also includes an excursus, utilising the testimony of new witnesses, where I evaluate the present debate on German atrocities in Belgium, finding broad continuities with the German army’s pattern of behaviour in August and September 1914.  
 Chapter II pivots around the Aisne-Champagne Offensive of September-October 1915, and the army’s self-evaluation following the Battle of the Somme from July-November 1916.  Indeed, the Somme is the single most important event in this work, as it solidified in the minds of German military elites the need to train soldiers to act as well as to endure.  Through the experiences of the Aisne Champagne, the Somme and Verdun came a renewed emphasis on training soldiers to endure and survive industrialised mass war.   Field Recruit Depots (FRDs), or front-line training camps which provided a finishing school in trench warfare for newly arrived recruits, were the sites of this new instruction.  FRDs are evaluated from the point of view that they were ‘brokerages of experience’ and the process by which the army turned soldiers’ combat experience into a commodity. Veteran instructors could demonstrate the manageable nature of the war as they demonstrated the newest tactics.  Furthermore, this chapter examines how the German army categorised and processed its experience of combat, which it will soon be made clear, varied a great deal depending on the evaluators, their needs and what was going on at the time.
Chapter III returns to the Vosges Mountains and the positional warfare conducted there between from Autumn 1915 to early Winter 1916, before leaving the battlefield to track internal discussions over the storm troop programme, which was fully adopted (but not yet fully implemented) by November, 1916, or just as the Somme was winding down.  The importance of the storm troop programme is then confirmed by the aftermath of 3rd Ypres, where an army that had happily sent recruit instructors to the front in 1914 categorically refused to do so in 1917, even in a situation of great strain.  Chapter III also details the fusion of the storm troop programme’s emphasis on the tactical offensive with the FRD’s emphasis on endurance and survival, and introduces the resulting amalgamation as ‘battlefield Taylorism.’  The former represented the institutionalisation of front-line tactical reforms made in response to an increasingly technological and ‘multi-sided’ battlefield.​[79]​  Such a functional goal blended with the latter, ‘battlefield Taylorism’, which reflected the army’s need for soldiers who would fight regardless of losses.  Storm troops served a plethora of essential functions but most importantly as ‘violence specialists’, who propagated the storm troop programme within their units.  Veteran soldiers, converted into ‘violence specialists’ by the storm troop programme, subsequently erased the general expectation that all soldiers fight in close combat but retain a general stake in the production of violence for all soldiers, replacing it with a ‘division-of-risk’ system which shielded the balance of soldiers from the psychological trauma of killing. As Geoffrey Wawro first observed, the German army deliberately fostered a lopsided burden of risk, which produced some soldiers who were reliable, and specialised in close-combat, and a vast supporting staff of defensive specialists in whom the army’s elites did not place so much trust.​[80]​ 
Chapter IV is concerned entirely with combat and its aftermath, beginning with the German assault on Verdun in February 1916, and continuing with an analysis of what German divisions learned about the nature of positional war while grappling with equally if not more resourceful French troops for ten months.  The chapter utilises a micro-historical approach to reconstruct combat in the trenches. It does so through the evaluation of numerous patrol operations, raids, and ‘attacks with limited objectives.’  Such acts were part of ‘small’ positional war, a notion derived from von Clausewitz to characterise the overall goals of those operations, which were to take prisoners, capture weapons and equipment, and capture documents.  Furthermore, Chapter IV provides a look a the German military system as it operated, with the view of demonstrating that senseless violence was not the norm, and the murky relationships between killers and victims even in close combat.The aim is to highlight the importance of single events through a micro-historical approach, in which the war’s great battles of materiel were fought with lessons learned from now-forgotten, localised combats in prior months.  But most importantly, Chapter IV binds together the techniques of survival from Chapter II, the techniques of action in Chapter III, and examines their being put into practice, under almost identical circumstances found to the battles of materiel, but in miniature.  












Chapter I:  Shattering and Remaking the Field army: 1914 and the shock of Mass Killing

German commanders liked their wars ‘short and lively’, if for no other reason than a parallel tradition of picking fights with their larger neighbours.​[81]​  Their trump was the qualitative superiority of their soldiers and their own willingness to take long chances in order to fight decisive battles.  Consequently,  soldiers trained to fight and die in such armies were taught to prize physical toughness, quick decision-making, mastery of their personal weapons, and a ‘wild drive’ to advance, albeit through a considered use of terrain and supporting arms to minimise losses.​[82]​  Still, in the tradition of the Kingdom of Prussia as well as that of the German Empire of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, short and lively wars would often entail high losses.  The length of the war itself, it was seen, would mitigate the general decline in the army’s quality over the course of the fighting, with victory achieved before new definitions of what was and was not possible for the troops pushed to the fore.  Somewhat paradoxically, the emphasis on a high overall quality of soldier also meant that the army could not afford dramatic expansion in pursuit of cherished military necessity without redefining itself, quite literally, from the ground up.  Such a redefinition began with the army’s expectations of individual soldiers, as well as a shifting weight of emphasis away from material factors, and towards the physical and psychological potential of the individual.  It was the shift from mobile to positional war which began this shift in emphasis.
	It is with the army as a whole that this chapter is most concerned.  First with the gradual resolution of a pre-war debate over whether a soldiers’ most important qualities were his willingness to die, or the combination of his willingness to risk his life and his skill.  The chapter then shifts to combat during the war of movement, where the Active army won huge gains and displayed incredible effectiveness even as it melted away under the effects of modern fire-power.   Consequently, replacement of losses among officers and men constitutes the next section of the chapter, culminating in the Battle of Langemarck, where new units built under wartime conditions were thrown away, demonstrating that motivation alone was insufficient on a modern battlefield.  An excursus on German atrocities ends the chapter, supporting the case that military expediency played a greater role in the murder of civilians than longstanding cultural biases.  In its overall aim, this chapter’s purpose is threefold, to introduce the importance of specialisation in shaping the army’s responses to mass killing, establish the importance of the Active army’s performance in shaping the thinking of military elites concerning the correct qualities of a soldier. 
And finally, to establish soldiers’ roles in determining army tactics on their own and with criteria that were not entirely aligned with their General’s thinking.  Popular accounts published in the ‘Battles of the World War’ series told German audiences of the heroic acts of self-sacrifice of the ‘Warriors of the Argonne’, where the Great War first became a trench war, or a ‘positional war’ [Stellungskrieg] to the Germans.​[83]​ Among rolling, forested hills and shattered trees, the spade and the grenade made their entrance even as elsewhere the rifle, the machine gun and field artillery dominated the fighting of August and September 1914.  Beginning with Helmuth Gruß, the fighting in the Argonne and the Vosges Mountains became the place credited by military historians with initiating new tactical forms and new modes of organisation.​[84]​  Such innovations were the roots of the future ‘storm troop’ programme, but at the heart of the innovation process was the immediate need for soldiers to better their chances.  However realistic the training or how assiduously reasoned their pre-war doctrines were, they could not protect soldiers against modern fire-power.  It was up to conscripts and veterans to help re-write the books.
Beginning in mid-August 1914, positional war spread from Alsace-Lorraine, through the Vosges and Argonne and down the line of the German invasion,  arriving at the English Channel with the 1st Battle of Ypres (19 October-22 November 1914).  Reading the ‘Battle Calendar of the German Army’, one finds continuous combat from August and September, before giving way to weeks and eventually months of ‘Stellungskrieg.’ With the shift in war’s practices, the localised innovations which had sought to make war as fought in the Argonne survivable again were now universally applicable in the West.  However, the army in the field in January 1915 was significantly larger than it was in August and utterly changed in composition. Approximately 2.15 million soldiers from the Active and Reserve armies with a minimum of 10 months in service by August, 1914 took part in the invasion of Belgium and France.​[85]​ In six weeks approximately one-fifth of them were dead, missing, prisoners or medically discharged.  
Shocking death tolls, particularly among junior commissioned officers stunned every organ stacked atop of the military establishment; the Oberste Heeresleitung  (OHL, Army Supreme Command), the Prussian War Ministry, and the Großes Hauptquartier, or Imperial Headquarters.​[86]​  As frontline soldiers refashioned the manner in which the army made war, these organs scrambled to shore up the army’s  structure, one among many in time of ‘wild improvisations’ as Denis Showalter has observed, in a ‘dialectic between mass and method.’​[87]​  Their focus was first on filling the gaps in the ranks, then re-establishing faith in the army’s qualitative edge.  Frontline units took advantage where possible of these improvisations to do their own housekeeping; they could not control the quality of their replacements, but they did have a say when it came to the quality and assignments of various officers. 
So in the approximately four months between the war’s outbreak and the Christmas Truce, the German army’s composition reflected a mingling of three cohorts: the standing army and such reserve divisions that were mobilized to fill out the Schlieffen Plan; remobilized reservists and war volunteers organized into additional ‘Reserve corps’ following the outbreak of hostilities; and finally the massive influx of reservists and conscripts who arrived late in 1914, driving army numbers to all-time highs in spite of horrendous casualties in the War of Movement.  Such variations in quality of recruits, length and quality of training, calibre of leadership and a new mode of warfare demanded a reconstruction of what the army could ask of its soldiers.  In effect, the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the shift from the war of movement to positional war redefined by force the army’s notions of what was possible and impossible for the German soldier, and with it, the army’s processes for shaping soldiers’ expectations of combat.  In this way, this chapter serves to set the stage for those following, by laying out key themes, and concluding with an excursus on the German atrocities in Belgium based on new witness accounts.
The section immediate following will briefly recount the basic debate of German tactical thought from the Franco-Prussian War until August, 1914.  This debate revolved around two camps; first the ‘heroic vitalism’ school - those who believed that morale, shock and self-sacrifice was the single most important factor in combat- and second the ‘fire-and-movement’ school, those who argued instead for skill.  Major doctrinal publications from the period, the Drill Regulations of 1888 and 1906 reflected the shifting fortunes of the two sides, but from a contemporary view there is nothing progressive on the evolution of German tactical thought. On one side were the advocates of ‘fire-and-movement’, following the example of Sigismund von Schlichtling, the prime mover behind the 1888 drill regulations.  On the other side were the advocates of ‘heroic vitalism’ and the primacy of morale.​[88]​ Their thought is typified by cavalry General Moritz von Bissing, who advocated (in 1895) the massing of 10,000 cavalrymen in solid body and unleashing them in a single charge.​[89]​  
Subsequent analysis has identified diverging influence on tactics and doctrine not to mention the strategic balance of power, while the Second Industrial Revolution exerted a growing but uncertain influence over war’s practice.​[90]​ Later historians, namely Robert Samuels, Bruce Gudmundsson and Terrence Zuber, disagree on which drill regulations were more forward thinking, those of 1888 or 1906, but what remains certain is that these debates over tactics were ongoing when the war began.​[91]​ Robert Citino has argued that the proper relationship between attack and defence was not resolved until Hans von Seeckt’s Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen was published in 1921.​[92]​  Most recently, the 1888 regulations have been described as ‘revolutionary’ by Terrence Zuber for developing the idea of ‘fire superiority’ and establishing it as the central idea of infantry tactics.​[93]​  Bruce Gudmundsson took the precise opposite view of this position, citing the 1888 regulations as the incarnation of ‘the continuing belief in close-order tactics’, while noting the introduction of the concept of ‘fire superiority.’​[94]​  By examining discussions of related doctrinal materials regarding combat skills, namely the Bayonet Manual of 1907 and the Shooting Manual of 1907, as well as the appendices [Beihefte] to the Militär-Wochenblatt, it will be argued that from 1908 until the outbreak of the war, the fire-and-movement school had regained primacy over those extolling ‘heroic vitalism’ and its attendant ‘cult of the offensive.’

Planning and Preparing for War, 1871-1914
Joanna Bourke identifies an essential ‘military psychology’ in which rage, hate and blood-lust are counter to good discipline; a soldier should only be conscious of a kill-or-be-killed dichotomy.  Armies strive to remove the emotional component from the killing act, and place men in the position to execute their orders uncoloured by uncontrolled outbursts of feeling.​[95]​ While true in Anglophone studies of war and training for war, in Germany this was not the case.  Killing was taken for granted in official publications; a by-product of combat where collective action mattered most, a part of soldiers’ occupation no more or less arduous than the other physical challenges the battlefield might pose.  This formulation was fundamentally derived from Clausewitz, who as Hans Rothfels noted, was interested in the killing of individuals only so far the killing aided in sapping the courage of enemy soldiers and the will of enemy commanders.​[96]​
Soldiers of the 1914 Active army were plying a trade, just as able to deliver volleys of bullets at a group of enemies two kilometres away as they were to shoot individuals at 100m. Use of rifle and bayonet were essential skills, but as part of a larger complex of technical ability and inculcated values grounded in making individual soldiers more efficient at their tasks.  Underpinning the system was a trust in soldiers’ individual capacity manage the physical and psychological stresses of the battlefield.  Building that capacity required months if not years of repetitive training, in order to produce an average standard of field craft, physical fitness, marksmanship and initiative.  Events proved this high standard both incredibly effective on the tactical level, and utterly unsustainable in the face of sustained attrition.
Paradoxically, German army officers debated the issues faced in 1914 years  prior to the outbreak of the war, with great vigour after the Second Boer War (1899-1902), and particularly after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).  In particular, Japan’s army became a sort of touchstone for German tacticians in the years prior to the war as recently brought to light by Terrence Zuber.​[97]​ Special reference was given to how Japanese units attacked increasingly sophisticated Russian fortifications.​[98]​  Indeed, Japanese tactics provided a trove of evidence for German advocates of skill and fire-power, specifically Col. Breitkopf, Chief of the Royal Bavarian Military Musketry School.  In this case, Breitkopf utilized the example of the Nambu Brigade to clarify opaque passages in the German army’s 1906 Drill Regulations.​[99]​  Such clarification was necessary, given the conflicted nature of the manual and the Militär-Wochenblatt’s target audience.  Contributions of serving officers at the regimental level or lower were welcomed, as well as those of retired officers of any rank, on a wide range of subjects.  But most importantly, officers at the regimental and lower debated the tactical issues of the day, most often the growing frequency infantry assaults on field fortifications, the complexity of such attacks and their attendant risks. 
Still, the historiographical narrative maintains that from 1871 to 1908, the overall trajectory of German military thought shifted from Moltke the Elder’s pragmatism to his nephew’s embrace of the pure offensive.​[100]​  Tactics, the means by which battles were fought and therefore by which soldiers practices of violence were organised, wrestled with the same problem identified by Helmuth von Moltke in 1862; that tactical firepower could now annihilate infantry units.​[101]​  Hidden between the lines was the supposition that the will to advance against the enemy regardless of cost was now a liability, unless it was carefully embedded in a technical and tactical framework.  Certainly Germany possessed and sustained a level of cultural militarism that cut across civilian political divides, suppressing both the reality of war and shaping public memory towards war as a romantic masculine exercise, but largely without political weight.​[102]​  Perhaps Moltke’s case was overstated, but his conclusion was sound; if mobilised nations were the basis of future wars, then deterrence offered the best chance of avoiding mass slaughter and distortion of the political order.​[103]​  Such reasoning was sound so long as no potential enemy wanted to fight, an issue recently cast into doubt by Sean McMeekin.​[104]​  In the mean time the army sought all possible advantages in line with the goal of qualitative superiority. 
It therefore followed that infantry’s ability to manoeuvre without the aid of heavy cannon or machine guns was drastically curtailed, and infantry’s ability to manoeuvre and attack without sacrificing itself to enemy firepower was in danger, if not gone already.​[105]​ Germany was not alone in this diagnosis of contemporary warfare, as military establishments across Europe wrestled with questions of training, equipment, and the utilization of personal weapons.​[106]​  Within Germany a hyper-conservative status quo took hold immediately following the Franco-Prussian War.  Under this paradigm, attacking units advanced with maybe an arm’s reach between soldiers combining the advance and assault in a single, continuous movement towards the enemy.  However the Drill Regulations of 1888 provided a radical departure as advocates of fire-superiority claimed the ascendancy, dividing the advance and assault into distinct elements linked with local circumstances like terrain, or the strength of enemy resistance, and the attacker possessing fire-superiority.   Finally, a conservative back-swing towards thick lines and closed columns took hold after the Boer War.​[107]​   At issue were two contending schools of thought that agreed combat ended in an assault, in which the enemy would either flee or be destroyed in hand-to-hand combat.  Where they diverged was in their conceptualizations of how troops closed with the enemy, and therefore whether attacks were dependent primarily on the skill and weaponry of troops, or their collective willingness to die.  
The 1906 Drill regulations split this difference, providing ample justification for an officer favouring either approach.  The central issue though was one of trust; whether enlisted men needed to be led (and if needs be, driven) forward, or given a task and a timeframe and left to fill in the details according to their training. Furthermore, as Bruce Gudmundsson notes, it represented the conflicts within German tactical thought, which still struggled with the question of control vs. loss avoidance.​[108]​  As soldiers could only be led by officers and therefore had to be able to hear their voices, it was necessary to keep a unit no further than 50 meters from an officer at any time, which demanded regular formations and uniform movement.​[109]​  Survival hinged in one camp on officers’ control buttressing soldiers’ morale, which produced less shirking and therefore stronger units. Stronger units, the logic went, closed relentlessly with the enemy, broke his lines and will and won battles. And the more battles won, the shorter the war and the smaller the losses. On the other hand, opponents held that better soldiers with greater skills were capable of fighting more effectively and with minimal officer direction, improving casualty ratios and thereby reducing losses by killing or incapacitating more of the enemy, faster. Skirmish lines and company columns were the most common formations discussed in the 1906 Regulations.  This is remarkable because the two forms are so at odds, indeed proving the ‘compromise’ nature of the regulations regarding ‘fire-and-movement’ vs. heroic vitalism.   
Simply put, soldiers were trusted to continue fighting without direction and as individuals if needs be.  Those in skirmish lines were told to stoop or duck, and to drop out of formation if doing so exposed them to greater danger.​[110]​  If going forward meant becoming a casualty, soldiers could drop out of an attack, on the assumption that they rejoined when it was safe to do so. Should the skirmish line become separated from its officers, or the officers become casualties, soldiers were trusted to continue their mission on their own and to take an active role in the fighting.​[111]​  In essence, officers’ battlefield role was to direct the high levels of skill and motivation already present in their men towards the most beneficial goals.  Therefore the army required officers with the ability to identify and seize opportunities on the battlefield through instant action, particularly when fighting a superior enemy.​[112]​
Attendant to the act of skirmishing were the soldierly qualities of self-reliance, boldness and sound judgment, to be ’extolled and reinforced’ during training.​[113]​  Obedience is strangely absent, but given how much faith was placed in common soldiers of the peacetime army it is not surprising. Furthermore, the Drill Regulations state that soldiers must learn to entrench quickly, to overcome physical obstacles with ease, utilize all cover, by ’stopping and creeping’ if so compelled.​[114]​  Soldiers were free to engage enemy targets at will, with volley fire being reserved at the commander’s discretion.  
	Such latitude is completely at odds with the company column, where the integrity of the formation is paramount over the lives of its members.  Since the sight of massed soldiers and the impact of the their bodies and bayonets were required to physically break the enemy’s line or frighten him into running, the front rank of a company column demanded solidity.  Replacements were therefore drawn from the following ranks as the formation went forward and those in the lead were shot down. Column advocates were not completely callous or insane, as they could point to recent statistics from the Russo-Japanese war which told that 20,000 bullets were fired on average to produce a single casualty.​[115]​ However, a direct rebuke to their methods came from von Schlieffen himself, as he noted in a published critique of field exercises in 1904,

In every age there have been prophets who would oppose the firing line with masses, the bullet with the bayonet…A few weeks ago, a massed Russian rifle regiment was shot down by encircling Japanese troops.  Nevertheless, one commander wanted to commit a closed-up mass of 32 battalions against the concentrated fire of enemy batteries and infantry.​[116]​

Such opinions exhibited a growing influence after the Russo-Japanese War. As Michael Howard observes, German officers believed that only loose lines or clouds of skirmishers [Schützenschwarm] would be able to go forward, and that the bayonet ‘would only gather up the harvest reaped by the rifle and the gun.’​[117]​  T
Furthermore,  manuals for weapon handling supplied in 1907 and 1908 that point towards a primacy of the ‘fire-and-movement’ school of thought, and therefore a de facto resolution of the debate before 1914. The Bayonet Regulations of 1907 were intended to guide and enhance physical and mental qualities emphasized in the 1908 Field Service Regulations for developing soldiers’ confidence.  They stated in simple terms, ‘Through the bayonet, the infantryman should win trust in his own strength and certainty in the use of bladed weapons in close combat.  The bayonet is the most integral means to strengthen the men’s moral qualities, and to cultivate their energy, quick decision making and courage towards a spirited advance.’ ​[118]​  These goals were reiterated by the Saxon War Ministry, which at the same time admonished the regulations as placing too little emphasis on proper technique.​[119]​  Instead, bayonet training was situated in a continuum of locating the enemy, initiating a gunfight, then achieving a position from which to launch an attack. The regulations expounded,

All efforts must be directed towards defeating the enemy as quickly as possible. He [the German soldier] has to be convinced that the surest guarantee of victory lies in attacking; not perhaps in a blind rush but deliberately, observing the demeanour of the enemy and perceiving every advantage in going forward.  Skill and agility will help to provide success against a strong opponent’.​[120]​

Going forward against the enemy also had widely-understood consequences if the wrong mode of advance was chosen, not to mention if it were undertaken at the wrong time. Consequences were made very clear in the Shooting Manual of 1907 [Schieβvorschrift für die Infanterie]. Units of soldiers in shoulder-to-shoulder order, or in successive minimally spaced skirmish lines such as were found in the German’s own company columns, would suffer heavy losses at ranges in excess of 800m to rifle fire alone; at ranges shorter than this they could expect ‘annihilation.’​[121]​ Soldiers’ individual marksmanship included regularly striking man-sized targets out to 400m.  Platoons trained to hit area targets at ranges of 700m or longer.​[122]​ Assuming that their enemy would be able to do the same, movement in small units towards a common goal at their own pace and direction was critical, and left far less room for shirking than the simultaneous advance of 240 or more individuals.  In fact, ‘shirking’ was per 1906 Drill Regulations, possible at the soldiers’ discretion assuming certain conditions were met.
Based on well-known technical specifications of the army’s service rifle, the manner in which soldiers engaged the enemy varied dramatically and hinged on collective action against groups of targets. Platoons were equipped with a pair of range-finders operated by specially trained men who steadily refined their ranging estimates, allowing soldiers to set the sights on their rifles with increasing precision as the battle went on.​[123]​  Volleys aided in spotting the impact of bullets.  Once a locus of bullet impacts occurred on and immediate to an enemy position, officers and NCOs made sure that all soldiers’ rifle sights were set to the correct distance.  Machine guns’ heavy tripods, telescopic sights and various mechanisms for holding the barrels in place added enormous volume and accuracy to the fire of riflemen. The enemy was to be kept under fire at all times otherwise he would be able to conduct a defensive battle akin to a round of target practice on advancing German troops. Moving forward against resistance was not a matter of willingness to bear casualties alone, but fire and movement conducted by small units.​[124]​ It was in delivering fire at ranges in excess of 400m that German troops excelled, but obviously they were often called upon to fight at shorter ranges or in rough terrain.  
The various components of battle produced a chronology for battle by creating a sequence of actions.  Locating the enemy, shooting at the enemy, winning fire superiority, moving from cover to cover, reaching a position to launch an assault, and the assault itself were the essential steps of this routine.  Through them, pre-war training laid out an image of combat around which soldiers could mould their expectations.  Men were taught to respond instinctively inside a carefully maintained environment which was bounded on three sides by officers, NCOs and the formations adopted.  Formation defined the physical space within which soldiers could conform to the rules they had learned and also exercise some measure of action for self-preservation.  The fourth side of this problem was held by their opponents, who were defeated by a combination of discipline, fire, movement and, if needs required, close combat.  Combat, as the most uncertain element of this experience, was envisioned as fire against an abstract body from distances where individuals were not identifiable.  Such actions may be better described as ‘destruction’ rather than ‘killing.’  Close combat provided the most uncertainty but was promised to be short and decisive.  In the small, sudden battles that took place regularly along the path of advance taken by the Schlieffen Plan’s ‘Right Wing’ during the summer and fall of 1914, these perceptions were largely vindicated.
Furthermore, training and drill offered another way for soldiers to manage the experience of combat, namely its fear.  By fusing the most dangerous act of combat with the conclusion of combat and therefore freedom from danger, safety and victory were linked in what the French General Bourbaki first described as ‘escape by advance’.​[125]​  But fusing them together require a successful combat.  Soldiers were free to take heart from their hours of practice and acquired physical fitness, which improved their and by extension everyone’s chances.  The regulations expounded, ‘All efforts must be directed towards defeating the adversary as quickly as possible. He [the German soldier] has to be convinced that the surest guarantee of victory lies in attacking; not perhaps in a blind rush but deliberate, observing the demeanour of the enemy and perceiving every advantage in going forward.  Skill and agility will help to provide success against a strong opponent.’​[126]​ Through the processes of learning various skills instructors attempted to manage soldier’s calculations of risk, so making risk management a collective endeavour with individual components.  In a continuum of locating the enemy, initiating a gunfight, then achieving a position from which to launch an attack, it was the actual coming to grips which trainers sought to make the easiest.  
Some background is necessary to establish the basic structure of Imperial Germany’s peacetime military instruction. German conscript classes were mustered every October and undertook basic training lasting between from eight to 16 weeks, with the amount of time decided by the local regiment.​[127]​  They were then instructed in local and imperial history among other subjects, and undertook a training regime based on marksmanship, formal drill, individual drill and gymnastics. Exercises in small units followed, and after ten months of such instruction recruits took part in the ‘Fall Manoeuvres’ [Herbstübungen] lasting from August to September.​[128]​  After the first three months of training, a formal observation was held in which members of the recruit class were tested on their basic skills by the regimental commander.  This test emphasized individual’s use of terrain, his ability to estimate ranges, and to engage various types of moving or stationary targets utilising his own range estimates.​[129]​  Such an examination measured his ability to act as part of company which, having started a firefight at around 700m from the enemy, moved forward in a ‘skirmisher cloud’ with its squads alternating firing and moving from cover to cover.​[130]​  
Fire-and-movement had won outMovement from cover to cover was referred to as an ‘advance in bounds’ [sprungweise], with the amount of fire received dictating the length of each bound. These were the tactics practiced by the Active army.  If the enemy’s fire grew, units decreased the number of soldiers moving to maximise the number shooting, even it meant moving one soldier at a time.  Artillerymen were expected to coordinate with the infantry, by bombarding fortifications both before and during an attack pushing their guns forward by hand alongside the assaulting infantry if required.  Infantry and artillery cooperated so as to put as much fire onto the enemy as possible and in so doing, permit the infantry to manoeuvre and attack even strong field fortifications, assuming small unit leaders moved their troops carefully and had accurate information on their enemy’s strength and deployments.  Fire scared the enemy into not shooting, shooting wildly or withdrawing, while killing and injuring enemy soldiers and destroying their cover or fortifications.  In essence, the more one shot, the safer one was.
Still, the pre-revision consensus seems to be reflected in Holger Herwig’s statement that the company column, with its precisely laid out ranks and files and perhaps just more than the span of an arm between soldiers remained the standard offensive formation of the army.​[131]​  Contemporary observers also weighed in German tactics during the 1911 Kaiser Manoeuvres, as Herwig has discovered.  The German army, a correspondent of The Times wrote, had ‘trained itself stale,’ quashing individual initiative and innovative thinking in order to coddle the present officer class within a martial spectacle.​[132]​  Such opinions evinced, as David Hermann argued, the subjective standards used by European powers to gauge threats, namely appearance, recent performance, and racialised ideas of ‘national character.’​[133]​ However, it now seems that Imperial Germany was not far off the mark in building the perfect army to win a war lasting six or seven weeks, in line with a pragmatic decision to embrace offensive strategies.​[134]​
The purpose of such an obviously offensive force was to execute Schlieffen’s plan, as adapted and modified by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, as Annika Mombauer has argued.​[135]​  Moltke, following Schlieffen as Chief of the General Staff, changed his predecessor’s preparations in light of new strategic realities, namely the growing power of Russia and France’s offensive intentions.  The results were stronger forces left Germany’s east and southwest to parry Franco-Russian offensives, and a shortening of the ‘Right Wing’ to preserve the Netherlands as a trade route.  However it was still Germany’s intention to crush France as quickly as possible and with a single offensive.  The key dates were known as ‘M+39’ and ‘M+40’, 39 or 40 days after mobilisation when France must be defeated and the armies sent east.  Otherwise, Russia would deploy overwhelming force against Prussia and Silesia.

Combat from the ‘War of movement’ to Christmas 1914

Which tactics predominated in the war’s opening weeks have been the subject of some revision.​[136]​  The emerging picture is largely devoid of the massed charges, anachronistic formations and senseless self-sacrifice which permeated earlier accounts. But an investigation of the same sources reveals that anachronistic touches (drummers, buglers, flags) often accompanied sound tactics.​[137]​  Such spectacular, frenzied self-sacrifice was the perfect military complement to the old myth of an ‘August Experience’, itself the transcendant nationalist expression of militarised imperial societies to prolonged crisis. But mass popular enthusiasm and war fever has lost its hold over the historiography of Germany’s ‘August Experience.’​[138]​ The story used to be that as peoples rallied to national causes in an instant of total devotion, so too did soldiers in standing armies.  Fuelled by the ‘Cult of the Offensive’ and its single-minded emphasis on the power of morale and the spirit of self-sacrifice, the standing armies of Germany and France hurled themselves into the fire of modern weaponry, determined to come to grips.​[139]​  Any progress made by Germany during the ‘Schlieffen Offensive’ as it conquered Belgium and France’s northern departments is therefore attributable to numbers and fanaticism.  As interpretations of the response of societies to the outbreak of war have changed, so with it views on how the war of movement was fought.  By and large the German army’s preparation proved correct, manifesting a high level of technical ability and morale in its soldiers.    
Since combat was held as fundamentally chaotic, the leader on the spot was expected to produce the best possible outcome in light of his commander’s intentions, his own judgement and available resources. This concept was known as Auftragstaktik, or ‘delegated tactical control’.’​[140]​  In light of these factors, the army valued decisiveness in its leaders, and commands given as generalised directives guided by a few well-understood concepts. On the offensive, officers should seek out the weakest part of the enemy position and if that could not be located, the ends of the enemy line.  The former reflected an individual’s evaluation of events, the latter a general principle with simple reasoning, built on the idea that the enemy’s weakest point is matched by the deployment of the strongest possible forces. The first step in pitting strength against weakness was almost always to deliver as much fire on the enemy as possible as fast as possible.  
So, time after time from August to September, in meeting engagements during the battles of the Frontiers, the Germans attacked successfully for minimal losses. In deliberate attacks such as occurred on the Mons, where for instance, six German battalions from three regiments of the Active army suffered an average of 14 percent casualties while inflicting about twice many casualties (845) on their opponents.​[141]​  On 22 August, German Infantry Regiment 157 wiped out the 1st Colonial Infantry regiment, reportedly the single best regiment in the French army in a day of attacks and firefights.  The cost was 23 officers and 163 enlisted men killed or dead of wounds, and 379 wounded.  Infantry regiment 51, also engaged and also successful, lost 10 officers and 257 men killed and 10 officers and 356 men wounded.​[142]​  For comparison, a German infantry regiment contained about 3,000 soldiers.  In simplest terms, to keep the Schlieffen Plan on track meant seizing roads, which meant seizing the villages athwart them, the woods near them, and the hills and ridges which overlooked them.
Combat in villages, forests, and hills were constant features of the war of movement.​[143]​  Given the ubiquitous nature of such terrain and the placement of towns on major roads, it is obvious to see why. Fritz Gries, who fought during the war of movement, recounted such an episode in his diary.  The setting were the hills and woodlands around the town of St. André, around which his unit, Infantry Regiment 98 fought from 6-10 September 1914. Parsing the technical language Gries used to recount the battle is its own problem, as he described the French moving forward in ‘dicke Schwarmenlinien.’  In other words, French soldiers crossed the battlefield in clumps of 10-15 men arrayed side by side in rough lines, the lines following each other closely and indicating that the French wished to move quickly cross-country but expected to be shot at. German firing commenced at a range of 1.6km and the French ‘vanish, like they had fallen off the face of the earth.’​[144]​ At such ranges, casualties were likely, but it is more probable that French troops quickly realised they were under fire and went to ground.  Bright red trousers and well-polished mess gear occasionally ‘flashed’, giving Gries the impression that French were attempting to crawl to safety.  In another instance, German machine guns fired at a French marching column from a range of 500m.  French troops shot back with great speed and accuracy, then attempted to assault the machine guns.  Making excellent use of terrain, they came so close to the guns that the machine gun crewmen shot at them with pistols.  French troops could not close with guns though, and after sustaining heavy losses, withdrew.​[145]​
Further examples from the experience of IR 180 are illustrative for the light they shed on the lethality of combat.  For instance, on 21 August, Infantry Regiment 180 was tasked with ‘cleansing’ a wood near Rothau on the German-French border.​[146]​  The unit did not attack immediately, taking extra time to bring up artillery and correct poor reconnaissance of the area, measures straight from the 1906 Drill Regulations.​[147]​  IR 180 attacked the next day.  French troops were strongly entrenched, their positions taken only after ‘bitter close combat’ and any who were not ‘finished off’ or taken prisoner fled over open ground, where they were shelled by German field guns for as long as they were in range.  The day of fighting cost the regiment the lives of one of three battalion commanders, three of ten company commanders and five lieutenants.  84 NCOs and enlisted men were also killed or died of wounds.  One battalion commander and a lieutenant were severely wounded, along with 178 NCOs and enlisted men.  In other words, one day’s fighting killed or wounded about ten percent of the regiment’s officers and about eight percent of its enlisted men.  ‘Numerous’ French dead were recorded, alongside one battalion commander, three captains and 250 other ranks made prisoner.  Two days later, IR 180 fought in the hills around the town of Salzern, where French troops made excellent use of heights to engage the Germans from multiple directions with artillery and gunfire.  IR 180’s attacks failed, losing two company commanders, one lieutenant and a battalion second-in-command killed, alongside 57 NCOs and men killed and 254 wounded.​[148]​  By 30 August, both sides were digging in feverishly, in order to shelter from artillery and maintain access to food and supplies.
It is worth noting that the proportion of casualties lost as ‘killed’ was much higher in a successful assault, while the overall number of casualties was much higher in a failed assault.  Furthermore, both the proportion and overall number of officers killed in a successful assault is striking, and a feature of combat in the war’s opening months that soon came to the attention of the Prussian War Ministry and OHL.  The 1906 Drill Regulations had laid out an officer’s responsibilities, namely that they were the first to move and the first to expose themselves to danger, while the army’s initial experiences had demonstrated great effectiveness, purchased it seems by sound doctrine and training but also with unsustainable losses among unit commanders.  As so very few of the peacetime army’s officers lived for very long, reflections from long after the fact must assume a key role in illuminating officer’s conduct in the view of explaining their losses.
Erwin Rommel was a platoon leader in the 7th Company, IR 124.  He compiled his First World War experience in the form of a textbook for young officers published in 1937 with a decidedly nationalistic slant: to demonstrate the offensive power of German infantry against enemies superior in resources.​[149]​  War for Rommel was therefore a matter of will, in which the small-unit leader kept a cool head and exercised clear judgment, apparently by isolating his judgement from hunger, fatigue or stress.  For Rommel, the officer’s roles were those of inspirational leader and meticulous risk-assessor on behalf of his unit that junior officers were compelled to drive themselves ruthlessly, in Rommel’s case to complete physical exhaustion ending in a collapse into unconsciousness.​[150]​  However, despite this strong theme of battle as an experience to be mastered through a soldier’s mastery of himself, Rommel stated ‘our recent experiences indicated but one way of keeping casualties down - the deep trench.  Company sectors were assigned, and the company commanders - three of them young lieutenants-were impressed with the vital necessity of seeing that the men dug regardless of fatigue.’​[151]​  This is not to say that troops, lacking central direction, had not taken matters of reform into their own hands, an impulse which comes through in Rommel’s testimony.  Local reform for self-preservation began in late 1914 and early 1915; in this instance, directing the army’s doctrine of continuous action away from unlimited advance and towards preservation of force.​[152]​ 
The problem was not that the Field and Reserve armies taking the field in the summer of 1914 were poorly or improperly trained, but that Schlieffen’s timetable demanded constant forward progress, and therefore, battle after battle.  War volunteer Heinrich Kox wrote home in a card ultimately published in the Viersener Zeitung, stating, ‘Since 19 October we have fought continuously.  At present we’ve made six assaults.  We were always successful.  Many comrades with whom I was quite close, are dead.  Of our company there are 40 men left at most.’​[153]​ According to the reckoning of the Sanitätsbericht, the German armies on the Western front (1st Army -7th Army) matched the frenetic fighting done by their component units.​[154]​  Beginning in the second week of August and extending to the first week in October, no army spent fewer than ten days in battle, some spending as many as 43.​[155]​  Only after the battle of the Marne (5-12 September 1914) did the front stabilise, with positional war set in firmly by the second week in October.  Positional war continued almost without pause until the turn of the year and casualty rates plummeted as a consequence.​[156]​
Writing after the war, Major General Wilhelm Balck, a prominent pre-war analyst of tactics also decorated for his service in the Great War, characterised fighting in the war of movement on the following lines. Balck contends that while German infantry desired fire superiority, they did not require it to attempt an assault.​[157]​  German infantry instead let local circumstances determine whether they would attempt an assault or not.  Infantry’s rifle fire, combined with the ‘skirmisher cloud’ [Schützenschwarm], were sufficient to defeat French troops, who would withdraw once the Germans closed to within 500m.​[158]​ Upon leaving their positions French troops became excellent targets for German artillery, which according to German statistics, was responsible for 76 per cent of the wounds inflicted by the Germans on the French during the war.​[159]​  French soldiers, seeking to avoid increasingly accurate German fire and the prospect of a hand-to-hand fight, made themselves easy targets for ‘pursuit by fire’.  Though well-known for the élan before the war, practical experience taught the Germans that French soldiers’ true aptitude.  This was their ability to skilfully use terrain on the defensive, and for being the first to construct extensive defensive works incorporating both camouflage and dummy positions.​[160]​

Casualties in the West, August 1914-January 1915
As with every other combatant nation, the early months of the war produced casualties that played havoc on the internal structure of the German army.  Moreover, the absence of a quick decision, the losses sustained and territory conquered demanded a vast recruiting effort to replace the dead and increase army size. The four months from war’s beginning until the start of 1915 yielded 8,733 fatalities among officers from all causes and a sum of 258,667 fatalities from officers and enlisted men covering all army branches.​[161]​  Michael Geyer has demonstrated that the War of movement was the most lethal period of the Great War, where 634 out of every thousand German soldiers were killed, wounded, went missing, or were wounded or became severely ill.​[162]​ In all, from the beginning of the War through to the beginning of 1915, the Field army also suffered 1,252,862 wounded, of whom 912,965 returned to duty while an additional 40,364 survived but were rendered unfit for further service.​[163]​   Therefore, from an initial invasion force of 2.15 million men, about 299,000 were killed or permanently incapacitated in five months.  Yet during this time the average strength of the Active army rose from 1.32 million to 2.01 million.  The average strength of the reserve or ‘Besatzungs’ army increased from 1.39 to 1.79 million.​[164]​
A deeper look into the numbers demonstrates the amount of tactical leadership and practical experience sacrificed during the opening phase of the war. By comparing the totals from 1914-1915 with the sum losses for the entire war, 16.1 per cent of Officers and 13.1 per cent of NCOs and common soldiers of the Imperial German army who were killed or died in Great War died between 1 August and the ‘Christmas Truce.’  Furthermore, the same period contains 23.1 per cent of the total number of officers and enlisted men who were wounded and survived to either return to duty, or to be discharged.​[165]​ 
As Michael Geyer has demonstrated, these casualty rates were not without historical precedent, as they neatly reflected casualty returns from the Franco-Prussian War.  However, in raw numbers and the toll taken among small unit leaders, they were unequalled in the history of the German army to that point.   Disproportionately high losses among officers were expected, as they led from the front and by example.  However, it is clear from the communications of the Prussian War Ministry, the Imperial Headquarters, and the Army High Command that officer casualties were viewed as utterly appalling. The collective response of the three organs was a wave of improvisations and shortcuts which rippled through the army, influencing particularly the training of new soldiers and the formation of new units well into 1915. Indeed, the Western Front killed and maimed small unit leaders at a terrifying rate for the entire war, a reality that the German army sought to offset through the development of the ‘storm troop’ program and will be examined later. 
Furthermore, an examination of wound pathology demonstrates that infantrymen still did a substantial share of the killing in most armies. Artillery caused the majority of wounds at 50.9 percent with bullets at 42.9 percent.​[166]​   Bullets and shells caused 93.4 percent of fatalities in the German Army, splitting the sum at 39.1 percent and 54.7 percent of battlefield deaths respectively.​[167]​   Casualty returns from a wartime Prussian War Ministry survey concerned with wound pathology and casualty distribution, corresponds to these figures.​[168]​  Württemberg’s contribution to this survey diverges only slightly, showing 44 per cent of casualties from gunshots and 45 per cent from shellfire.​[169]​  However, these statistics yield only 80,296 killed, wounded and hospitalized for wounds out of a total of 271,652 casualties sustained by the Army of Württemberg during the war.​[170]​  More plainly, the Württemberg contingent had ‘only’ suffered 29.5 per cent of its wartime casualties by 31 January 1917.  These partial returns include an estimate of the range from which gunshot casualties were struck, but this was only discernible in about ten percent of cases.​[171]​  For comparison, according to the best available numbers, 39 percent of British casualties from throughout the war came from gunshots, while an astonishing 76 per cent of French losses came from artillery fire from 1914-1917, dropping to 58 per cent in 1918.​[172]​  German soldiers fell about equal numbers to rifles and artillery, not quite two Britons were killed by artillery for every one killed by bullets, while French soldiers were killed by artillery at almost 5 to 1. On the German side, edged weapons caused six per cent of losses in the span of August 1914 to July 1915.​[173]​  It is worth noting that British figures are from a sample of about 213,000 cases, rather than a systematic study, included casualties from grenades in with shellfire, and noted that 0.32 per cent of BEF casualties came from bayonets. 
These losses fell on a meticulously selected and prepared cohort, the peacetime-trained active army and reserve armies, and were singularly heavy amongst the officer corps.  Such casualties posed a clear threat to the perceived efficiency, discipline and character of the army and its soldiers. Artillery fire-power in general and French heavy artillery in specific were the primary motivation for new forms of attack. Subsequently the first ‘assault squads’ were formed in the autumn of 1914 by German troops fighting in the Vosges.​[174]​ In the same place that winter, the Guard Rifle Battalion succeeded in taking a salient held by French troops by advancing in squads to the sides of the position and attacking towards the middle.  Their attack on 31 December 1914 succeeded where conventional assaults by two regiments had failed.​[175]​  Combat Engineer Lt. Walter Beumelberg introduced to the army the potency of the grenade and developed the idea of ‘rolling up’ a trench.​[176]​ ‘Rolling up’ [aufrollen] required on a small number of attackers with a large number of grenades; once inside a trench they walked down it throwing grenades without exposing themselves to gunfire or entering hand-to-hand combat.  
As frontline units developed new ways to attack, staff officers were devising new ways to defend against rapidly increasing firepower. In Lorraine, overwhelming French artillery converted mobile war to positional war as early as late August 1914.  Crown Prince Rupprecht’s response was to order his men to construct multiple trench lines, well-spaced and sparsely manned in the forward line with strong reserves for ‘hasty counterattacks.’​[177]​  Spacing ensured that a single barrage could not attack more than one trench line.  A sparsely manned forward line limited casualties from either a concentrated barrage or a strong attack.  The Crown Prince did well to acknowledge reality quickly.  As Dieter Storz discovered, Rupprecht’s chief of staff, Krafft von Dellmensingen remarked, ‘The eagerness to attack has declined alarmingly.’​[178]​ Military necessity dissolved the very things that German officers had taken for granted; high general levels of proficiency and motivation.  Already units were dividing themselves roughly between those who would go forward, and those who supported their advance.  In the Active army, one platoon or one squad was considered as good as the next in all things, but no longer.

Propagating the Active Army: Responses of the Imperial German Government

To maintain a system of military violence according to specific rules built to ensure specific ends required both direction and constant attention.  The chief sources of inefficiency are fear and a lack of skill, and the first line of defence against them was proper training and socialisation.  When that failed, a trustworthy cadre of Officers and NCOs were required to correct deviant behaviour.  To this requirement Imperial Germany added a need for absolute political reliability, an implicit trust to act on behalf of the monarchy upon which acceptance by the officer class rested.  Veteran NCOs of the highest grades contained enough of this trust to remove any ambivalence over their political sympathies.  Mass killing, employed and resisted but most importantly sustained, threatened the Army as a functional and political instrument.  As a response, any officer with a peacetime commission regardless of army service branch was sent to the front, excluding only the very worst.  Those officers were put in charge of tasks normally given to long service NCOs, or placed in charge of training volunteers and new conscripts.  In short, the demands of the front were a form of institutional cannibalism, as experienced teachers were rounded up as replacements or to form cadre for new units, and training billets became a dumping ground for sub-par small unit leaders.
Compromises and improvisations marked the initial manpower policy of the German army, but the goal of these moves was ultimately functionalist, rather than political.   In simplest terms, the borders of the Reich required additional security, particularly in those states whose mobilized troops were sent west.  Similarly, the gaps appearing - and in some cases yawning - in the officer and junior officer corps of the Schlieffen Plan armies required filling.  Practically speaking, those who were unqualified by the standards of the Army were about to elevated, while new battalions were to be formed outside of the carefully managed infrastructure enjoyed by serving units.  Even so, these improvisations were sufficient to see Germany through the first year of the war. So much was its focus on education and intangibles, that Dennis Showalter argued the Imperial German Army preferred an empty billet to a full one with an inadequate officer.​[179]​  This was not necessarily the case, as membership in the pre-war trained officer corps became the determining characteristic of officer competence and reliability.   
The roots of improvisation lay in the experience of forming units nearly from whole cloth.  This was undertaken almost immediately, with the 5th Army headquartered in Posen combing through the lists of officers to provide leadership for an expanded Border Patrol [Grenzschütz], and finding a shortfall of three Battalion commanders, 17 company commanders and 129 NCOs.​[180]​  The 5th Army’s administration went on to observe that, ‘... after raising the Battalions, the local population of Officers is exhausted, with the result that the number of officers in Replacement formations cannot be increased from here onwards.’​[181]​  The circumstances were shared by most of the German Empire’s eastern states which feared raids by Russian cavalry, Cossacks in particular, but in remedying these concerns they imperilled units counted on to win the war against France.  The almost immediate shortage of leaders was soon felt keenly in areas beyond the 5th Army Corps’ district.
	In a message delivered to all Army staffs at the beginning of September, the Chief of the Military Cabinet laid out a seven point memoranda concerning casualties, the state of the officer corps, and measures to be taken in order to ameliorate the present situation and rationalise officer assignments.​[182]​   All officers able to serve in the field were to be assigned to units in the field, and their places taken by convalescent officers or officers not yet qualified for field duty, while training was given over to staff sergeants and officers formerly available for field service.​[183]​  Surplus officers unfit for field service were to be given assignments below their ranks, notably as instructors for replacements, teachers at military academies, and adjutants for army administrative staffs.​[184]​  In short, the front had priority for every officer of competence, while the training system for replacements was given over to high quality NCOs and the lowest quality of officer.  
The same day, a second communication arrived from the Military Cabinet with precisely the same list of recipients.  This message stated that all ensigns who had seen action and performed well be promoted to Lieutenant while raising the possibility of establishing a rank of ‘Staff Sergeant-Lieutenant.’​[185]​  Whether this new chance for NCO advancement was only for Sergeants-Major already in the field or included those in the Reserve or Territorial Army is unclear.  However, the new rank provided Sergeants-Major a way to escape service under officers of doubtful ability, and an upwardly mobile one at that.  In this manner, replacements were deprived of quality instructors and access to enlisted men who were immensely knowledgeable in the practice of everyday life in uniform.   The old principles governing officer selection strained under the weight of losses, but through bureaucratic contortion they were maintained at least somewhat.  
That contortion was most evident after the failure of the German Empire’s invasion of France.  Following the dismissal of Moltke the Younger, the Kaiser and Erich von Falkenhayn created new paths into the Officer corps while doing their best to maintain its political reliability.  The document they produced was based on the ‘Deviation from the provisions of Army Regulations….’​[186]​  Some things did not change:

NCOs and enlisted men who have distinguished themselves before the enemy so far as they belong to the Inactive Service will be permitted consideration for promotion to Officer of the Active Service, so long as they served in the Friedenstande.  Achievement of the rank of Sergeant Major or 1st Sergeant is a requirement.  The promotion of these NCOs and Enlisted men to Ensign will not be considered.​[187]​

That is to say, enlisted men who were of long service in the peacetime army and could be counted on would be the only ones considered for advancement.  Enlisted men and distinguished NCOs who had not achieved the highest grades an enlisted man could typically aspire to were still excluded.  The rank of Ensign would be denied to them, as this was still the preserve of carefully selected and screened officer candidates.   NCOs of the highest grades who served in the Active army were eligible for a commission, subject to the same selection processes as Ensigns.​[188]​  For membership in the NCO corps of the inactive service, the stipulations of army regulations were waived entirely so long as candidates had ‘sufficiently clarified any middle-class or such other relationships...’ as they may have conducted.​[189]​
	This approach did increase the potential pool of small unit leaders, and though the war had become deadlocked in the West, war in the East had yielded notable successes and brought the destruction of Russian forces invading East Prussia..  There was no reason, it seemed, to throw the old criteria overboard completely.  But there was still no solution to the question of mass killing or the toll it exacted from the ranks of NCOs and junior officers.  That toll was evident by 20 November, 1914, when the 18th Army Corps reported that its replacements and war volunteers had received insufficient training.​[190]​  More to the point, they reported ‘the number of Officers in infantry regiments is so limited, that many companies are being led by Sergeants-Major or Offizierdiensttuer.  The number of NCOs is also very small.’​[191]​  A desperate calculation began to take form.  Mass killing at the front demanded replacement by officers from the rear.  Removal of officers from the rear deprived replacements of training staff and leadership.  Poorly trained and partially officered units increased casualties and so a cycle of degeneration in leadership, discipline and effectiveness threatened to take hold.  Further illumination of these processes is provided by the formation of 27th Reserve corps, raised in August and September 1914.  
27th Reserve Corps contained within it the so-called ‘Youth Regiments’ of war-volunteers. Its sacrificial assaults at 1st Ypres (19 October-22 November 1914) were speedily fashioned by the OHL into a fable of patriotic death encapsulated within the ‘Langemarck’ myth.​[192]​  Karl Unruh’s work in dispelling the ‘Langemarck’ myth and reconstructing the reality of the battles of Bixschote, Dixmunde and Baleares remains a landmark work.  However a look at related primary documents demonstrates through the lens of recent research on German tactics sheds new light on how the troops of the Reserve corps fought, and what they were trying to do when they died.
Complete records have not survived, but from the remaining source material it is possible to piece together the OHL’s response to rising losses among enlisted men.  27th Reserve corps was composed of men from the Kingdoms of Saxony and Württemberg, containing the 53rd and 54th Reserve divisions. Each division had four infantry regiments and a reserve light infantry [Jäger] battalion, a cavalry squadron and an artillery regiment with two batteries of field guns and one of field howitzers.​[193]​  All told the Corps had more than 30,000 men but no heavy artillery, which were reserved for Active army units.  Recruits were assembled between 16 August and 5 September 1914 so that on 5 September some guidelines were passed on structure training noting that ‘It is the time for action, not words’:

	Squad-and Company columns; Forming skirmish lines from both.  Movement in 
	Skirmish lines; do not get too close in order to avoid an increase in losses.  Practice
	frontal attacks by approach in skirmish lines culminating in a vigorous assault.​[194]​

Time was precious, so apart from basic formations, instruction in how to attack and some training in the ‘simplest form’ of day and night time sentry duty, not much else was expected of the infantry from the OHL.​[195]​ Taking stock of the situation, Reserve Infantry Regiment 245 revealed approximately what could be achieved in 4 weeks; this was roughly enough time to assemble the required number of men, provide them with uniforms and weapons, then train them in the operation of their rifles.​[196]​  Company and Battalion manoeuvres were scheduled to finish by the end of September along with basic marksmanship instruction.  However decreasing casualty rates did nothing to answer the related problems of making good losses and preserving effectiveness. The War Minister instructed ‘The Corps Staffs whose troops occupy fortified positions are concerned about the advanced training of their replacements.  Even marksmanship practice will be held.’​[197]​   Training in rifle marksmanship was fundamental to the pre-war training regime, and its explicit mention is a stern rebuke of training quality.​[198]​ 
	 A week later some additional guidelines came down from the Corps headquarters in Dresden, proposed ‘on account of new experiences.’​[199]​  Loading weapons and fixing bayonets while laying down were concerns, but they were second to quick deployment from line of march into skirmish lines without ‘fearful glancing from side to side and at the immediate area.  Eyes towards the leader and the enemy.’  Returning to the issue of assaults, troops were to ‘vigorously bound’ to the assault, accompanied by an equally vigorous break-in to the enemy position accompanied by a loud shout.  Basic ideas relating to soldiers’ location and job on the battlefield were emphasized along with the ability to act independently in the event leaders fell.​[200]​  Three days later the OHL declared that ‘the great and clear successes of the present campaign are based foremost on the wild [ungestümen] drive to go forward, which inspires every man from first to last and whose degree the enemy nowhere matches.’​[201]​ We know now that the ‘wild drive to go forward’ was rapidly waning in Active army soldiers at this time.​[202]​  Falkenhayn stated that this ‘unsurpassed offensive spirit’ would carry the army through any test and any act by the enemy to break ‘our will.’  But at the same time declaring that no exertion or sacrifice was too great to preserve the army’s offensive spirit, he lauded the effectiveness of pre-war marksmanship training.  Moreover, Falkenhayn noted that no attack should be deprived of artillery support, as such cooperation did the enemy the most harm.​[203]​
	Unruh’s work reveals just how off-base the OHL was.  Reserve corps soldiers apparently ignored their instructions and instead attempted to emulate the tactics of the Active army.​[204]​  Explicitly instructed to undertake their advances in regular formations, they instead attempted advances by long bounds.  However, their artillery supports routinely fired inaccurately if at all, and sometimes shelled their own troops.​[205]​  Furthermore, poorly trained troops found it almost impossible to locate British positions, which were skilfully concealed.​[206]​  Neither had the British been idle in gauging German methods, placing their troops and machine-guns to fire at right angles to their infantry’s trenches.​[207]​  Reserve corps soldiers planning their bounds and assessing cover relative to the rifle-fire they received from somewhere to their front were subsequently helpless against machine-guns emplaced on their sides.  OHL emphasis on launching the assault proved to be cart-before-horse thinking; most Reserve corps assaults never succeeded in reaching British defences, as the attacking units fell prey to the same problems which beset the Active army.
	Repeatedly, the troops of the Reserve corps noted that their Junior Officers and NCOs were the first to become casualties.​[208]​  With the loss of company, platoon or squad leaders, subordinates proved reluctant to assume command.  Troops without leaders and thrust into a situation deliberately de-emphasised by their leadership, frequently took matters into their own hands and took shelter behind whatever cover they could find.  When night fell they quit the field, but in at least one instance, the soldiers of Reserve Infantry Regiment 235 turned and fled, crashing into reinforcing troops in a panicked mob.  Theirs, as Unruh notes, was a microcosm of the battle experience of the Reserve corps: enemy fire from all directions; terrible casualties; not the slightest idea where the enemy was located.​[209]​  But just a month before, German officers offered a rare self-critique of their conduct, as well as suggestions of how to get the most out of their soldiers.
	Falkenhayn’s memoranda was included in a sheaf of documents sent by the War Ministry on 9 October 1914.​[210]​  Attached was another memoranda composed of topics like ‘Leadership’ [Truppenführung], ‘Infantry’, ‘Artillery’ etc., and a list of problems, experiences or observations derived from the campaign in the west to date.  Under the topic of ‘infantry’, German officers described their men as ‘devoted, tough, brave, comradely, one can only be fond of them.  But often they lack for officers!  As casualties are taken among officers and NCOs, many times this extraordinary manpower has been sent carelessly into battle in thick formations.’​[211]​  Part of the reason for this lack of leadership was, the Germans believed, that French commanders designated a half-platoon or squad at the start of each fight whose sole job was to pick off junior officers and NCOs.​[212]​  
What is clearly evident is that Reserve corps recruits mustering into service before the battle of the Marne, received wholly offensive training, and were given an image of combat tenuously based on the experience of Field army units. At the same time they had not the equipment, leadership or expertise to replicate the Field army’s performance.  Instead, War Minister Falkenhayn did his best to convince the units mustering that combat was a psychological rather technical exercise, simple and incredibly brief.  Such opinions are completely at odds with the army’s pre-war training regime and readily available information from the front; at best they were a deliberate obfuscation.  A looseness with the truth was nothing new as Horne & Kramer have observed, postulating that rumours of barbarous civilians told to new soldiers were mental preparation for combat and the army’s policy of atrocities.​[213]​
	Still, the improvisations continued as the Prussian War Ministry sought to correct the lack of small unit leaders and replacements from any source.  This translated into more permeable boundaries between Military Districts and an emphasis on making up the numbers based on rank rather than rank and specialization.  Military districts were pressed to transfer officers and replacements toward raising new units, as the XVI Corps experienced in mid-September and protested to no avail.​[214]​  The War Ministry was unresponsive to arguments based on the needs of individual corps, though it is illuminating that only a Lorraine-based formation was treated in this manner.  Fortresses and specialist troops were also not above selection for the infantry arm, as long as they were not currently serving in the field, so engineer and combat engineer officers were placed at the disposal of the Active army.​[215]​  Fortress personnel in particular, it was proposed, could take up duties instructing replacements, assuming they had finished their tasks as armourers.​[216]​
But harkening back to early October brings the first acknowledgements of a new form of warfare requiring new types of skills came into being on 9 October 1914, with the institution of special training courses for Ensigns who had completed their basic training.​[217]​  The courses lasted eight weeks and were held at the training grounds in Döberitz.  The results were viewed so positively that more courses were established and were held in November and December.​[218]​  By January, 1915, a three-week preparation course to refresh skills learned in basic training and promote physical fitness was added, with a secondary objective of removing the physically unfit.​[219]​  By February, the Prussian War Ministry ordered every Active army corps to send an experienced NCO from each regiment to the Reserve army, to specifically inject their experience into the training process.​[220]​
Similar measures were taken regarding enlisted men, but without the care or regulation to ensure quality.  Instead, the purpose lay in getting men to their respective units quickly.  Therefore, a full training regime was neither possible nor desired in the base depots, but that recruits would receive the most basic instruction while still in their military districts.  Similarly, it was conceded that base depots did not provide the most relevant skills and lagged behind the pace of innovation at the Front.  A two-part system arose as a result, built on basic instruction in the military district, and practical instruction in the ongoing positional war held at the Front.  After this brief introduction to Army life, recruits were given their equipment and sent to the front, where their training was completed by Field Recruit Depots. It was noted that ‘Recruits at the front had received good and realistic training from veteran instructors’ and more importantly could be deployed quickly once their training was completed or in the event of an emergency.​[221]​  Still, the army’s plan was apparently to bloat its numbers with barely-trained replacements while the steadily declining peace-trained cadre fought to complete the Schlieffen plan.  Obsession with quick and decisive victory drove the OHL and Prussian War Ministry to embrace pointless violence in pursuit of that victory.


Excursus: German Atrocities in Belgium and France

Alan Kramer has argued that the frequency of German atrocities was linked to the Schlieffen plan, noting a 90 percent decrease in the number of atrocities from August to the second week in September.​[222]​  Defeat at the Marne caused the German army to ‘sober up’, alongside growing international pressure from neutral countries, namely the US, which Germany could not afford to antagonize.​[223]​  Still, ‘war culture’ was the primary motivation, a potent blend of ruthless officers and soldiers acting upon ‘nationalist hatreds and stereotypical images of the enemy.’​[224]​  However, this section will argue for a modified version of Isabel Hull’s thesis: that military expediency in pursuit of the Schlieffen plan produced atrocities through the practice of ‘managing’ increasing risk with increasing violence.  The testimony of five new witnesses to the atrocities or their aftermath provide the basis for this section.
Fritz Gries’ unit, Infantry Regiment 98, marched over the Belgian frontier on 18 August, after the initial wave of invasion troops had passed.  Gries was from Alsace-Lorraine, as was the rest of Infantry Regiment 98, and he made no mention of Franc-Tireurs.  Having seen no combat, they arrived at the village of St. Julien on 19 August, halting outside.  Their sentries were shot at from the buildings in the town, whereby the town government were informed that any house where shots were fired at German soldiers would be razed to the ground.  Numerous houses were then destroyed, and a newly built brewery and apartment complex were detonated with explosives, ‘collapsing like a house of cards.’  However, no one on either side was killed.​[225]​
Hugo Stehn was a student of theology, having passed into the Reserves after performing two years’ service in the Active army. Crossing the frontier on 11 August, his first vision of war was a village shelled to ruins, aflame and devoid of people.  Rumours abounded already of women and children armed with pistols, and two wounded men in his unit were reported discovered in a trench with slit throats.  On 14 August, the surrender of a nearby fortress appeared to prompt a signal flag’s raising in a nearby village church.  Stehn’s unit went to investigate, rousting civilians from their houses and holding them in the church itself, where they proved completely at a loss as to what was going on.  Hearing that two wounded German soldiers were supposedly strangled, Stehn’s unit discovered two fresh graves in the church garden, unearthing two German corpses.  The town was set ablaze in response, with numerous civilians dying in the flames or at the hands of vengeful German troops, who pillaged freely.  Stehn felt remorse for civilians ‘who had to suffer for the agitators and a church that hunted wounded.’​[226]​
	Sgt. Richard Reuter entered the Active army in 1911 and served as an Einjahrig-Freiwilliger, or a conscript who volunteered for additional service in exchange for fast-track promotion to the reserve officer corps, assuming passage of a final examination. During the War of movement he was part of 1st Company, Saxon Infantry Regiment 102.  On 25 August 1914 his unit crossed the Maas at Dinant and he wrote home ‘the residents shot at us and we spared nothing…residents were shot in groups, 70 yesterday.’​[227]​ Again on 27 August additional Belgian civilians were shot and Reuter wrote to his family ‘It is uncomfortable [unangenehm] when one has to shoot at civilians.’  By 6 September he was fed up, writing home ‘I won’t describe atrocities anymore.  Who wasn’t there can’t conceive of it.’  Reuter was killed on 9 September in an assault on French troops holding woods near Euvy.
	Martin Thielemann, a Sergeant of the 2nd Class Landwehr, or the oldest age group in the German army, arrived in Dinant on 4 September, as part of the 47 Mixed Independent Landwehr Brigade, a scratch unit thrown together in response to the losses sustained in August.  The city was completely destroyed in Thielemann’s estimation, the first view of complete devastation that his unit had witnessed so far.  However, Thielemann makes no mention of ongoing atrocities or Franc-Tireur, and though unnerved by the sights of destruction the unit passed through without incident.​[228]​
	Hermann Heinrich Baumann, a baker serving in the supply train of VII Reserve Corps, was part of a troop train moving through Belgium on 16 August when the train was stopped by a sabotaged tunnel.  Dozens of locomotives had been crashed into each other inside the tunnel, so they halted for the night while it was cleared.  An officer appeared in Baumann’s train and took the first eight men he saw for sentry duty during a night so dark one could not tell ‘if it was a man or an animal’ at ten paces, while gunshots echoed all over from unknown sources.  On 19 August, Baumann’s unit was reported fire on, which prompted the searching of all nearby houses.  Where arms were found or gunfire reported, the house was burned.  Ultimately 50 buildings, the whole street, went up in flames.  The next day, 20 August, the firing squads went to work.  ‘Hundreds’ of prisoners were locked in a local museum including youths, old men and clerics.  30 were selected and shot, joining 50 bodies already lying at the junction of two streets.  Baumann reported ‘heartrending scenes’, and a proclamation on 21 August, origin unknown, that any civilian found in arms would be shot.​[229]​  The proclamation was put to use the next day, against a Belgian civilian who shot at Baumann.
As long as the army’s advance approximated Schlieffen’s timetable, officers urged greater exertions to make up the deficit.  To satisfy irrational goals, Isabel Hull has argued, the army embraced violence and personal sacrifice, and the findings of this chapter lend their weight to Hull’s arguments.   Ultimately it embraced the execution of civilians, as ordinary soldiers broke down physically and emotionally and officers accepted the utility of violence and terror in pursuit of their objectives.​[230]​  From August to September, approximately 6,000 civilians were killed and on occasion whole villages were destroyed in retaliation for perceived partisan attacks; War Minister Falkenhayn ordered on 26 August 1914 that all suspected partisans regardless of age or sex were subject to summary execution.​[231]​  OHL Chief Moltke had given similar orders concerning ‘armed civilians’ on 14 and 26 August, and it is the arrival of the 14 August decree that Hermann Baumann is probably referencing in his diary.​[232]​ None of the soldiers who witnessed atrocities mention existing fears of Franc-Tireur, only present rumours of violence by civilians against German soldiers or the wounded.  Wherever these new witnesses were, the responses were largely the same. Houses were burned and civilians were shot in groups, but five witnesses from every category of soldier in the German army, both at the edge of the Schlieffen offensive and the occupied areas of France and Belgium make no reference to a legacy of Franc-Tireurs.  Rather, their lethal violence was propagated in accordance with orders from their superiors, to no logical purpose, in the absence of a ‘franc tireur myth-complex’ identified by Horne and Kramer.​[233]​ 




From 1871 to 1908 the German army struggled within itself determining just how it would fight offensive war.  After 1908, a working consensus established the supremacy of ‘fire-and-movement’ which meshed the institutional bias for offensive action with a workable system of tactics, training and recruitment rooted in the evaluation of recent conflict and the army’s political biases.  Individual skill in the use of terrain and weapons and cooperation between small units and supporting arms, and faith in small unit leaders underpinned a ‘wild drive to advance’ on the part of common soldiers.  This was not simple atavism, but a well-developed confidence in weapons, leadership and oneself which took months to create.  The results of German thinking were clear in both pro and con; ‘typical’ German regiments won lopsided victories against elite, veteran units of the French army and veteran professional units of the BEF, while the army’s obsession with short-term thinking ensured that no means to sustain the army at its desired competence were developed.   In August, 1914, the army displayed incredible effectiveness.  Then from September to November, 1914, the German army cannibalised itself to meet a growing list of demands generated by the front line, while soldiers at the front began their own odyssey of how to make combat bearable.
	Carefully shaped expectations of combat created standards of physical and mental endurance.  That is, they define the individual’s physical capacity to fight in the proscribed manner, and the levels of fitness needed to perform battlefield actions in concert with a plan.  But they also inculcate the ability to manage physical fatigue’s influence on decision-making by reducing the novelty of distractions and discomfort.  Doctrine makes war more efficient, as it renders otherwise detailed elements of the decision-making process down to simple phrases and practiced operations.  Judgment and experience were the means by which officers fit doctrine to circumstances which may be similar but are almost never identical.  Every action taken in combat comes with an associated risk of injury or death based on the threat provided by the enemy and the amount of time the soldier is exposed to it, making self-preservation at least partially illusory.​[235]​  Offensive tactics and doctrine did not just order knowledge but also an individual’s experience of combat, providing a chronology which pitted skill and cooperation against risk.​[236]​  In August and September 1914, the war for which soldiers had trained more or less matched the war they were fighting; but before September had passed positional war was spreading, from the Vosges towards the channel coast. From October to December, as the army expanded dramatically and front lines solidified, veterans of the peacetime army in the west were confronted with ‘mutual mass siege.’  Remobilized reservists and hastily trained war volunteers had their preparation deliberately curtailed only to basic formations for offensive tactics in order to economize time.  
Training is the establishment of routine, the ‘imposition of rationalized patterns of performance’ upon soldiers, which aids the creation of an ‘objectively verifiable standard of regular work for regular pay.’​[237]​ The power of the routine lies in its ability to construct a mechanism for the production of violence which distinguishes the act from the sensory experience of the battlefield.  Through repetition, soldiers develop a repertoire of skills which confirm their place in the larger group and promote their individual survival on the battlefield.  The real power of these skills is in the manner in which they shape perception of war’s sensory experience, where battlefield events prompt an individual response in line with the ‘rationalized patters of performance.’ 
Veterans would always exist before published doctrine, taking the lead in developing and practicing tactics based on survival.  But they also constituted the simplest and most effective way to transfer skills, leadership and an up-to-date vision of war to recruits.  The medium mattered as much as message, for veterans carried more respect than any other instructor and were examples of ‘calmness and self-control in peril’, a truism which persisted throughout the war and to varying effect, as will be made clear in later chapters.​[238]​  Moreover, training provides time and place in which to become accustomed to the sights and sounds of weaponry, the arduousness of movement across the battlefield, and the completion of complex tasks. Through the rotation of officers between front and homeland in 1914, what the army was attempting to do was reduce the novelty of war.  The Field army of 1914 was not perfectly adapted to fight the War of movement, but its training and doctrine were close enough to limit war’s novelty, inspire confidence and convince men that sticking with what they knew was the best.  When soldiers perceived a new form of war and with it a new risk calculus, tactics changed. This is nowhere more apparent than in the process which began Vosges and Argonne, beginning in late August 1914 but truly emerging in the autumn of 1914 and ultimately structured German tactical thinking throughout the war.  
Statistics from the Sanitätsbericht demonstrate that the killing which took place during the war of movement featured more face-to-face killing than any other phase the war, as the percentages of wounds and deaths from bayonets and other edged weapons indicate.  Compared to other types of wound pathology, their occurrence was still miniscule. Instead, shells and bullets killed from distance, delivered by skilled professionals who themselves likely died under similar circumstances in the next few months.  As skill levels on both sides plummeted and the front solidified, casualty rates in the German army fell as well. With the onset of positional war, tactics and skills increasingly came to terms with rise of firepower.  Officers took the first steps towards the dispersion, concealment and fortification which marked later-war defensive systems, while a soldier-driven movement arose later in the year that refashioned offensive tactics.  Leaders in the highest echelons of the German army noted a dip in men’s willingness to go forward, associating it with the onset of positional war and the grave rupture with the image of combat instilled in prewar training and predicted by prewar doctrine.  Font line units had already taken the lead on the issue on the basis of personal survival rather than doctrinal normalcy.
Finally, in order to realize and later in an attempt to salvage the potential of the Schlieffen plan, the German army murdered civilians in thousands purely for perceived benefit in military expediency.  Indeed, reprisal for attacks by armed civilians implied an immediate response by the army which had been attacked, but this response did not entail mass killing until the OHL and Prussian War Ministry made a policy of mass shootings.  Everything from reprisals to a programme of mass executions, such as occurred at Dinant, took place. The invading German army itself could not seem to determine whether it was offering reprisal for isolated incidents, or conducting a punitive campaign against a hostile population.  In either case, lethal violence and brutality were embraced under a veneer of legitimacy provided by the chain-of-command.   Only Sgt. Reuter implied participation in atrocities, and his feelings on the subject slid quickly to hopelessness at both communicating and rationalising what he had seen.  Though some were shocked, few if any seem to have balked at their orders, and none mentioned an abiding fear of Franc-Tireur. 










Chapter II:  New Ways of Fighting, New Ways of Thinking: Values, Experience and the Depot System 1914-1918

In 1917, from his trench somewhere in Flanders, Capt. E. Blackadder remarked that things would have been a ‘a damn sight simpler’ had the BEF stayed home and shot 50,000 men every week.​[239]​  Somewhat less annoyed, in a trench somewhere in Flanders in June 1915, war volunteer Hermann Boeddinghaus, now a veteran and an NCO still well shy of his 19th birthday, commented that the most recent group of replacements were so poorly instructed, it would have been easier to rank them up outside the trench and shoot them.  That way, Bayha observed, the troops relieving him would only have to worry about the smell of the corpses Bayha had deposited with such consideration.​[240]​  Bayha flatly told his company commander that he could not be held responsible for doing his duty with 90 such soldiers in his line, and no grenades.​[241]​  So the question is posed; how was German army post-Schlieffen Plan but pre-storm troops prepared to fight, and what was the influence of that instruction on the rest of the war?
Except as preamble to the widespread acceptance of storm troop tactics, the mechanisms by which the overwhelming majority of German soldiers were prepared for combat are so far largely ignored by historians. Over the course of this investigation, what became evident - albeit from limited findings - was the absence of training from the overwhelming majority of soldier’s testimonies consulted.​[242]​  Though not the focus of this project, training constituted a ‘formative’ experience only in the case of one soldier, and even then only when linked to post-war civilian opportunity.​[243]​  As might be guessed, the Army was of quite a different opinion and still reeling from the losses absorbed in the Summer and Autumn of 1914.  Here the Germans benefited from something like a period of mutual exhaustion, as the French dealt with death-tolls which dwarfed even Germany’s and Great Britain set about sacrificing such peace-trained soldiers as it had in order to build a mass army from scratch.  Germany’s reserve system proved more than up to the task of providing manpower, and German doctors had returned a huge percentage of wounded to the field still capable of some form of service, but the army still wrestled with the conversion of manpower into decent soldiers, let alone heirs to the old Active army.
With time of the essence, the old blend of skill and motivation appeared fatally undermined, so combat experience became the keystone trait of an effective soldier.   But there was more to the system of organisation than blending green troops with experienced troops and experienced leaders.  The army increasingly viewed combat experience as a commodity, whose value was expressed in the imperturbable character and clear-headed decision-making of veteran officers, and in sifting through after-action reports to derive the most essential skills, the most desirable values, and the most efficient forms of organisation.  Through proper utilisation of experience, the phenomena of industrialised mass war would be made manageable to the hundreds of thousands who joined the ranks each year, or so the thinking went.  For the purpose of transmission and commoditisation, the combat experience was rendered down into three components: ‘experience’, ‘official experience’ and ‘realism.’  
‘Experience’ was generated by the war itself, relating to an individual’s capacity to act in a proscribed manner on the battlefield, and so demonstrate by example that combat could be mastered on a psychological level.​[244]​  It also provided a rough gauge of his potential. ‘Official experience’ refers to an institutional reflection on recent events, specifically with reference to present doctrine, existing technologies and institutional values, and the internal biases which helped determine how the army interpreted events. ‘Realism’ here refers to an environment presenting a facsimile of war for the purpose of instruction, so as to ‘condition men to the noise, turmoil and fright of war….’​[245]​  ‘Realism’ was the process by which ‘Experience’ and ‘Official Experience’ were combined within the training system in order to manufacture veteran soldiers.   
To ease the task of placing recruits among veterans and learning the ins and outs of fighting at the front in as close to real time as possible, the German army hit upon an elegant solution, the Field Recruit Depot.  FRDs replaced division’s existing Recruit Depots, putting basically-trained troops within sight and sound of the frontline and under the care of veteran instructors.  It also gave divisions access to additional manpower for labour, and for use as emergency reinforcements.  In effect, the adoption of the FRD was the institutionalisation of the wild programme of improvisations and reforms worked out by the OHL and Prussian War Ministry from September 1914 to February 1915, and amounted to system for enduring the horrors of industrialised mass war. In the aftermath of the Battle of the Somme, the OHL  would embed the storm troop programme in the training regime of the FRDs, creating a system not just for enduring the war, but for demonstrating to all German soldiers that they had a stake in combat and in the production of violence, albeit in distinct ways.  FRD training got the German army through the destruction of its peacetime cadres, and provided the backbone of Imperial Germany’s military instruction for the rest of the war. 
The strength of the resulting training system was that it affected every aspect of a soldiers’ behaviour in combat.  Its weakness was precisely the same, that it could not be abandoned in whole or in part without starting over.  Therefore, the sum of this process is defined in this chapter as neither innovation nor stagnation but accumulation, or simply a mounding up of new skills and desired qualities on top of those incorporated into the peacetime ideal.​[246]​  More bluntly, the Imperial German army had given up on reviving the general standard of technical expertise found in the old Active army, but never gave up trying to revive its moral and spiritual qualities.  
Of course, experience and skill are separate categories and the arrival of veterans does not entail an increase in effectiveness when played off against the rapidly changing nature of the war’s practice.  Skill and experience constitute important but proximate causes of battlefield performance, and similarly and above all time outside of combat is required to develop interpersonal relationships under military guidance which are so crucial in keeping men in combat.​[247]​  Therefore the most promising recruits were selected for immediate service as frontline replacements.  Such a measure was symptomatic of a German army moulding an internal value that sought to counter uncertainty and extremity through collective morale and physical excellence augmented by tactics and technology.  In the same vein, it is worth noting that the desired qualities for NCO selection were loyalty to the army as an institution and what amounted to an imperturbable character in the face of stress.​[248]​  	
In this chapter, I investigate the army’s modes of interpreting and responding to the task of fighting a positional war in relation to soldiers’ preparation for combat.  The structure of soldiers’ preparation was determined largely by a conversation conducted at the army level and higher from December 1914 until December 1916.  Both start and endpoints were times of crisis, for in December 1914 the army was still reeling from the failure of the Schlieffen plan and its own massive expansion.  In December, 1916, Germany’s military leadership were wrestling not just with the aftermath of the Battle of the Somme, which had tried the army’s resources and confidence severely, but also what looked like a collapse of German morale during France’s counter-attack at Verdun.  It was the fusion of the FRDs and the storm troop programme that resolved the crisis of December 1916, providing the foundations for a new system of defensive tactics called Elastic Defence, which would see Germany through the fighting of 1917.
The system of training decided upon in December, 1916 would remain until the end of the war. The reasoning was simple: the army believed it had finally discovered a system of practical instruction and individual moral regeneration shaped by those qualities it valued most, physical fitness, quick decision-making, imperturbability, and a daredevil attitude in attack and defense.  The combination of recruit depots and storm troops became the silver bullet answer to all the stresses laid upon the army, first by the war of movement, then by the war of position and in the end formed a conceptual funnel through which all new ideas passed.  But most importantly, it seemed to answer the most pressing issue of the war movement; how to transmit expertise, experience and innovation from the frontline to new recruits.

The Genesis of the Depot System

The Field Recruit Depot system’s genesis cannot be separated from the early war scramble for replacements.  Instead it is here located amongst the numerous proposals, improvisations and debates over the providing of replacements and the composition of new units.  From these processes emerged several norms that governed the construction of new units which would carry on through the rest of the war:  first, the belief that the best training was conducted at the front under the auspices of units currently engaged; second, that training at the front was led by veteran officers;  third, that every new unit formed would contain experienced troops;  fourth, that veteran troops should be withdrawn from frontline units to provide a cadre for units forming;  fifth, veterans withdrawn to provide cadre for new units would be replaced by an equivalent number of recruits from the youngest conscription class. The propagation of organisational patterns and tactics according to these values was much better left to a permanent institution than a series of improvisations and interventions by the overlapping bodies which administered the military.  An attempt had recently been made to do so and was met with the agreement of all relevant bodies.
On 8 December 1914 the Saxon War Ministry received a directive to establish Infantry Recruit Depots.​[249]​  The recruit depots were to utilize so called ‘half-trained’ [halbausgebildete] recruits for four weeks’ instruction to ‘receive further training through instructors from the troops fighting.’​[250]​ No mention was made of earlier decisions which had designated regimental depots and training areas as dumping grounds for officers and NCOs unfit for service in the field.  This is peculiar as the adoption of von Bergmann’s proposal was nothing less than an official acknowledgement of deficient instruction in the homeland, to be rectified at the front.  The directive originated from the Prussian War Ministry and the Großes Hauptquartier, with the original copy containing specific instructions for various corps administrative staffs.  The original order was sent on 21 November 1914 to every corps administrative staff in the German empire except the VII and XIV military districts.​[251]​  The reasons for these exclusions were not stated.
The Saxon War Ministry proposed that it was not possible to follow Prussian instructions which stipulated that ‘half-trained’ recruits arrive at the depots fully equipped.  This was because there were not enough rifles to go around.​[252]​  There followed a scheme to extend recruits’ training times from less than eight to a minimum of fourteen weeks to establish a basic level of competence derived from field experience.​[253]​  No official response was made to this proposal, or if one was made it has not survived.  In the meantime, preparation for combat remained entirely dependent on the needs of the Front.
Some time passed before the orders were put into practice.  Citing earlier communications from the Prussian War Ministry, the 3rd Army did not establish recruit depots before April 1915.​[254]​  It could take as long as two weeks for an order concerning the establishment of new units to take effect but the first evidence regarding the establishment of recruit depots came on 16 February 1915 at the earliest.​[255]​  8th Reserve Corps established a Recruit Depot for each of its divisions, the depots being ‘completely self-sufficient’ in terms of supply and pay and commanded directly by the divisions they served.   Each division already maintained a Replacement Depot, but these were wound up in favour of the Recruit Depots, to which their recruits were transferred.​[256]​  Ultimately, each Recruit Depot held 1200 replacements divided into four groups of 300 recruits which provided a group of replacements for each infantry regiment in the division.​[257]​  All told, the Field Recruit Depot system appears to have taken hold between February and August, 1915, with reports from various divisions and corps arriving to confirm the establishment of their depots.​[258]​  
Divisions were given specific instructions for the administration of the recruit depots.  The whole recruit depot was commanded by a staff officer or senior Captain and placed under his command were added eight ‘experienced officers, for instance, First Sergeant-Lieutenants who were responsible for 150 recruits each.​[259]​  A Staff Sergeant was responsible for seventy-five recruits, and a Sergeant or able Corporal for fifteen recruits.  In sum, the recruit depots needed a minimum of nine officers and 96 NCOs, or about half as many leaders as were required to run a fully functional battalion.  Since the recruit depot was under direct command of the division whose men it trained, we can safely assume that the same division was required to furnish the necessary number of instructors.
Guidance provided for instruction emphasised the process of successful unit movement to the exclusion of all else.  Remarking that ‘soldiers’ individual training is of the utmost importance’, recruits were to practice in all weather, day or night, their movement across broken terrain utilizing all natural advantages.​[260]​  While some of the recruits practiced quick and concealed movement, the others were instructed to practice spotting them and appreciating their numbers and position.  Finally, all troops were to be told that their worst chances of survival lay in lying down without cover or concealment when shelled, and that their best chances lay in withdrawal through preparation by fire.​[261]​  ‘Withdrawal through preparation by fire’ can be understood as moving away from shelling in small groups, some shooting while some retreated until all were safe, and was a basic tactic of the pre-war army. 
The recruit depots were also integrated into the army’s system of indoctrination, such as it existed.  As early as December 1914 the army began searching for a reliable means to gather and circulate ‘acts of heroism’ from officers ‘and especially by NCOs and enlisted men.’​[262]​  To build something of a bridge between combatants and non-combatants tales emphasizing the selflessness of officials and chaplains were also requested.​[263]​  Reports were also sent to newspapers in the occupied territories, specifically the ‘Lille War News.’  This same pattern was applied to the recruit depots, and in just as haphazard a manner.
Alongside the ways in which the enemy fought, instructors were to detail the heroic acts of German officers and soldiers, and the various regulations concerning the content of letters and behaviour if taken prisoner.​[264]​  Through this instruction, they ‘strove towards the goal of educating fresh, cheerful [fröhlich], triumphant soldiers happy to fight.’​[265]​  This section of orders, marked as ‘Unterricht’, had nowhere near the unity of purpose or technical focus of the prior sections and seems to have been included almost as an afterthought.  No army would reject having its ranks filled with cheerful, triumphant soldiers happy to fight, so there was no harm in saying so and letting someone else muddle through. 
Crown Prince Rupprecht’s memorandum and the state of reserves in 1915

Historian Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau views 1915  as a ‘Stalemate’, while Lyn MacDonald referred to 1915 as ‘the death of innocence’, summed up in the massacre of the Battle of Loos and officers sent home in disgrace for failing to prevent what few, dismal repetitions of 1914’s ‘Christmas Truce’ there were.​[266]​  In the west this makes perfect sense; the processes of economic, industrial and military mobilisation were still maturing, as the average competence of French and German mass armies decreased through the gradual destruction of their pre-war cadres. Armies found themselves compelled to negotiate compromises with valued traditions and long-held standards, notions that failed to maintain their relevance in the face of immediate need.  Compromises would themselves be tested as the efficiency of their processes and the quality of their products were exposed to the realities of war.  Having made it through the winter of 1914, the summer of 1915 exposed the deficiencies of bifurcated training system of depot and homeland.
In about six months of operation, the depot system seemed only to highlight the extent of the present deficiency in training rather than to remedy the problem.  Coming to light by late summer 1915, the Saxon War Ministry provided its response to a questionnaire disseminated by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria on the ‘aimless’ training given to recruits before they arrived in the field.​[267]​  The questionnaire was directed at all army corps serving in Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht, as well as the 2nd Guard Reserve Division and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, with answers sought of the corps administrative staffs responsible supplying the units previously named.  Demanding a ‘brief’ [emphasis original] report, the Crown Prince put forward a number of questions, the first of which was ‘Do the corps administrative staffs follow the instructions of the mobilized corps commands, when not, and for what reasons?’​[268]​

The Saxon War Ministry responded:
The desires of the mobilised Corp commands have been matched according to [what] is possible.  The reserves dispatched have in part lacked the required amounts of sturdiness and military bearing.  The causes - excluding the high age of the soldiers - certainly lie with the lack of qualified training personnel among the reserve troops.  Attempts to correct these [circumstances] have created partial successes; low wages and lack of recognition have aggravatingly affected training personnel among reserve troops.  Distinguished elements-first of all former active army sergeants-therefore strive after assignment in rear areas.​[269]​

The rear areas continued to suffer a lack of rifles, reporting with some venom that the absence of arms was an impediment to training.  However, the Saxon War Ministry essentially blamed the Prussian War Ministry’s original directive for the deficiency in instruction.  Instead of twelve weeks’ training in the homeland, the Saxons believed that six weeks was sufficient to increase soldiers’ physical fitness and to achieve a basic competence in marksmanship, weapon handling, and instil basic formal drill.​[270]​  The Saxons then said concerning time in depots that ‘More than 8 weeks are required’ to bring troops up to the very vague standard that the Crown Prince had set.​[271]​  But Saxon responses to the Crown Prince’s inquest came to nought, and training proceeded in 12th and 19th Military Districts according to the timetables laid out by the Prussian War Ministry.  
On its face, the Saxon response is quite pragmatic.  If training personnel in the Homeland were inadequate and likely to stay that way, then there was little point in asking them to perform anything beyond basic instruction.  Similarly, reserves should therefore spend as little time in their charge as possible before heading off to the front for their true military education, where instructors of a much higher calibre were available and they were of much more use to the army as emergency reserves and labour units. Actions along these lines were so widespread that they were specifically quashed in an OHL directive sent on 10 January 1918.​[272]​  
Under normal circumstances however, the unit in field responsible for operating the depot brought replacements to the front at need.  The request of 12th Reserve Corps provides a typical order for replacements.  The Corps’ recruit depot asked for 250 ‘half-trained recruits’ with two calendar months’ worth of instruction in the homeland.​[273]​  Replacements were to be sent fully equipped and armed with a G98 rifle and bayonet.  The 250 recruits were then split into three groups of eighty, eighty-five and eighty-five men with shoulder straps for Infantry Regiments 107, 133 and 104 respectively.​[274]​  All recruits were from Saxony and were sent to Saxon regiments.  However no guidance was provided as to how the various regimental consignments were chosen.
As to the quality of instructors, it was not as if the various recruit depots had trouble identifying the poor ones.   In the case of the 40th Infantry Division, three of its training sergeants were physically unfit for duty, either from disease, unhealed wounds, or for lack of improvement on poor physical conditioning.​[275]​  One sergeant was too old, and all were either physically unable to lead their men in exercises or could only train alongside their men with great difficulty.  However, the division made certain to point out that these were but physical shortcomings. Reports were quick to mention that instructors were generally eager; the men in question had never displayed a lack of ‘desire, love and understanding for the task…’ rather their bodies had let them down.​[276]​  The depot system operated without independent oversight from its broad acceptance in the Spring of 1915 until the winter of 1917-1918.
‘Experience’ and its Management
‘Experience’ was the simplest indicator of an effective soldier and is defined as having demonstrated the ability to overcome the effects of modern warfare on the senses and to respond in rational manner to circumstances of their immediate environment.  It is expressed as a response to immediate circumstances conditioned by adherence to an overarching set of goals and the accumulated skills and principles inculcated by an army.  Therefore, it is not just a personal struggle to make sense of war, but a tradeable commodity for military institutions which can be increased or transferred.  Through action, soldiers and small unit leaders demonstrated the capacity for clear headedness and action which in turn lead to the development of an official lexicon, a lexicon that reflected both the quality of the individual and the approval of superiors.
The German army had many words to describe experienced soldiers but preferred adjectives like ‘tapfer-‘[courageous] or ‘kriegserprobte’[war-tested].​[277]​ ‘Tüchtig’ [efficient, capable, brave] was the term used on personnel evaluations of officers to agree with the positive statements of previous observers, specifically by officers with little personal contact with the examinee in question, but could also appear as  one of many positive qualities witnessed by observers well acquainted with the candidate.​[278]​  Taken in total, these elements formed the basis of an ‘inner continuity of military effort’, founded on individual will and the bending of events to plans.​[279]​  However, the pace of events had outstripped the army’s ability to adequately replace soldiers, as a number of complaints soon made clear.  
At the centre of these complaints were statements damning an increasingly ineffectual nature of training at home.  Units in the field sent their admonishments directly to the Prussian War Ministry, the Großes Hauptquartier and the OHL.  Criticisms were levied at replacement soldiers, pointing at their lack of skill and self-control in combat.​[280]​ So in a substantial handwritten note from early October 1914, an officer about whom very little is known, Col. von Bergmann wrote to the Großes Hauptquartier advocating for an exchange programme of veteran officers with those instructing recruits.​[281]​  These were not permanent reassignments but a cyclical rotation to fuse every aspect of military life from preparation to combat with practically experienced leaders.  Von Bergmann received a reply from the Großes Hauptquartier, which concurred with the proposal but noted that any wishing to apply for such a scheme would require the assent of the Kaiser after a formal submission from the Chief of the Military Cabinet, Moriz von Lyncker.​[282]​   This was the first suggestion that a direct link be maintained between troops fighting and troops preparing to fight, a notion acted on two months later. 
Furthermore, the number of leaders killed paled in comparison to the number of small unit leaders wounded and in hospital. Though in the majority of cases their wounds were survivable, nobody had bothered to keep track of who was being treated where. The Prussian Guard corps wrote on 23 November 1914 requesting permission to attach their convalescent officers to the corps’ field infantry battalions, which were then still undergoing instruction.  Deputy War Minister Gustav von Wandel forwarded this request to the Chief of the Military Cabinet, stating that in the interests of maintaining the army’s fighting strength he would assent to such assignments only as a measure of the very last resort.​[283]​  Von Wandel then issued a general rebuke to the army corps administrative staffs. He stated that they could better help themselves by keeping much tighter control of their long term wounded and convalescents, many of whom were currently being treated in Berlin and its environs without having notified their superiors of their whereabouts.​[284]​   Here were two simple arguments, the first of which provided new recruits with experienced leaders while at the same time exposing them to the exingincies of wartime service.  The second tried to simplify questions of military organisation; by returning wounded to corps as quickly as possible they became available for limited service and reintegrated them with their units.
By December 1914, the administrative staff of the Prussian Guard corps reported that a ‘strict’ system of control had been implemented over its wounded.  However, the Guards questioned the wisdom of utilizing recovering officers in the manner previously described, noting that even when healed these men would be fit for field or garrison duty only in the loosest sense.  More to the point, such assignments would threaten the viability of freshly raised battalions currently in training which it was expected would complete their instruction by the end of January 1915 at the latest.​[285]​  
At this early stage in the war, the deficiency in practical skills and discipline was intertwined with the need to communicate the lessons of the front to men assigned as replacements.  However, the need to replace casualties and to expand the overall size of the army remained paramount.  Toward this end, modifications were taken in the personnel assignments of both units at the front and newly established formations which would address both problems.  For the purpose of expansion, 72 new battalions were established and began to form with manpower furnished by war volunteers.  In a substantial memorandum, OHL Chief Falkenhayn gave orders to the effect that the 300 best trainees from each new battalion should be sent to the front along with ten NCOs as replacements.​[286]​  If enough recruits of the right quality were not available, the numbers were to be made up through exchange with the relevant military district’s recruits currently in training.​[287]​  From 72 groups of 300 men, the army created 12 groups of 1800 replacements which were assigned to twelve active corps, which themselves assigned the replacements to reserve infantry regiments.​[288]​
Having lost about a third of their men, the battalions forming would receive the equivalent number of veteran soldiers and NCOs.  Special reference was made to the youthfulness and energy of the volunteers that made up the replacement battalions as qualities that ought not be squandered.  Therefore veterans were to be carefully selected so as to weed out any who might have a negative influence on their new comrades.​[289]​  The selection criteria given for small unit leaders reveal what the OHL meant by the term veteran: men known for their steadiness, energy and dutifulness that would provide a ‘strong framework for the young soldiers.’​[290]​  
With some basic qualities of a good small-unit leader now identified, the Prussian War Ministry continued the search for ideal officers.   In middle July 1915, the War Ministry lamented the growing requirements for ‘older, veteran 1st Lieutenants or Lieutenants for utilisation as company commanders….’​[291]​ Army rear area inspectorates were charged with filing medical reports on all Lieutenants, 1st Lieutenants and Captains of the active and furloughed designations regardless of service branch, who had spent more than three months assigned to the rear.​[292]​  Then the War Ministry finally said in plain language the principle it had always followed: ‘Fundamentally, the interests of the front line are put above the interests of the rear area.’​[293]​
Frank admissions continued at the highest levels through the summer of 1915.  The Army Supreme Command noted ‘the heavy artillery has found far more and useful roles in the war than were foreseen in peacetime.’​[294]​ The OHL recognized that the war in the west was now ‘Positional war resembling fortress war’, but the German army in general benefitted from increased firepower, and now every army would include a ‘General of Heavy Artillery’ to ensure its proper use.​[295]​
Furthermore, whereas individual units began the business of changing tactics and organisation, and divisions and corps took up the responsibility for preparing their replacements, 1915 saw the beginning of army level participation in the training process.  Beverloo, an old drill area built by the Belgian army, was maintained by the Germans as a training ground for replacements and regulations governing the ‘Infantry Replacement Troop-Beverloo’ were duplicated in the east.​[296]​  The resulting ‘Infantry Replacement Troop-Warsaw’ was composed for three battalions, each of 2000 replacements and overseen by a brigade commander.​[297]​  Administered by the General Government of Poland, ‘IRT-Warsaw’ was intended to be a permanent institution with a permanent staff where infantry recruits did nothing but train for their eventual deployments.​[298]​  Instruction was provided solely by personnel fit for garrison duty, veterans ‘if possible’, to which was added quite literally between the lines in pencil, ‘physically able.’​[299]​ Why permanent training areas received a lesser grade of instructor is unclear, but is probably related to the secondary function of field recruit depot contingents; use as emergency reserves for their parent unit. Therefore it was a sensible thing to demand, as veterans rendered fit only for garrison duty had no danger of reassignment to the front in extreme situations. 
But what distinguished ‘Infantry Replacement Troop-Warsaw’ and ostensibly, ‘Infantry Replacement Troop-Beverloo’ from homeland depots or recruit depots in the field was an active selection process in recruits.  The replacement contingents were taken from six corps administrative staffs, 1st, 3rd, 7th 17th 20th and 21st for units without veteran officers of the active class, which had been garrisoned in towns and lacked training areas and firing ranges.​[300]​  In order to make best use of a six-week-long training, the army mandated that the recruits receive no furloughs for the length of their stay, though soldiers with good cause for furlough could be let go if possible.
The army was tested in the Autumn of 1915, by France’s Aisne-Champagne offensive.  A great deal of time and energy was devoted to studying Germany’s successful defence, presenting a mixed picture.   An analysis was compiled by the staff of 3rd Army and published as Experiences of the 3rd Army during the Champagne Offensive.​[301]​  The focus of the lessons were counter-acting the effects of artillery and artillery observation.  In fact, the authors identified what they called 'Joffre's Method' [Joffre'schen System].  French artillery shelled every part of the German defensive system, and where direct observation of German defenses was possible, both trenches and wire obstacles were reduced to ruins by heavy guns.  French infantry prisoners yielded maps of the German defensive system 'down to the smallest detail', while aircraft dropped to altitudes as low as 600m in order to strafe German artillery crews.​[302]​  As the day of the assault neared, French artillery, which had already assigned two or three batteries to every German battery identified, were joined by squadrons of aircraft that aided in attacks on German guns while bombing rail lines and bivouacs beyond artillery range.  Raids in squd-strength took place up and down the German line as the French gauged the effectiveness of their barrage.  In all instances they were driven back from the German line, and in all instances, the spots where they were driven back received standing barrages of increased intensity.  The Germans suspected afterwards that these small-scale attacks served partially as decoys, to draw out pre-planned defensive barrages from German artillery for the benefit of French tacticians.
Luckily for the Germans, those same tacticians ensured that the calculating, cooperative effort of artillery and aircraft stood in contrast to the use of France's infantry.  The failure of the assault on 25 September, 1915, was laid squarely at the feet of the French General Staff, whose goal the Germans surmised, was 'to achieve a complete breakthrough of our position at any price'.  A 'senseless sacrifice of regiments and even brigades' followed from it.  French regiments detailed to the assault went forward in 'thick skirmish lines', indicating as little as 1m between soldiers, and rarely more than 50m between lines. Leading the skirmish lines were squads of picked grenadiers loaded down with grenades, then individual officers ahead of their men.​[303]​  Behind the skirmish lines, officers on horseback rode at the head of reinforcing regiments, marching in closed columns.  Nevertheless, the German first line was stormed in numerous places, with greatest ease where French artillery had destroyed German defensive works.   But a programmatic advance of large units in regular formations continued, and French regiment after French regiment was for lack of a better word, slaughtered, by single machine guns or brought to a halt by German counter-attacks, often delivered to the sides of attacking French formations.​[304]​  
The Germans laid the blame for the insufficient training of French soldiers and junior officers at the feet of the French General Staff,   Their suicidal formations and the robotic maneuver of units produced senseless losses, which prevented a renewal of the offensive but also confirmed to the Germans that sound training still trumped any numerical disparity.  Four German divisions had held against 19 assaulting French divisions, fighting in place or counter-attacking regardless of the odds.  But with incredible rapidity, the French changed tactics.  Instead of trying to storm German positions with grenadiers leading masses of riflemen, French troops sought out the ground where their artillery had laid waste to German defenses and killed the garrisons, occupied it and transitioned from attack to defense. Destroyed German trenches and shell craters were quickly refortified and the troops holding them relieved with fresh units or reinforced.  Small-scale attacks reappeared in order to seize favorable artillery observation points, safeguarding units dug into the old German front-line while preparing for an attack on the second line of defenses.  By the end of 28 September, French troops were well dug-in with trenches connecting captured ground to their original front line, offering a far more difficult and costly target for German counter-attacks than massed columns of infantry.  For the German army, the central lesson learned from the Aisne-Champagne was the importance of timing.  Counter-attacks had to strike an attacker while assaulting troops were consolidating their gains, a very, very narrow window of opportunity which demanded quick decision-making from a local commander making do with whatever troops he had at hand.  
Units appeared to realise this as well, bringing about a direct intervention by the OHL.  This meant the OHL snooping around frontline units in order to counteract some of various tricks and strategies developed by frontline units to keep officer’s billets filled. In a directive from 6 January, the OHL moved to end existing practices developed by front-line units to effectively hoard small-unit leaders. The directive was intended to keep units from accruing surplus junior officers beyond the number permitted by military regulations.​[305]​  Exceptions were made for a surplus of junior officers if they were being used as recruit depot staff.  Appended was also a new rule governing deployment of recruits from depots to fighting units, detailing the circumstances under which field recruit depot contingents could be used before their training was completed.  Infantry replacements in recruit depots were not to be deployed unless the average strength of each battalion in the division fell to less than 900 men.​[306]​  The OHL would determine officer assignments, and divisions would not be permitted to use up their depot recruits in dribs and drabs.  
Summer and Autumn brought a return to the lessons of defensive warfare with the Battle of the Somme.  Experience on the Somme vindicated the lessons of Aisne-Champagne, while tacitly admitting that they had gone unlearned in the passing of year’s time.  In September, 1916, the Chief of the General Staff published a summary of its thinking on the state of combat on the western front, providing an outline of the problems caused by Entente attack methods.  For the infantry, the General Staff determined,
	Counterattacks are on the most part successful only when:
		-they followed directly after an enemy breakthrough
		-the enemy’s success remained confined to the first line
-Artillery closed off the area behind the enemy, and the troops tasked with the execution of the counterattack were trained; well led and well equipped small units have achieved the most, while mass attacks of forces deployed are nearly always shot apart.​[307]​

The first of the specific lessons the General Staff wished to forward to field commands was as follows,

It is wrong to base the defence of a position solely on the strength of the construction of its first line positions, and its garrison’s powers of resistance.  Due to the systematic, days long artillery preparation for enemy attacks, the defender’s positions can only be held through counterattacks launched from rearward positions and through effective artillery and machine gun fire, if possible from the sides or rear.​[308]​

Well-trained infantry who were confident in their abilities and would attack without hesitation or consideration for numbers were still indispensable.  By the winter 1916-1917, the OHL was doing to new divisions what it had mandated for new battalions in 1914; ensuring that each new unit had a substantial percentage of its manpower and small unit leadership composed of experienced soldiers.
The Raising of 241st Infantry Division, November 1916-February 1917

Having first improvised, then institutionalised and fine-tuned measures to sustain units fighting in the west, the OHL and Prussian War Ministry applied the lessons learned to the formation of new infantry divisions. Ten new divisions were ordered raised according to a single set of criteria in November, 1916. The formation of one such unit, 241st Infantry Division in Saxony is the subject of a brief case study.
It has been put forward, most notably by Dennis Showalter, that technological expertise ultimately trumped personal experience over the course of the war.  To put a finer point on Showalter’s case, ‘The embrace of technology permitted the relegation of experience as a necessary category for soldiering and the restructuring of the officer corps to acquire necessary skills, even at the expense of letting in suspect social groups.’​[309]​  It was quite the opposite in fact, with innovations of technology and organisation acting in conjunction to produce distinct experiences of both survival and combat over time.  Hasty improvisation to answer immediate crisis became an institutional response during a prolonged crisis for lack of time and satisfactory results. Both Falkenhayn and Ludendorff identified experience as a critical category working and in the context of the German army experience was to be spread as far as possible, especially to new units.
On 26 November 1916, the Saxon War Ministry received notice from the Prussian War Ministry that the conscription class of 1898 was mustering in, and some of this new manpower would build ten new infantry divisions.​[310]​  The recruits had until mid-January 1917 to complete their basic training, followed by training in companies from mid-January to mid-February, which meant that all divisional officers and staffs should assemble no later than the third week of January.​[311]​  Two weeks of battalion training, then two weeks of regimental and brigade training followed.
Each of the three infantry regiments formed according to the divisional outline drew half of its manpower from troops with prior service.  Experience, as the communication of steadiness and the will to action, was even more important now as half the soldiers in the division were hardly 19 by the time they first deployed. Their instructions were as follows,
The infantry regiments shall obtain for their complements: ¼ veterans, to be taken from the front in exchange for recruits, ¼ convalescents, [and] ½ recruits.  For each company that is beneath established strength approximately ten men fit for garrison duty will be assigned[,] as transportation troops and so on.
Battalion commanders will be drawn from the front and the homeland.  Towards the production [Gewinnung] of courageous company commanders and junior officers that will [also] be drawn from the front and from the homeland, special training courses [Lehrkurs]shall be established.  Battalion commanders will take part in the Course for Company Commanders which lasts fourteen days.​[312]​
Five days later a more ominous message followed, stating that ‘the training of recruits will utilize all possible means, so that training is completed by mid-January 1917.’​[313]​  This admonishment is probably more bluster than anything else, so that time training in companies, battalions and regiments was the longest permissible.  12th and 19th Military Districts in Royal Saxony were ordered to supply officers for unit staffs, but no similar stipulation existed for enlisted men.
The Saxon War Ministry issued formal orders to raise the division on 11 November 1916, offering slight deviations on the outline proposed by the Prussian War Ministry.  Those differences settled on the issue of providing leadership within the division.  Therefore the corps administrative staff of the 19th  Military district concerned itself immediately with the problem of officering the new division, first in finding enough officers, finding enough officers with the correct specialties, and ensuring that all selected were properly trained.  The pressing concern was finding officers with machine gun expertise, as it took six to eight weeks of instruction to produce a machinegun officer from scratch.​[314]​  Most significantly, the Saxons insisted that all non-commissioned officers come from either the convalescent or veteran allotments of the division’s assigned manpower.​[315]​ Those with deficient training were recommended for attendance at a platoon leader’s course held in Prussia.​[316]​
Training infrastructure served an alternate function besides bringing junior officers up to speed on the latest tactics.  The reassignment of convalescents and the supervision provided by training gave the army a chance to weed out soldiers who were physically unfit for duty.  While under instruction at the Zeithain exercise area, IR 474 subsequently produced a list of fourteen NCOs and enlisted men who were no longer fit for active service.​[317]​  Aged 31 to 45, the soldiers suffered primarily from chronic ailments of the chest and head, the lingering effects of old wounds, and nervous disorders from having been buried alive.​[318]​  The regiment’s evaluation was the result of specific instructions concerning soldiers over the age of 30 who were subject to additional scrutiny.  Of the fourteen, the 44-year-old Pvt. Ernst Oskar Kunz’s asthma and ‘lung complaints’ rendered him fit only for garrison duty, while the final status of the remaining thirteen is unknown.​[319]​
All the patterns established in December 1914 were followed and almost to the letter.  The balance of the unit was provided by new conscripts, while the rest was composed of experienced men and veterans who also provided the units’ NCOs.  There were two major divergences from 1914, but these were technical in nature rather moral.  The first was the establishment of additional machine gun and trench mortar units which had since been added to divisional structures.  The second was the increase in the allotment of veteran troops from approximately ⅓ of each battalion to ½ of the division.  However, whereas in 1914 the veteran troops and NCOs were specifically selected for their quality, no such distinction was made in 1916-17 and half of those with prior experience were convalescents drawn from hospitals throughout the German Empire.   Little morale benefit is derived from reassigning soldiers from hospitals to strange units and officers, and it must be counted as a weakness of this form of organisation.   

Official Experience, ‘Realism’ and ‘realistic training’
As stated previously, ‘Official Experience’ refers to an institutional reflection on recent events, specifically with reference to present doctrine, existing technologies and institutional values.   In the German army ‘official experience’ was propagated through official memoranda, but also through after-action reports intended for officers only.  However the reflection can come from any number of observers, from the highest levels of army command to pamphlets drafted under the auspices of a regiment, brigade or division.  ‘Official Experience’ is guided by ideas of ‘realism’, or the ‘realistic’ trend described by Herbert Rosinski as blind faith in the superficial forms of the Prussian officer tradition in ignorance of its deeper responsibilities.​[320]​  The expression of these ideas were an overriding interest in ‘realistic training’, or the processes which inured soldiers to the stimulae of the battlefield and equipped them to act according to a prescribed set of values and skills.
The great lessons in positional war were taught to the German army from February to November 1916 through the experiences of the Somme.  The lasting lessons of these battles were the importance of small unit leadership and a universal requirement for aptitude with grenades.​[321]​  The point was also driven home that rest time was simultaneously for the ‘revitalization and recuperation of the troops’ and ‘the most intensive training.’​[322]​
Decentralised command and freedom of action of subordinates is one thing, but putting contradictory goals to them is quite another. Technical considerations aside, none of the points raised were appearing in print for the first time.  By the summer of 1916, the army had ostensibly known for eight months that mass attacks produced nothing but mass casualties and if counterattacks were to be centre of defensive thinking, then they had to be launched according to local circumstances.  Though no evidence exists to link this movement towards greater dispersion to the recent army-wide casualty audit cited in Chapter 1, completed in January, 1917, they seem a strange coincidence indeed. 
In response to these realities, the Command of 26th Reserve Corps published ‘Experiences during the Somme Battle: Guidelines for similar battles in the future’, a booklet ‘Only for the use of Officers.’​[323]​  It began by stating that the battle was a ‘pure defensive battle’, wherein through the lowest possible losses the defender must repel an attacker who was superior in manpower and technology.  As for the emphasis on counterattack, ‘counterattacks on a broad front will have no view of success as we are inferior in men, guns, shells and planes.  Every large and deliberate counterattack will splinter in the face of enemy artillery.  [Large counterattacks] are therefore useless.’​[324]​  However, ‘small counterattacks’ were successful ‘every time, so long as they were launched immediately after the enemy penetrated [German lines] and from close distance by troops of the second line.’​[325]​
February 1916’s attack at Verdun and the following months of combat posed a unique challenge to the German army, while offering a new set of technical problems to address, but rather demonstrated a moral collapse vis-à-vis their opponents.   By November and December 1916, the OHL took notice, particularly while enduring French successes on the Maas river.​[326]​  Here, Field Marshal von Hindenburg gave voice to the pre-war belief in the army’s readiness to fight and die,

The unusually high number of prisoners among German troops, who obviously, partially without serious resistance and without great and bloody losses gave themselves up proves that the morale of individual troops involved stands on a slippery slope.  The grounds for the waning of morale require thoughtful examination.  Through training and strict drill it is [possible], just as through education and indoctrination, to resuscitate the old spirit of German infantry.  Correct measures for these purposes are the life-and-death question [facing] our army.​[327]​ 

In a report to the commander of its infantry brigade, 28th Reserve Infantry division commented on the grasp of essential principles of doctrine by its commanders.  They noted ‘the reports and notes on fighting previously submitted concerning the fighting around Verdun prove that the fundamentals of delaying battle and that ‘offensive Defense’ [angriffsweise Verteidigung] are not present in the troops in the desired extent.’​[328]​  Briefly, ‘offensive Defence’ is the idea, derived from Clausewitz, that the real strength of a defence is the attacking power of its reserve units, rather than fire-power of its fortifications. The purpose of defense ‘…is to hold permanently the forward defensive position.  Before Verdun this forwardmost defensive position was the second crater position [Trichterstellung], not the fighting trenches.  Only the higher leadership is permitted to direct withdrawals from the forwardmost lines.’​[329]​   ‘Offensive Defence’ did not so much rely on a persistent defense by the units in the most danger, but rather demanded it and reinforced this demand by placing harsh restrictions on their ability to move within their defensive zone.  If there was an upside to demands placed on front line garrisons, it was the guarantee of ‘powerful, hasty counterattacks’ [kräftige Gegenstoß] to reclaim lost areas of the forwardmost line.  Of course, the soldiers or storm troops committed to the local counterattack were intended to drive through whatever opposition existed until they had reached the original front line.​[330]​  
The principle of the ‘Offensive Defence’ was manifested in a system call ‘Elastic Defense’, which in theory abandoned the idea of continuous trench lines entirely for a camouflaged network of fortified shell craters, as well as similarly concealed concrete bunkers and forts.  Amongst and behind these fortifications, local troops waited to launch counter-attacks at their own discretion, while Eingreifsdivision waited beyond the enemy’s artillery range to strike at potential break-throughs. Underpinned by the assumption that an attacker would always attempt to drive through the German defences as quickly as possible and regardless of loss, ‘Elastic Defense’ sought to fuse the offensive power of German infantry with the disorienting effect of advancing over the ‘Empty Battlefield’ in the face of concentrated machinegun and artillery fire from unknown sources.  Critical to its success was the ‘Forward Zone’, the technical term for No Man’s Land, which German infantry had to control in order to avoid surprise attacks, and begin disordering enemy units and killing enemy soldiers before they engaged the heart of the defense.  That heart was the network of bunkers, forts and counter-attack specialists of the ‘Main Battle Position’ which replaced the old front line, in which defenders were permitted to move forward, backward and laterally at will, so long as they did not abandon the ‘Main Battle Position’ or permit its capture.​[331]​
So it was that the German army learned that in positional war, ‘small units with energetic leadership achieve far more than huge, uncoordinated masses of men.’​[332]​   This was a lesson learned by senior army officers in the autumn of 1915, but for whatever reason had not made its way up the chain of command, until Falkenhayn and then later Hindenburg and Ludendorff embraced and instituionalized the storm troop concept.
Ideally, storm troop squads made a quick and quiet exit from its own trenches, traversed the shell holes and other obstacles of No Man’s Land, and broke swiftly into the opposing position.  Toward this end, exercise areas were constructed in broken terrain and provided with shell holes and simulated defenses.  Maneouvres were as much about increasing the physical fitness and dexterity of soldiers as they were implanting new skills.  As was argued in Chapter one, physical fitness, dexterity and also instinctive decisionmaking were the primary goals of bayonet drill; there seems little reason to draw a distinction between it and  storm-troop exercises based on their central themes,   which were, to shape the conncection between thought and action in a manner agreeable to the OHL.
The break-in, or the entry of an attacking force into a defensive position,  was followed by a ‘rolling up’ of the trench, or moving down the trench from one blind corner to the next behind a shower of grenades.  Speed and surprise enhanced by shock were the essence of their tactics, and so it made perfect sense to build practice grounds which familiarised candidates with what they were expected to do and how they were expected to do it.  That these grounds bore little resemblence to working defenses was beside the point.  Essentially, such training grounds served as a ‘proof of concept’ for troops undergoing instruction, as carefully staged photographs from the Bild-und-FilmAmt (BuFA) demonstrate. ​[333]​
In determining the doctrinal path of German infantry for the remainder of the war and the army’s dedication to the ‘offensive Defensive’, large, high quality formations were now required to execute deliberate counter-attacks.  This required clarification, first as to the new defensive methods, second to incorporate innovations which pre-dated the institutionalisation of these reforms.  Such was the 4th Army Command’s task in the summer of 1917.​[334]​  What stands out from the internal documentation of the Imperial German army are the number of words found translatable as ‘guidelines’, ‘hints’ and so on.  Perhaps such ambiguity in issuing instructions was conducive to good leadership on a battlefield, but it created organisational problems, especially in the context of frequent changes in doctrine.  The 4th Army was compelled to publish an eighteen page memorandum clarifying the names, roles and organisations of new units, along with practical instructions for building new units.  The 4th Army made sure to say that, 

The following guidelines offer no ironclad provisions and no schema.  They expand on [previously disseminated] experiences and should illuminate for officers and men of divisions soon to be deployed in Flanders the tasks of an Intervention [Eingreifs-] division as determined by the experiences of deployed divisions.​[335]​

New terminology acknowledged measures already in place, so officers were informed that units which the Army had formerly designated ‘Strike divisions’ [Stoßdivision] and ‘Combat Reserve divisions’ [Kampfreserve Division] were now ‘Intervention’ units.​[336]​  Divisions which did not receive the Eingreifsdivision designation became Stellungsdivision, ‘Holding’ or ‘Garrison’ divisions, without privileged access to rest, training or equipment. Divisions with troops who had prior instruction in ‘offensive fighting’ were slated for eight to ten days’ additional training, while those without should receive at least two weeks.  The 1st Army produced its own ‘Pamphlet on the organisation and equipping of Intervention-Divisions’ that May, doing in two pages what took 4th Army a small book chapter to explain.​[337]​   
1st Army however, confined itself to the circumstances under which an Intervention division was deployed, and the special equipment of its soldiers which included a canteen of spirits.​[338]​ In later months, specifically designated and trained unit s for deliberate counterattacks were designated ‘Intervention Divisions.’  ‘Intervention Divisions’ were simply the largest of the specialised counter-attack formations, which included storm troops but also the coordinated use of field guns and small infantry units to counter tanks.​[339]​  It seems that whatever the tactical problem facing the German army, the solution was based on small squads of specially trained soldiers lead by picked officers. Such was a pattern had been viable, but not for long.  The introduction of the tank and the refinement of tactics for its use caused Crown Prince Rupprecht’s staff publish a memorandum for the units of his army group, stating; 

Where the terrain permits the employment of tanks, the enemy will certainly be able to repeat such surprise [überfallartig] attacks.  Therefore “quiet fronts” are no longer to be spoken of.  It will not be possible to equip all of such sectors with the appropriate means of defence.​[340]​  

The integration of the tank into the Entente’s offensive doctrine, by means of ‘surprise’ attacks undermined the fundamental logic of the Prusso-German army’s military organisation.  Previously, large scale, deliberate attacks were easily detected, allowing the Germans to  concentrate high quality, counter-attack formations in threatened areas.  Since the movements of highest quality formations were reciprocal, the security of other sectors was assured.   The Staff of Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht feared that the Entente had successfully decoupled its offensive capability from the logistical constraints of a huge artillery park and the institutional bias toward elite units for leading assaults.  Though this was worst-case thinking, in time its basic message proved true.

The Army’s Values for Positional War and ‘Accumulation’

These values were also not the singular province of German military thought.  Assessments of the situation tended to sound the same regardless of author’s nationality,

The commanding general of 3rd Army brings to the attention of all concerned the following important observations:
In order to make good use of the unquestionable superiority of our artillery and the offensive power of our infantry, all attacks must be methodically prepared; with the execution of approach marches the strongest security measures should be taken, that they keep themselves completely hidden from the observation and blows of the enemy.

The impression shared by all troops (French as well as German) is this, that nothing holds back our infantry when their advance is supported by artillery.  Therefore we do not spare our artillery, so long as their protection is certain, in order to save the blood 
of our infantry.​[341]​

The fact that the author of the above passage was General Rouffey of the French 3rd Army does little to mitigate the form and sentiment of his words.  They are just as likely to appear conveying the same sentiments in almost the same manner as a German General describing the combat of August 1914.  Rouffey’s beliefs are obvious; that French infantry’s willingness to attack was almost self-destructive and therefore not in doubt; that that willingness produced irresistible offensive power boundaried by the fact that his soldiers were not immortal.   Perhaps German methods were more subtle, but even perfectly executed and successful attacks against weak opposition produced a loss rate of 12-14 percent, as were experienced by Infantry Regiments 82 and 84 at the Battle of Mons.​[342]​  
In the spring of 1915, 1st Sergeant-Lt. Kempf of Reserve Infantry Regiment 239 reported to the 26th Reserve Corps on a recent operation, a night attack against French opposition, drawn from the personal papers of the Corps commander, the Freiherr von Hügel.​[343]​  Kempf described his units as forming Sturmkolonnen, or attack columns, composed of three elements; Engineers, ‘specially trained infantry units for the removal of obstructions’, and finally ‘assault companies’, most but not all of whom were equipped with grenades.​[344]​  Kempf painted a familiar picture; his men, spattered with mud from bursting shells, sprung to their orders when the attack when commanded, taking three lines of defences. There was no mention of combat in Kempf’s report; the French offer no resistance as individuals but emerge from the dugouts too shaken to resist and gave up straight away.​[345]​
Even when going through the defense, very little changed regarding the character of Kempf’s narrative.  The attackers pushed forward, again uncaring of a French barrage and quickly took more prizes, this time seven machine guns whose crews were either shot or captured.​[346]​ Batteries of field artillery were overrun attempting to retreat through the expedient of shooting their horses.   When French infantry were encountered in house-to-house fighting they were subdued by setting the roofs on fire with grenades and taking them prisoner as they ran out.​[347]​  His men demonstrated their obedience and fearlessness in the face of technology, the enemy was reduced to helplessness by their skill and daring, and their fine conduct proved by the capture of prisoners and artillery.  Four months later, the 2nd Army reported in the exact same manner an attack conducted in the exact same way on positions near Frise, extolling the ‘courage’ and ‘offensive spirit undiminished by positional war’ therein displayed.​[348]​
A believed spiritual superiority counted for only so much though.  A special report to the Third Army staff was made concerning the experience of Reserve Infantry Regiment 122, which had fought near Souain from 22 to 25 September 1915.​[349]​  Five companies of the regiment were annihilated [vernichtet] by sustained barrages [Trommelfeuer].​[350]​  It was said, ‘they will overwhelmingly be counted as “missing”, but presumably they did not give up but according to the reports of the few men who returned to the regiment, fell victim to the barrage.’​[351]​  There followed a four point explanation of how such events could occur, with two points standing out: that too many men were deployed in the forward trenches and that their shelters were poorly constructed and in fact many had caved in.​[352]​  3rd Army could take comfort from the fact that it soldiers had not succumbed to the moral effects and given up, rather they were buried alive.  More worryingly, the connections between the fighting positions and their supporting positions and artillery broke down [versagte gänzlich] and were only maintained intermittently by messengers.
At least in the early war, the most impressive qualities that soldiers could display were fearlessness, obedience, and willingness to die.  Certainly these were the virtues that officers used to soften the news of their mistakes and to accent the breadth of their successes.  Moreover, none of those qualities listed were new to someone familiar with the Drill Regulations of 1906, the Prusso-German army’s essential statement of pre-war doctrine.  But what Sgt.-Lt. Kempf’s ‘attack columns’ presented was a growing specialisation for organisational forms and technological means to more easily attack fortified points.  Were the values of an envisioned Second Franco Prussian War compatible with ‘the great surprise of the war; the year long fight for position’?​[353]​
Perhaps a better name for the ‘War of Position’ is the ‘fight for positions.’  In battles lasting weeks and involving firepower capable of permanently altering natural and man-made landscapes, orientation and direction became issues of critical technical but also personal importance.​[354]​  Fighting the war became the province of small unit leaders and by the summer of 1916, the quality of their leadership and their repertoire of skills became the subject of frantic debates.  The 12th Infantry Division published a memorandum on reserve officers and officer-aspirants, forwarding a copy to the Chief of the General Staff while also making its way into the files of headquarters of Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht. It observed,
Ensigns and officer-aspirants who have been trained in the homeland lack working knowledge of the service and in dealing with enlisted men.  Subsequently, more care must be taken that young replacements arrive at the front well disciplined, which due to a lack of usable training time upon arrival at the front, can only be achieved by a narrow majority.​[355]​

That “lack of working knowledge” generated a detailed list of subjects whereby, “particularly, a more intensive preparation in the following service sectors would be desirable”; trench construction, familiarity with close combat weapons, familiarity with the operation and maintenance of machine guns, a clear knowledge of the procedures and effectiveness of field and heavy artillery, and how to execute, and behave on, a patrol operation, including how to draft accurate reports and sketches of enemy dispositions, and how to conduct oneself during a gas attack.​[356]​  In light of the present state of positional warfare, the guidelines for officer training in the replacement army were obsolete, to the noticeable detriment of effectiveness and troop morale.  The 7th Army published its own findings to its attached units having ordered and concluded an inspection of training infrastructure for small-unit leaders, finding that ‘according to [its] scope and performance training has been quite inconsistently managed.’​[357]​
Army divisions constituted but one level of training infrastructure in a multi-tiered system where each level established its own set of necessary skills.  Above the 12th Division, a specialist school for small unit leaders was established for all units of Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht at Sissone in November, 1916.​[358]​  For small unit leaders, the emphasis of their training as combat commanders lay above all in preparation for ‘the demands of protracted, defensive warfare, for example, the Somme, and added familiarity with operation of the enemy’s weapons as well.​[359]​  His responsibilities now included sure communication of reports and notable events while in combat, and ensuring coordination between his men and supporting machine gunners and artillery.​[360]​  Thus, the junior officer became simultaneously, point of inspiration, risk manager, scout, and lynchpin between small units and their only means of retaliation or preservation against enemies beyond their reach of their weapons.​[361]​
Given time and space, small unit leaders could be brought up to a state-of-the-art understanding of positional warfare while learning the personal management skills necessary for changing modes of leadership.​[362]​  However, this required tapping another increasingly scarce human resource.  The 6th Army command wrote to the Prussian War Ministry, demanding that training ‘only be led by older, active officers with personal experience in war’ as ‘only they can be in the position to generate dash and self- reliance in young people.’ ​[363]​  Besides these changes, candidates should display physical toughness and maintain a military bearing at all times. ​[364]​
3rd Army Command ordered every one of its divisions to construct an assault school and to communicate the location of these assault schools to the OHL.​[365]​ This was soon followed by the whole of Army Group German Crown Prince, which provided a common training plan for its component units, outlining a course for three weeks’ instruction.​[366]​  Army Group German Crown Prince noted that this plan was drafted ‘without knowledge of the final draft of the new A.V.F and the new Attack Manual [Vorschrift für den Angriff].’​[367]​  Where some armies went it alone or recycled old training instructions, others laid down clear instructions for fixed training infrastructure.
One of those was the 6th Army, which published ‘Field Regulations for small-unit leaders of the 6th Army.’​[368]​  Candidates were instructed to bring their copies of the 1906 Drill Regulations, both for Infantry and Heavy Artillery, a document called ‘D.V.25’, a compass, binoculars and a flashlight.​[369]​  ‘Essential’ [Grundlegend] for the instruction of officers, it included all relevant doctrinal publications from the OHL, as well as ‘Experience’ reports and guidelines published by army groups and armies from which candidates originated.​[370]​  Noncommissioned officers received far different instruction which emphasized physical fitness, quick decision-making and building of strength of will through ‘frequent exercises with the Assault-Instruction battalions.’​[371]​  
The conflict between experience, official experience, army values and the storm troop programme and the old officer corps took place among those closest to the front: junior officers and enlisted men. The result was an unmanageable conglomerate of best-case thinking framed neatly within the values of the pre-war army, with very little in the way of reflection on what was actually possible with the time and resources at hand.  However, the army continued in this vein, believing that properly disseminated ‘experience’ and rationalized training were sufficient when blended with a modicum of technological innovation.

FRDs and the Storm Troops: Fusion and Accumulation
Hindenburg and Ludendorff moved quickly to bind the various training systems together with the cord provided by the storm troop programme.  Ludendorff stated, 

I agree with the suggestion for the initial creation of a local company- and platoon leader school for every Army Group and the 4th Army-with local instructors-similar to the one which has arisen among the Rohr Assault Battalion.  Their incorporation with suitable Recruit Depots is discretionary and suggested to assign to the formation of Field Combat Schools [Feldkriegsschule] an older officer experienced in war and practiced in the building of recruit depots.​[372]​

The Field Recruit Depots were brokerages of experience.  But from early summer 1916 the acceptance of the ‘storm troop’ programme produced an apparently superior mechanism for generating experience  by mating it with technical expertise and tactical innovation.  Indeed this was the idea, for the ‘storm troop’ programme was constructed with planned obsolescence in mind so that at some point, the 17,000 very best soldiers in the German army would return to the fold of an institution revolutionized by their training efforts.   However, the perceived continuous decline in the quality of soldiers and the ability of junior officers produced an essential threat not just to the effectiveness but also the institutional self-confidence of the German army.  That confidence lay fundamentally on the amalgamation of physical and moral characteristics and the acquired immunity to the experience of combat.  For these effects the storm troops offered a silver-bullet solution to what was a structural problem, and the army seized at it.  How this process was resolved is detailed by the establishment of divisional ‘assault schools’, which were established under the control of divisional recruit depots, here examined from the records of Reserve Infantry Division 28 and Infantry Division 56.
The Records of Infantry Division 56’s recruit depot and divisional assault battalion are the same file in Karlsruhe. They show that the unit proposed the establishment of its own recruit depot alongside those already built by units of the 14th Corps at le Chesne late in 1915.​[373]​  The unit requested 500 recruits from 18th corps administrative staff, and 250 from 3rd corps administrative staff.​[374]​  Under this outline, each regiment of the division would have a company strength unit of replacements, trained specifically in trench combat and radio operation by a Captain fit for garrison duty.​[375]​
While serving in the 7th Army, Reserve Infantry Division 28 received orders to establish special units for the destruction of machine gun nests and bunkers.​[376]​  Appended to the order was a brief memorandum, ‘Training of Assault Troops’ [Ausbildung der Stoßtrupps], with guidelines and goals for training alongside a sample plan for a fourteen day training course.​[377]​  For the propagation of the new methods, the division’s Recruit Depot established ‘assault courses’, under the supervision of the division’s field recruit depot commander and led by a reserve lieutenant.  The first task was to establish a corps of trained soldiers, then to train three NCOs and twenty-four men from each of the division’s infantry regiments who received three week’s training.​[378]​  The 56th Reserve Infantry Brigade, which oversaw the division’s infantry, reported to the division on 5 January 1917 that in accordance with the recently published Training Manual for Foot Troops in War, referenced by its German acronym, A.V.F, ‘…that every platoon strove to produce more than one assault squad, consisting of the very best men and kept in the 2nd Line, to serve in counter-attacks and [various] operations as shock troops.’​[379]​   Following on the heels of the A.V.I’s publication was an OHL directive of 29 December 1916, mandating the exchange of training personnel between storm troop training courses and training areas in the homeland.​[380]​
Ad-hoc assault schools could be formed when necessary, and suffered the same problems as the rest of the training system. These were the persistent lack of qualified instruction personnel and a shortage of arms for training purposes.  So the Field Recruit Depot requested four sergeants from the 7th Army’s assault battalion and the loan of three light machine guns, stating ‘Presently next to no-one can be trained with these new weapons on account of the lack of light machine guns.’​[381]​  Competent instructors were now available under the auspice of the assault battalions, but with the light machine gun becoming backbone of German infantry tactics, the absence of such weapons for training purposes meant fundamental training in new methods was sketchy at best.
The penetration of storm troop tactics into each infantry division was the responsibility of the division’s infantry brigade, in a process regulated by the division command. In the summer of 1917,  56th  Reserve Infantry Brigade then proposed the establishment of permanent ‘assault school’, which the division command promptly shot down, ordering the Brigade to report as soon as three assault squads had been trained for each company in the division.​[382]​ 56th Reserve Infantry Brigade reported 30 June 1917, detailing how many assault squads were present in each of the Division’s thirty-six infantry companies.​[383]​  Each company possessed at least one and some as many as six assault squads, with additional squads ready amongst the reserve army and more undergoing five week training courses.​[384]​  Units could form permanent assault schools, but by the war’s third year Field Recruit Depots could function as assault schools with little trouble if asked.
In November 1917, the Prussian War Ministry through the O.H.L proposed an integration of the three training infrastructures by including recently devised storm troop training courses in the rotation of training personnel from homeland to recruit depot.​[385]​  Crown Prince Rupprecht personally commented on the proposal, noting that he agreed with the ideas as a means ‘to increase the knowledge and love of duty among instruction personnel monotonously deployed at home, in order to maintain a constant, intimate connection between field and replacement troops.’​[386]​  This is most likely the Crown Prince recommending for the German Empire what was already standard practice in Bavaria, as 6th  Bavarian Assault battalion provided demonstration courses for personnel of the Bavarian corps administrative staffs since January 1917 until at least March of that year.​[387]​  The training schedules of  16th Assault battalion reveal similar timelines, with each of its four companies being assigned a class from a corps staff and corps administrative staff to instruct.​[388]​  Classes from corps staffs were composed of frontline troops, while those from Corps Administrative Staffs were composed of generals and staff officers who ostensibly observed but did not take part.​[389]​  The names and ranks of staff officers were provided in rosters, which also indicate course lengths of about ten days.  The first class held by 16th Assault Battalion was held from 17 to 27 April 1917, incorporating staff officers of the 8th , 13th, 14th, 18th  and 21st corps administrative staffs totalling eight majors, two captains, five major generals and one lieutenant general.​[390]​
The scheduled instruction of the sixth ‘homeland course’ of 6th Bavarian Assault battalion sheds some light on what officers from corps administrative staffs were witnessing.​[391]​   Days were divided in half with a morning and afternoon session.  The first two days’ morning sessions were devoted to grenade throwing techniques, crossing No Man’s Land, cutting barbed wire and breaking into enemy positons.  Day three was dedicated to the use of assault squads in immediate counterattacks and techniques of ‘rolling up’ trenches.  Day four was devoted to combined arms on the tactical level and the overcoming of bunkers and blockhouses, ‘Wave Attacks’ and consolidation of captured trenches.  Day five featured a model attack by the assault battalion.  Afternoons were taken up by theory lectures, demonstrations of grenade launcher and machine gun marksmanship and instruction by assault company officers alongside grenade launcher, machine gun and flame-thrower specialists.  Morning sessions lasted from 8.30am to noon, then a three to four hour pause before the evening session.  Officers in the rear areas therefore received a whirlwind instruction heavily weighted towards the use of grenades, the overcoming of obstacles and the crossing of No Man’s Land.  All of these were matters of individual skill and physical fitness.  A single day was devoted to combined arms tactics for units larger than a squad.   An attendee could reasonably assume that his job was to produce physically fit and expert grenade throwers, able to utilize cover, and higher developments were the responsibility of the field army.
By January 1918, when plans were well underway for the Spring Offensive, the conscription class of 1899 mustering into service and to ensure uniformity between all the components of the army in the West, the OHL took an unprecedented interest in how soldiers were being trained and the quality of instruction they were receiving.​[392]​ These controls were exercised through a new office, the ‘Representative General of the OHL’ to ensure obedience to the goals and procedures established by the Supreme Command.​[393]​  This officer was the vehicle through which ‘a strong influence of the OHL upon Field Recruit Depots and upon the utilization of replacements’ was exercised, to establish unifying principles for training replacements from the Beverloo exercise area, recruits from the homeland and soldiers transferred from the East.​[394]​   All commands and units were ordered to provide reports to the Representative General on anything related to training, supply, the general health of soldiers, and to submit their recruit depot exercises to his observation.​[395]​
To execute this offensive, the OHL disseminated the final distillation of its wartime experiences.  Within it the OHL produced a system which divided the offensive task into three distinct components, but was most startling in what was asked of common soldiers.  Entitled ‘The Attack in Positional War’ it was published first in January, 1918.​[396]​ The most telling of its ‘General Principles’ is reproduced here, 

7. War promises the greatest success to those measures for which the enemy is least prepared. Therefore in all offensive action the surprise of the enemy is of decisive importance [entscheidender Bedeutung].​[397]​

The publication continued, with point eight emphasizing the effects of flanking movement, even when done by small forces to deliver fire or attacks from the sides or rear and the critical responsibility of small unit leaders to correctly evaluate the tactical importance of the terrain they were to fight over.​[398]​ The specific instructions concerning leadership demanded extensive personal reconnaissance, preparation, and mapping of opposing positions with sketches. There responsibilities were dominated by the coordination of supporting artillery and mortars and the close coordination of assaulting troops with their artillery programme.​[399]​  However the instructions made the distinction between the psychological and moral states of being surprised and never-before-seen modes of war-making.  The principle of ‘morale-shattering’ was reaffirmed by Ludendorff as the Spring Offensives continued, ‘Training must be expanded in accordance with the experience of the most recent battles’, Ludendorff wrote on 4 April 1918, two weeks after the beginning of the Spring Offensives.​[400]​  He went on to say,

The basics of offensive experience drawn from positional war were surprise, combination of weapon effects in a quick and timely manner, [and] swiftness of execution of attacks.
Artillery has striven less for complete annihilation and destruction than the immediate moral shattering of the enemy and surprise to the greatest possible extent.  Its impact is to be used immediately by the infantry.
These principles have proved themselves, they must remain in prominence in the 
future, [but] artillery’s effect must nevertheless be increased.​[401]​





How the German army was trained throughout the First World War is a subject of scholarly neglect, owing largely to the influence of the ‘storm troop’ programme on historiography, and more recently debates over ‘military effectiveness.’ As Mark Grotelueschen has observed, ‘combat effectiveness’ is a problematic mode of analysis and has narrowed scopes of inquiry concerning wartime military thought and organisation by channelling research into a ‘good-bad’ dichotomy.​[402]​  
But when faced with a problem, the point of departure for the OHL was always an improvisation based on the individual moral and physical resources of its soldiers.   These resources were accessible and modifiable through training, and brought to their peak through contact with soldiers who displayed the greatest aptitude for clear thinking and prompt action in combat.  The recruit depot system was simply the first step in institutionalising the transfer of experience, and therefore courage, fortitude and willingness to risk one’s life from the front to fresh conscripts establishing the centrality of combat experience in the German army’s training process.  Through the depot system, German soldiers learned once again that combat was manageable, even as high ranking officers sought the means to restore the old Active army in a new form.  From Autumn 1914 to Summer 1916, the depot system, and finally the FRDs worked towards this goal, doing well enough to sustain the army through the first half of the war.  But after the Somme, the army fused the FRD system with the storm troop program to restore the infantry’s offensive capability through a regeneration of old values and a few new skills.  The resulting combination of the two systems produced a complete program of how to live through, and fight in, the mutual mass siege of the Western front.  However, even as early as Autumn 1915, and again in Autumn 1916, there were signs that the army had to remain flexible in its thinking, and consequently in the merits of its skills and values if it were to continue denying victory in the West to France and Great Britain.
The Recruit Depot system formed the keystone of this structure, first serving to intimate recruits with the realities of the front, then in concert with the storm troop movement, to create the machine gunners and grenadiers the army wanted.  These were combatants who were taught in depot facilities how to execute basic tactics, how to overcome rough ground and hindrances, and what exploding grenades and shells felt and sounded like.  Having attuned soldiers to the sights, sounds and ‘rhythm’ of the battlefield through ‘realistic’ training, soldiers were now basically prepared to fight a positional war. The army’s ‘official experience’ taught it that German soldiers would fight and die but were far more ready to do the latter than the former.  So a careful system of combined arms were required to get the most out what was available.   Still, the fusion of FRD and the storm troop programme served only to managed the effects of positional war for the balance of soldiers.  It was not enough, particularly in a defensive system dominated by the idea of the ‘Offensive-Defensive’ as manifested in Elastic defense, to have soldiers capable of attacking.  There had to be a cadre of soldiers reliable enough to go forward whenever asked, and here the army could not escape an additional investment of time, resources and equipment.   
Therefore, the recruit depot system’s fusion with the storm-troop movement prompted the third and final configuration of the German army’s wartime training infrastructure.  By blending the role of elite soldier and elite instructor, the army had finally eliminated the gap between homeland training and frontline innovation and experience.  Moreover, they had developed a self-perpetuating system for generating permanently located and physically fit veteran instructors.  Ideally, haphazard rotation of officers between front and homeland had ended, and so had differences in training or doctrinal interpretation.  Instructors could simply attend an assault battalion training course.
With the fusion of FRDs and the storm troop programme, the army too finally believed that the means existed to arrest the decline in junior officer and NCO leadership brought about by the gradual destruction of the peace-trained army and the profusion of new skills, values and technologies which sprang up during the war.  It would have been illogical to ask more and more of men from the peacetime army, let alone from men with no prior military service.  As will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, the army was caught between letting units prepare and deploy soldiers according to their own best understanding of war, and the need to guide these innovations in a common direction rather than a uniform implementation, grounded on institutional value placed on the veteran.  While rumblings of stark differences in instruction and expectation began in 1916, formal oversight of the training system was not established until the winter of 1917-1918.  The ‘Representative General of the OHL’ was soon joined by an extensive FRD inspectorate, whose operations began in earnest in the Spring of 1918 and whose reports from February 1918 until the end of the war will be dealt with in Chapter V.












































Chapter III:  The Storm Troop Programme and Creation of ‘Battlefield Taylorism’, 1915-1917

Chapter II focused on the German army’s drive to create a system for enduring the horrors of industrialised mass war through the commoditisation of experience.  At this, the FRDs were only partially successful, though fusion with the storm troop programme promised to satisfy organisational goals by linking survival and endurance with action.  Still, although the western army was committed to positional war, the army’s professional consensus maintained that it was an offensive instrument by doctrine and tradition.  Therefore the army would attack whenever possible.​[403]​ However, as Chapters I and II have established, taking the offensive meant certain casualties and also the potential for catastrophic losses.  Any offensive system had to account for this reality, as well as adapting the forces already in the field to fight a mutual, mass siege with semi-skilled labour.  The heart of the issue was how to create a tactically potent offensive system, which convinced soldiers that they had a stake in violence production as a matter of personal survival, while ensuring that soldiers were easily replaced if killed or wounded.
An additional problem emerged as the war dragged on; the increasing ability of all sides towards developing the techniques of positional warfare.  Whether offensive or defensive in their emphasis, the rush for specialisation demanded new skills, new technologies and an efficient, durable network of command and control. But at the root of these new systems were new values to be inculcated through repetitive training, values that were not the property of one side or the other.​[404]​  What was desired by all combatants was a mutually respecting leader/soldier team, which could then be equipped for a specific task inside a larger, more complicated unit.  The tasks themselves were dictated by the army’s understanding of the enemy’s present state-of-the-art, revolving around a sequential elimination of capabilities which rendered complicated defensive or offensive systems into their constituent elements. 
Such combinations of men and machinery had to be matched to the ongoing tactical developments at the Western front. A portion of the following chapter outlines the standard account of the genesis of these units, as it was first recounted by Helmuth Gruβ. Prepared for the Historical Seminar of the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Berlin in 1939, Gruβ’s monograph utilised sources later destroyed in the RAF bombing raid on the Potsdam military archive in 1945. In terms of content, Gruß’s account acknowledges numerous on-the-spot tactical adaptations by various German army units, but ultimately credits the development of ‘storm troop tactics’ on an experimental battalion established by the OHL.​[405]​ The site for local innovations by soldiers, and actions undertaken by experimental units produced by the OHL was the Vosges Mountains, where positional war had raged since the end of August, 1914, and where, it is worth remembering, even Active army soldiers’ willingness to advance quickly waned.  
 While new tactics were developed and experiments were undertaken with new combinations of weapons and certain types of soldiers, the army continued to reconstruct what was expected of officers and men.  For junior officers in command of small units, however, the need to place oneself in mortal danger to initiate an assault was still key, although with a renewed emphasis on preserving the lives of small unit leaders by all possible means up to that point.  Thus in 1915, the army’s symbols, organisation and composition were filtered through the realities of positional warfare and mass killing for the purpose of ending and preserving life.  Harking back to the combat of the summer of 1914, a later observer concluded that only a total effort drawing on all available physical and moral resources that soldiers possessed could prompt movement in an environment dominated by firepower.​[406]​  This chapter details the second half of that effort, introduced in Chapter II as the storm troop programme, and in its last section, outlines the goal of Germany’s training establishment built on the fusion of FRD and the storm troop programme, the ideal I have named ‘battlefield Taylorism’. ‘Battlefield Taylorism’ was a Taylorism of destruction rather than production which sought not only optimum task efficiency, but also to access all of a soldier’s personal resources through a clear division of labour directed by a labourer/leader team.  That labourer/leader team was epitomised by the assault battalions in their battlefield actions and training courses, providing the army with a body of approximately 18,500 soldier-instructors.
Divisions, regiments, battalions and frequently companies also raised their own storm troops, composed of unit members who had attended assault training courses and who then trained additional soldiers.​[407]​  Storm troops raised within army units were sometimes gathered into permanent formations, but more frequently they were trained and returned to their original duties, to be reassembled when specialists were required for a specific mission.  Reliable data on just how many soldiers received storm troop training either from an assault battalion or from within their own unit is hard to come by, and we are largely dependent on Gruβ’s figures.​[408]​ These would indicate that about a tenth of German troops receiving storm troop training of some description before the winter of 1917-1918.  Played off against the fluctuating strength of the German army, which peaked in 1917 and declined until war’s end, precise figures are impossible to derive.  300,000-450,000 storm-troop -trained infantry seems a reasonable estimate.  In preparation for the Spring Offensives when the OHL mandated two months of storm troop training for 63 divisions, one quarter of the army, which given the army’s average numbers from December, 1917 to March, 1918, yields about 1.1 million soldiers.
The first section of this chapter deals changes made across the army to better conduct war at the front, namely a massive effort to rationalise equipment and unit structure for positional war.  Furthermore, this effort included measures to spare foremost officers, then soldiers’ lives through concealment and later through passive measures like body armour.  Soldiers accepted the former and partially adopted the latter in the form of the steel helmet, but ultimately trusted in their basic skills and dexterity to prevent injury or death on the battlefield.  Section two provides an overview of the storm troop programme from its origins in new tactical methods developed in the Vosges Mountains late in 1914, through its initial experiments in Autumn, 1915, to its army-wide implementation directly following the Battle of the Somme in November, 1916, followed by broad adherence by May, 1917.  Building from section one, section two extends the theme of survival based on skill and physical fitness by exploring what skills were passed on, how they were passed on and how soldiers were intended to behave in aggressive roles.  The final section outlines ‘battlefield taylorism’, and the fine, almost compartmentalised division of labour developed by the German army to retain competence in the tactical offensive in the face of sub-standard manpower and certain losses.  ‘Battlefield Taylorism’ did not foster aggression above all else, but instead sought to husband carefully trained, veteran troops for the most dangerous jobs, while assigning common soldiers to defensive  duties built on resistance to, and production of, fire-power, or repair and construction.  In this way, the German army constructed a training regime encompassing survival and aggression, while re-creating units capable of the tactical offensive in the context of positional war.


Out with the Old, in with the New: Reequipping Officers and Men for Positional War
 
The nature of combat in the emerging positional war is illustrated by battalion surgeon Theodore Zuhöne’s experience in January, 1915.  At the turn of the year of 1915, Zuhöne’s unit, I Battalion, 73rd Reserve Infantry regiment, marched to miserable positions near Bazancourt. Under constant shelling, Zuhöne recorded four to ten burials per day.​[409]​  From 5 January,  the unit’s time was spent as ‘emergency reserves’ waiting to fight in the ongoing Battle of Champagne, and the soldiers passed the time riding and playing skat.​[410]​
The French attacked on 7 January 1915 with a ‘never before seen’ expenditure of shells, mortar bombs and small arms.  The battalion’s most forward trenches were shot to pieces and its 2nd Company driven back.  Two counter-attacks were needed to drive out the French troops, about 120 of whom were killed, 69 made prisoner and ‘many’ were wounded.​[411]​ I Battalion, 73rd Regiment suffered 61 wounded and 48 killed including one Captain and three Lieutenants.​[412]​  The next few days passed quietly until the 10 January, where the French requested a truce to collect their ‘many’ dead and recovered two severely wounded soldiers.   German and French officers and men mingled freely and shared cigarettes until French artillery opened fire again, driving men of both sides into the nearest shell hole.​[413]​  Overwhelming firepower leading to a successful attack drawing an immediate counter-attack leading to a bloody confrontation in partially demolished defences was the new positional war in a nutshell.  But as terrible as losses appeared, they were actually declining sharply from two or three months before, giving both sides a welcome pause not just to wrestle with the new type of warfare, but also to refill their ranks and build up their armies.  
The sum of the Field and Reserve Armies in July 1914 was 2.89 million men, but by January, 1915 the army had already suffered 665,419 men killed, died, missing or wounded and rendered unfit for service.​[414]​  At the same time, the army’s total average strength had grown to 2,618,158 men.​[415]​  To both make good its irrecoverable losses and also to grow the army to the listed average size meant that about 1,756,000 men were added to the ranks of the field and reserve armies.  Reckoning a male population fit for service of about 13.3 million, it was clear that even a modern state with an efficient conscription regime in place would soon run out of soldiers if the pace of the killing and maiming did not slow.​[416]​  As discussed in the previously, German soldiers were already developing new systems of offensive tactics.  Now they began modifying their defensive methods, and when in 1915 they began to abandon broad fields of fire in order to fortify themselves in much rougher terrain, which thwarted observation and the effects of direct fire weapons.​[417]​ Concealment was now associated with survival.
Six months later, Army Group Falkenhausen received an order from the Chief of the General Staff.  Falkenhayn instructed all of the Army Group’s corps and divisions to establish special schools for company commanders noting positive results from units which had already established similar schools on their own.​[418]​  Instruction was provided by veteran active army officers [bewährte aktive Hauptleute] in existing courses as Falkenhayn was sure to point out.​[419]​  Indeed, from the summer of 1915 to May, 1916 the Prussian War Ministry strove to put ‘old, active Officers’ in charge first of the training of replacements in Germany, then in charge of the training of recruits in the Field Recruit Depots.​[420]​ Only active officers designated ‘g.v.’, or fit for garrison duty were made available for Field Recruit Depot service.​[421]​  The staff of Army Group Falkenhausen passed the order on to its constituent corps and divisions with a few additions.  Only officer candidates from the peacetime army with frontline experience would be admitted to the officer candidate’s course, as well as ‘such personalities as fulfil the requirements of the W.O [Wehrordnung, or Draft Regulations].’​[422]​
Besides pushing recruit and officer training closer to the frontline and placing it under the auspices of fighting units, ultimately institutionalised in the establishment of the FRDs,  the army’s recent experiences brought about a wholesale reevaluation of unit structure, equipment, clothing and insignia based on utility.​[423]​  First was the reconstruction of the army’s divisions.  Formerly containing two brigades of two regiments, divisions gave up a brigade staff for use by the O.H.L, while select army corps nominated by the O.H.L turned over ‘1-2 complete infantry regiments including MG companies.’​[424]​  These units were combined to form new divisions, or used as the nucleus of divisions filled out by freshly raised conscription classes.​[425]​  In return, the corps received 2,400 trained replacements and two machine gun platoons with three guns each.​[426]​  Cavalry compliments were reduced and the number of combat engineer companies was increased.​[427]​  The result was a general reduction in a division’s infantry strength, from 12,000 infantry evenly split between two brigade staffs to 9,000 infantry under a single brigade staff.  These reforms demonstrated the new importance of firepower relative to manpower, and the growing need for skills in both the construction and destruction of fortifications.
By turning all efforts towards the more efficient pursuit of the war, the German army of 1915 opened itself to radical change in both official mentality and combat practice.  Impelled by the reality of industrialised mass war and a shrinking pool of peace-trained soldiers and officers upon which views of soldierly discipline were anchored, the German army wrestled with the now diametrically opposed needs. First, to bring the war to a successful military conclusion which entailed massive expansion and modification.  This was – second – set against the army’s institutional imperative toward independence from civilian oversight, a position secured by its monopoly on the knowledge and practices of waging war.​[428]​
Some means was therefore required to reduce the overall number of losses and more specifically, the losses among officers.  For the infantry, one solution was again, concealment,  to reduce soldiers’ visibility in general, but also to minimise the visible distinctiveness of officers from enlisted men.  Such a functional turn meant discarding, obscuring or modifying distinctive symbols bearing traditional significance as they tied the current army to its victorious past.   Such ties were not easily cut, leading to improvisations which often corrected the original fault while giving rise to another.  Moreover, of similar importance was the need to provide visual reference points for German troops in order to give a sense of location on the battlefield.  Battlefields were wiped clean of the familiar sights like villages, farmland and woods.  Some type of replacement visual marker became necessary and a solution presented itself by transferring these reference points onto the bodies of the soldiers themselves.   Then by locating specific individuals within a set of standardised formations, troops more easily oriented themselves in what was an increasingly an empty battlefield with an invisible enemy.​[429]​
Thus on 22 March 1915, the Major General of the 5th army corps administrative staff in Posen published a minutely detailed memorandum on soldiers’ equipment.​[430]​  Referencing the combined impact of the growing number and precision optical instruments and the increased versatility and effectiveness of weapons, it nevertheless acknowledged the great and unexpected demands of positional war offered the chance to take advantage of some practical experiences.​[431]​  Though 35 separate items of equipment were analysed, on examination the entries concerning helmets and insignia are sufficient to give a sense of the changes made and the thought processes behind them. Helmets, the Pickelhaube in this instance, had too much ‘historical significance’ to give up.​[432]​  But a great many creature comforts were conceded to hold onto this piece of gear.  That they offered no protection went almost without saying.  Helmets made from leather shrivelled up when wet.  Spikes on top could not be permanent, as during the war of movement soldiers had gotten their heads stuck in hedges, not to mention they provided a distinctive silhouette that made German infantry easy to identify.​[433]​  Furthermore, besides deforming under moisture, helmet’s design meant rainwater ran off them onto their wearers.  Helmet covers, which obscured permanent metal decorations proved even more absorbant than the helmets themselves.  The dyes used in their fabrication were unequal to prolonged exposure and bleached into highly visible shades.  Numbers on helmet covers which denoted the wearer’s regiment, the memorandum stated, should be visible but from no more than ‘20 paces’ away and affixed to the front and back of the helmet.​[434]​
In time, not even the historical value of the helmet prevented its replacement.  The process that resulted in the Stahlhelm began later in 1915 with a systematic investigation of head-wound pathology.​[435]​  Doctors and officers determined that small shell fragments were the most dangerous and frequent cause of wounds for which comfortable protection was possible.​[436]​  The first steel helmets were tested in November 1915, and issued to frontline troops in December 1915 and January 1916 along with a questionnaire which addressed weight, ease of use, and any deleterious effect on marksmanship and other skills.​[437]​  Soldiers complained about the weight of the helmet, which caused neck strain and headaches, but noted that while not bullet proof the helmet often deprived bullets of so much momentum as to prevent severe injury.​[438]​
With the success of the steel helmet, steel body armour offering protection against slow and medium velocity shell fragments was also developed and extensively tested in the field.​[439]​  Soldiers appreciated the protection it gave.  On the other hand, their complaints mentioned its weight, poor ergonomics, and obstruction of basic functions like aiming and grenade throwing.  This led to suggested improvements which would help maintain users’ dexterity.​[440]​  Storm troops tested the armour as well, ultimately rejecting it as too noisy and cumbersome to wear.​[441]​  Reasonably effective, passive protection measures against some of the war’s most common wound agents, the shell splinter, were rejected by soldiers themselves because those measures decreased mobility and the ability to perform fundamental combat actions.  In 1916 at least and with the exception of their helmets, soldiers preferred to trust in their skills and physical fitness to keep them alive.
Adding to belief in their own skill and fitness, The 5th Corps administrative staff memoranda continued on to the issue of uniforms and the simple advantages of not being seen.   Therefore, concealment from observation was sharply emphasised.  ‘Field grey’ was deemed satisfactory camouflage, but it was forcefully suggested that all uniform articles (belts, pouches, satchels, collar tabs, etc.) be the same colour while at the same time observed that ‘Jäger’ colours offered even less contrast, and were harder-wearing.  More importantly, the uniforms of officers and enlisted men were to be indistinguishable from distances greater than 50 meters.  To further blend officers with enlisted men, officers were now permitted to carry rifles.   However they were asked to keep their attention firmly on the task at hand rather than get carried away shooting at the enemy.  Company and platoon leaders received instructions that ‘As is it is now with squad leaders, who only fire when they have nothing better to do, it presents no danger in this case for company and platoon commanders to simply act as riflemen.’​[442]​
Having taken pains to conceal frontline troops from view and furthermore to hide officers amongst enlisted men, officers’ first responsibility was still to lead by example.  Effectively, the role of officer prevented their being shielded by the soldiers they led.  Patterns of behaviour established by the 1906 Drill Regulations apparently took over as officers placed their men in firing lines, took ranges to enemy positions to foster accurate shooting and tried to discern when the enemy’s fire decreased which signalled to time to launch an attack.  Proceeding from the document’s assessments of distance relative to the enemy, preservation of officer’s lives was no longer a priority once units reached close quarters.  Rather, officers were to do what they needed to in order to put their men into contact with the enemy; their safety and survival were secondary concerns when set against putting their units into motion.
But if the present state of warmaking had proved anything, it was that officers required more than the ability to inspire.  Technical expertise in the deployment of machine guns was crucial, and in this instance the problem lay both in raw numbers and skill.  The army looked back regretfully on the massive expansion undertaken in 1913, where it still had not provided full complements of trained officers to a vastly multiplied machinegun arm.​[443]​  Specifically machine gun companies lacked peace-trained company commanders as they had been promoted to battalion command.  At the same time, the raising of new machine gun units during the war resulted in a threefold increase from the 94 army and 15 fortress machine gun companies raised after 1913.​[444]​ At this point, there was no supply of qualified officers left to tap except those located in cavalry units.   The officer corps was not immune to the same fundamental problem that afflicted the army in general, the need to acquire more and more skills in less and less time.
Falkenhayn inserted the OHL directly into the reform process by collecting useful lessons from frontline units.  In a message to army commands, he wrote ‘The following attached copies of proposals from our forces have reached me and are notable’, proposals dealing solely with the training of the army and the deficiency of training in Germany as opposed to Field Recruit Depots.​[445]​ The OHL noted,
While the troops in Field Recruit Depots behind the front whose training is in the majority case sufficient, the training of replacement units that have been formed in the homeland is, despite a considerable length of time, insufficient.​[446]​

That insufficiency was grounded on two faults in the eyes of the OHL.  The first was the lack of training space in which soldiers could practice ‘Schützengrabenkampf’, or trench fighting in its various forms.​[447]​  The second was the lack of veteran training personnel who were familiar not only with how fortifications were constructed but also in specialised weapons and tactics.​[448]​  At the very least, the commanders of each Replacement Battalion should attend a two week training course at their division’s Field Recruit Depot, and if possible all company commanders and the majority of senior NCOs. 
Though the reforming impulse that ultimately coalesced into storm troop programme grew from the experiences of individual units, there was as yet no broad effort to link the skills developed to a specific doctrine.  Given the select nature of the assault battalions and their modus operandi, only some principles and innovations in weapons technology would be practical for the army in general.​[449]​  This implicit division-of-labour was already recognised, and by the late summer 1915 German units seem to have developed enough common principles and modes of organisation for their enemies to notice.  British Capt. Fraser, adjutant of the 9th Royal Scots, noted a hybrid organisation of skirmish lines mixed with specialist squads.  German troops advanced until they were about 200 yards away, when picked squads of grenadiers and wire-cutters left the formation to execute their tasks.  These specialists ignored all further commands from their unit’s officers while they went about their work.  When German officers thought the time was right, the skirmish lines fixed bayonets and charged with a loud shout, officers in the lead. Specialists re-joined the unit as charging infantry passed over them and the whole unit entered the enemy trench as a single body, in a single movement.​[450]​  The tactics of 1915 followed the same broad outline in the German and French cases; a body of riflemen in loose lines working in concert with squads trained in engineering techniques, close-combat, or both.

Spring 1915: Storm troops, the Tactical Offensive and the Rationalisation of Reform

As of late 1915, the nascent storm troop programme and local tactical reform existed as parallel operations.  The genesis of the storm troop programme lay in the improvisations of regular army units and its progress was determined by members of the OHL, who attempted to harness and direct their actions towards a broadly applicable method of tactical warmaking.​[451]​  The following section makes heavy use of the work of Helmuth Grüß, for the practical reasons explained previously, but also to show that Grüß was perhaps less positive concerning the storm troops than subsequent historians.  However, the programme did codify and centralise the division-of-labour principles already at work within army units, providing a template for restoring competence in the tactical offensive to almost any quality of unit.
Some sort of dramatic tactical reform was needed, and at a grassroots level, this reform was already taking place.  From this process of experimentation, the ‘Calsow Battalion’ emerged under Maj. Calsow, a combat engineer by training, as a select, heavily equipped combined-arms unit based around the deployment of small artillery pieces against strong points or machine gun nests.  Thus, the formation of ‘Assault Battalion Calsow’ provides an easy date for the beginnings of the storm troops program: 2 March 1915.​[452]​  But the ‘Infantry Gun’ approach proved a failure, as the guns themselves attracted enemy barrages, meaning nearby infantry were in no hurry to support them while the blast of the guns themselves made them easy to locate and bring under small arms fire.  Maj. Calsow was sacked on 28 August 1915 for the resulting poor performance of his battalion and high casualties his unit sustained, and was replaced by Capt. Wilhelm Rohr who promptly disposed of infantry guns and focused on the combination of elite infantrymen and man-portable weapons.
Here, it is necessary to backtrack somewhat to 9 May, 1915.​[453]​  French Capt. André Laffargue was at the time leading an attack on Neuville St-Vaast, in which his company took severe casualties storming a German trench system.​[454]​  A clear path lay ahead of Laffargue’s unit but for a pair of machineguns in a bunker some hundreds of yards away.  With French artillery out of communication and no means to attack the bunkers but rifles, bayonets and grenades, Laffargue’s company took cover from the bullets and watched as German reinforcements arrived and dug in.  By then, Laffargue’s company and a neighbouring company, with a total listed strength of perhaps 400 soldiers, were reduced to 80 men.  Two French battalions arrived and attempted to advance in spite of the two machine guns, with predictable results. A dozen Germans halted attacks by a sum of 2400 French soldiers, killing and wounding hundreds in the process.  Based on the experience, Laffargue published a pamphlet entitled L’Etude sur l’attaque dans la periode actuelle de la guerre, or The Attack in Trench Warfare, which was published in 1916.​[455]​
Combat now, according to Laffargue, was a question of time and the moral and physical quality of soldiers.  He wrote, ‘The whole series of frightful defences cannot be nibbled at successively; the must be swallowed whole at one stroke with one decision.  Therefore, the fight is an unlimited assault.’​[456]​  A successful assault therefore had four requirements; ‘Assaulting troops, and all troops are far from being assaulting troops’, an overwhelming superiority in firepower, the shortest possible distance between attackers and defenders, and the resolve to make such sacrifices as were necessary.​[457]​  However, Laffargue warned that while resolution to drive the attack forward regardless of losses was prerequisite, it should be tempered, ‘...calculating, however, that infantry units disappear in the furnace of fire like handfuls of straw [italics original].’​[458]​ Such extremities of thought and action were justified by Laffargue as the best hope for ending the war, ‘saving the inestimable existence of so many humble comrades’, followed immediately by a hedging of bets, ‘...or at least to figure out how the sacrifice of their lives may result in victory.’​[459]​  In support of the infantry, artillery destroyed barbed wire entanglements, ‘neutralized [sic] or destroyed’ defenders, kept opposing artillery from firing, blocked the advance of reinforcements, and acted immediately to destroy enemy machine guns.​[460]​  Or more succinctly, artillery deprived defenders from any form of aid as it stunned and killed them. A complete copy of the The Attack was captured in by the Germans in a trench raid in the summer of 1916, where it was promptly translated and disseminated.​[461]​  However, its reception among German commanders was limited, and among the Entente little attention was paid to it.  The significance of late 1915 is that France and Germany produced modes of warfare based on human potential.  France ignored Capt. Laffargue’s ideas and continued its search for a better way to wage war.​[462]​  
Germany would come to embrace the ideas of the storm troop programme and made human potential the central focus of its war machine, a decision that reaped great dividends but grew ever more troublesome as time passed. As Rolf Raths has argued, the German army was more accepting than rejecting of technology, and was inclined to let technology drive tactical development.​[463]​ However, the storm troop programme ensured that its primary interest remained in human potential augmented by new forms of existing technology and innovations in organisation, rather than innovations in technology.
Returning to Capt. Rohr, his new ‘Rohr’ assault battalion was then deployed against particularly rugged Entente positions, which meant fighting exclusively against the French army.  The first operations under Rohr’s regime took place in December, 1915 in the Vosges Mountains. Attacks in the Hartmansweilerkopf, Schratzmännle and Jägertanne sectors and were successful, while an attack in the Hirtzstein position failed.​[464]​ Rohr’s unit was reinforced by IR 188 and IR 189, regiments with specialist training in mountain warfare, then attacked Hirtzstein position again in January 1916 and took it with few losses.​[465]​  The assault battalion was then transferred to Verdun, where it was attached to units assaulting the Herberbois and was unsuccessful.  A second assault, with the battalion’s 1st company reinforced by a battalion of IR 24, and 2nd company reinforced by battalion of IR 64 against Chaume Forest, Caurierers Ravine and Caurierers Forest succeeded with few losses and the storm troops were commended for their ability to destroy French strongpoints.​[466]​  In a third assault, working again with units from IR 24 and IR 64, the attackers achieved only partial success , prevented from leaving their positions on time by a misplaced German barrage.  As Gruß notes, these results were mixed, as were the responses of conventional infantry regiments to the actions of the storm troops.  The men of IR 64 were generally positive towards Rohr’s unit while the men of IR 24 evinced a general animosity.​[467]​
In criticising their own actions, the assault battalion located their failures in the deployment of the unit rather than the employment of their various weapons and specialist organisation.  Subsequently Rohr published a pamphlet, which provided guidance on using his unit to best effect.​[468]​  For the greatest chance of success, he concluded, the assault troops had to launch their attacks as close to the enemy as possible, ideally from positions approximately 100-200 yards away.  Distance was determined through a balancing act of acceptable danger from short-falling shells vs. time spent crossing No Man’s Land.  Furthermore, infantry were compelled to assault fortifications rather than watch them shelled to pieces, Rohr argued, as fortifications were purposely designed to resist firepower, rather than an assault with grenades and flamethrowers.​[469]​ Couched in these terms, Rohr successfully sold this justification of his units performance to officers across the army and ultimately, to the OHL.
From August to November 1916, Rohr then held a number of instruction courses, usually between three and five days long, to demonstrate the new techniques.​[470]​  Such ‘proof-of-concept’ demonstrations put the onus on divisions to truly raise and instruct their own storm troops.  However, as developed in the previous chapter, high ranking members of the German military bought into the storm troop programme, so that by November 1916, the storm troop programme had taken a firm hold, and a profusion of units formed and deployed their own storm troops, assault troops, demonstration troops, strike troops, and so on, along with establishing their own assault schools.​[471]​  The dizzying number of names referring to storm troops and the variations in tactics and instruction produced mixed results, at least in the short term.​[472]​  Subsequently, the development of truly universal storm troop doctrine was one of Ludendorff’s first priorities upon Falkenhayn’s dismissal.​[473]​  It was the fall of Falkenhayn and the rise of Hindenburg and Ludendorff drove the training of the army more and more in the direction of the storm troops.​[474]​ 
Mode of operation remained the same as practiced on the Hartmannweilerkopf; storm troops undertaking attacks on strong positions were always supported by a unit of conventional infantry many times their size. Thus, careful planning in binding together hundreds, sometimes thousands of soldiers melded with diverse expertise to form a methodical offensive system of tactics focused on introducing two dozen or so elite troops to the enemy trench, killing, capturing or routing its defenders in the meantime.​[475]​  
	Subsequently, divisions constructed elaborate facilities for storm troop manoeuvres.  Consisting of small trench systems combined with barbed wire and other obstacles, storm troops practiced grenade throwing, the crossing of wire obstacles, and the use of flame throwers.​[476]​  2nd Württemberg assault company for instance, constructed exercise grounds replicating a section of German and British front lines, complete with obstacles, shell holes, fighting trenches, bunkers and approach saps.  It is worth noting that nowhere in its exercise ground were the German positions more than 120 meters from the ‘British’ positions.  This is about the same distance put forward in Rohr’s published advise, which itself was about the same distance where infantry used to begin their bayonet charges before the advent of storm troops.​[477]​  
Training also included simulated attacks with live artillery support, and attempted to reproduce rolling, cratered landscapes, which the storm troops had to negotiate at speed.​[478]​  Grenades figured heavily in every exercise, with rifles shown slung around the back as often as they are held in the hands.  In the absence of purpose designed demolition materials, storm troops improvised by detaching the handles from the explosive heads of their grenades.​[479]​  
Given their proximity to the enemy, hand-to-hand combat instruction was generally de-emphasised in favour of demolitions training and practice in grenade-throwing.  However it was not entirely absent. Students of assault battalion training courses received instruction in hand-to-hand combat, during a four week course described by the 2nd Royal Saxon assault battalion. This instruction focused on killing the enemy at the first attempt, killing quickly enemies that had been knocked down, and admonished soldiers to avoid wrestling on the ground and to remain on their feet.​[480]​ The preferred weapon in hand-to-hand was still rifle and bayonet, though if disarmed, soldiers were instructed to use their fists.  
Though unique in its attention to hand-to-hand combat, 2nd Royal Saxon assault battalion otherwise towed the line with regard to the overall purpose of its training courses.  In four weeks, the training class [Ausbildungsgang] states in its first paragraph ‘Specialists are not to be trained, but rather those trained should serve in company manoeuvres as ‘Muster’ troops and assistant instructors.’​[481]​  General instruction was all that was possible; trainees were not expected to become elite soldiers in four weeks, but to carry assault battalion tactics and organisational practices back to their original units, who would then establish their own storm troop training infrastructure.  Emphasis on the role of instructor caused some assault battalions to adopt special names, transforming ‘Sturmbataillon’ into ‘Sturm-Lehr bataillon’, or assault battalion into assault instruction battalion. Even the length of courses could vary, as 6th Bavarian assault instruction battalion stands in contrast to those previously mentioned offered by 2nd Royal Saxon assault battalion.  However, this is counterbalanced by the sheer amount of training that 6th Bavarian assault instruction battalion  conducted. The 6th held at least 20 courses for frontline troops and five demonstration courses for staff officers of the replacement army and corps administrative staffs.  In total, 6th Bavarian assault instruction battalion provided training to 14 active, 20 reserve and three Landwehr divisions.  A single assault battalion provided instructors in the storm troop programme to 37 of the eventual 251 divisions raised by the Imperial German army in Great War.  

Learning to Kill to Stay Alive: Assault battalion training and its Meaning to the Army

The units of the German army fighting on the western front had taken it upon themselves to alter their tactics to better fit their circumstances.  Behind them, the OHL and War Ministry juggled the problems of mass killing, small unit leadership, and a long list of specialities in industrialised mass warfare which required ever more specialists with higher and higher levels of competence.  Managing these problems required clear lines of communication between the fighting front and the war’s third space, the areas of recruitment, transport and training which began at the home front and ended just behind the front line.  After ten months of fighting, the War Ministry decided on a two stage training system consisting of eight to twelve weeks of basic instruction with little practical value in terms of necessary skills taking place in Germany, and a four week stint in the Field Recruit Depots for practical education and service as emergency reserves.  
As stated before, the assault battalions, or units of storm troops comprising about 600 men and kept solely under the control of army or army group commands, were established with the two-fold purpose of both instruction and combat troops.​[482]​ It was an elegant solution to a long-standing problem; that of supplying energetic, veteran instructors with up-to-date knowledge of positional warfare to the masses of replacements flowing from home front to fighting front. By blending instructors and combatants employed in relatively low-risk situations the German army simplified the transmission of the war’s lessons from the frontline to its training infrastructure.   Second, they were offensive specialists, available upon request to lead raids, patrols, counterattacks and attacks with limited objectives.  In terms of their role in combat, overwhelmingly storm troop squads were the first soldiers to enter an enemy fortification, and so begin the break-in.  Whereas the initiation of an assault and leading assaulting troops into an enemy position had been an officers’ chief job, the task was now split, between storm troop squads and infantry officers.  Furthermore, whereas German units had attacked trenches in a single rush as a single entity, storm troops made their way forward at their own best pace while common soldiers followed behind. 
Nonetheless, the prerogative of unit commanders to instruct their men as they saw fit remained. Rather than dictating a new policy, the army had to persuade subordinates to give up this longstanding right and also to modify or abandon such innovations as they themselves had devised.   The rub however was in what the storm troop programme meant for soldiers. The opinions of ranking officers reveal subtle but significant differences as well. Ludendorff had very little to say and upon witnessing a demonstration by Capt. Rohr’s model assault battalion with Ludendorff, and remarked; 

The formation of storm troops from the infantry had not only to be regularized, but to be adapted to the common good.  The Instruction Formations and the Storm Battalions have proved their high value both intrinsically and for the improvement of the infantry generally.  They were examples to be imitated by other men.​[483]​

From this the storm troops provided valuable skills and filled a particular need, while serving as a vehicle to raise the average competence of the army.  The use of the term ‘imitation’ is particularly enlightening, implying that general improvement to a level still below the competence of carefully constructed elite units from handpicked recruits.  
Crown Prince Wilhelm, the titular head of Army Group German Crown Prince and Capt. Rohr’s patron in the army’s highest levels, was both more direct and specific stating,
What the assault battalion can demonstrate through its instruction, however, is nowhere near sufficient in its extent given the strength and dimensions of the army. The troops themselves must undertake proper instruction.  Army corps as well as individual divisions must therefore establish courses for the instruction of training personnel on the model of the assault battalion courses for the development of instructors, and to concern themselves with the help of these instructors to further the training of their soldiers.
Every unit of infantry and engineers must bring themselves closer to the capabilities of the assault battalions.  Well trained infantry, supported by engineers and equipped with machine guns, light mortars and grenade launchers must eventually be able to go without the assignment of special assault squads from the assault battalions.​[484]​

‘Strength’ here refers to massive expansion in the size of the army from the beginning of the war until October, 1916.  The army’s average number of men fit for duty in August, 1914 was 1,527,919 and in spite of casualties by October 1916 had grown to 4,670,840.​[485]​  It is possible to calculate precise casualty statistics for October, 1916 which show that the Imperial German army had suffered 918,277 men killed and missing.​[486]​ Therefore by mid to late 1916 Germany had put into uniform or lost as casualties somewhat less than 60 percent  of its available manpower fit for military service. The question of potential benefit to the army in general dominated Crown Prince Wilhelm’s thinking on the matter.
‘Dimension’ is somewhat more ambiguous and can encompass both Western and Eastern fronts and the multiplication of weapons and specialities which had come into service since the beginning of the war.  But what Crown Prince Wilhelm proposed was a fourth set of training institutions apart from barracks depots, Field Recruit Depots, and storm troop instruction courses.  The army’s units would acquire some training from storm troops, used the men so trained to found their own schools, then instruct their own soldiers.  The problem was that six weeks were needed to create a storm trooper for one of the assault battalions, and instruction courses held by assault battalions never lasted more than two weeks while upon returning they would lose access to the training facilities the storm troops enjoyed.​[487]​ Finally, the assault battalions were under control of corps, armies or army groups and seldom deployed as whole units, whereas the nature of defensive warfare that infantry divisions transferred up and down the front, switched army groups, or moved into OHL reserve.  
They would be compelled to abandon and construct training facilities with regularity, assuming time and space allowed. On the other hand, Crown Prince Wilhelm’s claims were much closer to the thinking of the Prussian War Ministry.  From the Summer of 1915 to May, 1916 the Prussian War Ministry strove to put ‘old, active officers’ in charge first of the training of replacements in Germany, then in charge of the training of recruits in the Field Recruit Depots.​[488]​ Only active officers designated ‘g.v.’, or fit for garrison duty were made available for Field Recruit Depot service.​[489]​  
The result was a general modification of training standards enshrined in the Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie, published by the Prussian War Ministry and disseminated to the Bavarian War Ministry in December, 1916.​[490]​ This was done at the request of the high command, but was described as a modification of the existing training regime codified in the Drill Regulations of  1906.​[491]​  Though measured in its language, the document outlined a worsening strategic situation requiring fundamental changes in the way conscripts were prepared to fight, and how the army viewed the war’s effect on national manpower resources,

The regulation arose from war experience and is initially and primarily intended for training in war.  The war compels [us] to condense training time and preserve training resources.  The drill school will therefore confine itself to the acquisition of such skills and processes which cannot be excluded from combat, and on the other hand-through strict implementation- are appropriate to encourage an education in discipline.  Sector training schools [Abschnitts Kampfschulen] contain all regulations and doctrines for combat training of individuals and units of the Army Group up to the regimental level, as well as machine gun units.​[492]​

In light of pressure from the front line, the goal of the reserve formations within the German states became the replacement of frontline losses, rather than the replacement of frontline losses with well-prepared troops. Instead, training programs emphasized physical fitness, proper grenade throwing, pistol shooting, machine guns and grenade launchers, and the particulars of combat in and between trenches.​[493]​  The assault battalions of Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht held 28 instruction courses between 4 December 1916 to 3 March 1917, on the Western Front, and a course in the east, held in Warsaw.  In total, approximately 500 officers and 3300 non-commissioned officers ‘have enjoyed assault battalion training.’​[494]​   Crown Prince Rupprecht, spoke on the subject 14 months after Crown Prince Wilhelm,

The assault battalions were tasked with a total of 23 operations, with storm troops, grenade launchers, machine guns, trench mortars, flame throwers and infantry guns, of which 16 must be designated as successes.  These battalions were deployed with an average strength of 25 officers, and 750 non-commissioned officers and men, totalling 45 officers and 1850 other ranks.  At present, our losses [among these units] were 7 officers [and] 274 other ranks, including 60 killed.​[495]​

Conspicuously absent from this total is any mention of the number of common soldiers who received instruction, at the same time revealing the blending of storm trooper and small unit leader.  Though functionally still distinct, the logic behind officer/storm troop cross-training appears from the balance of the statement, where Rupprecht’s argument is simple enough and potent. Having mastered new tactics, the assault battalions achieved a 70 per cent success rate in their operations, with only 12 per cent of 1895 officers and men wounded and three per cent killed in four months.  Though replicating the quality of soldier, officer and equipment available to the assault on the division scale was impossible, there appeared to be a way to both increase tactical potency while economizing manpower.   Whereas the Crown Prince Wilhelm spoke to the army as an institution, envisioning an eventual mastery of positional warfare, Crown Prince Rupprecht spoke to soldierly expectations.  Storm troop training offered the best chance not just to resolve the war victoriously, but also to get home in one piece.​[496]​
Assault battalion status as instructors, and integral to a regeneration of the army’s offensive capacity and moral state was confirmed by events.  At the Battle of 3rd  Ypres (11 July 1917- 10 November 1917), the 4th army headquarters, citing recent experience in ‘new English attack methods’, wrote a proposal to army group staff on 30 September, 1917, demanding reinforcements of a very specific nature.   What was proposed was an ‘Assault Division’ or ‘Infantry Assault Brigade’, built by stripping each division in the army group of the storm troop unit in had formed and combining them.​[497]​  Specifically, 4th Army’s thinking postulated that ‘through the assault division, parts of the assault companies from all divisions within the army group would be brought into the infantry of the Assault division.’​[498]​  The army group quickly quashed the idea, writing the OHL that ‘it could not affiliate itself with the proposed creation of an “Assault Division”’, as it would decrease the worth of existing units by withdrawing ‘valuable forces.’​[499]​  Furthermore, it was impossible to secure any more storm troops from within the army group, as only two independent assault companies were available, and had to be preserved for ‘special operations and as training troops.’​[500]​  Permanent formation or not, the army group would not allow one of its component armies, not matter how dire the situation, to cannibalise storm troop units raised by divisions or instructors from storm troop companies training soldiers in rear areas.  It also seems that the army group had a fixed understanding of what lay in store for an Eingreifsdivsion once deployed in their prescribed role.​[501]​  For the good of the army group, the men of divisional storm troop units and independent assault companies were preserved for the value of their experience and ability as instructors.  For once, when crisis loomed, the German army did not panic, appeal to its traditional values, then hurl whatever soldiers and officers were available at the problem without regard for long-term consequences.  The full extent of the German army’s maze of training courses and institutions is the subject of Chapter V, as this vast training infrastructure had no formal oversight until 1918.
Storm troops and ‘Battlefield Taylorism’

Drawing connections between Taylorism and military establishments was first used by Martin van Creveld to describe the workings and basic assumptions of the American office corps during the Second World War.​[502]​  Recently Taylor has been utilised by German scholars, namely Peter Berz and Christoph Nübel, in the contexts of technological Taylorism and as a component of ‘biopolitics’, respectively.​[503]​  Here, Taylorism is best understood as organisational, to resurrect the most desired qualities of the pre-war army; decisiveness, skill and individual willingness to collective action, carefully nurtured through years of barracks life, drill and regular exercises.  However such preconditions were not sustainable given the frequent relocation of units, expected losses, and the multiplication of specialities entailed to positional war. Instead of a strong individual will to collective action, tactics increasingly revolved around the personal direction offered by leaders of specialised small units.  The collection of specialised squads inside a platoon constitutes the historical basis of the army’s division of labour system.
At its most essential, a division of labour system atomises complicated tasks into constituent operations, so as to reduce the dependence of a system of production on a small number of expert workers. That is, to remove dependence on the successful functioning of the system from the perfect utilisation of any single quality of its operators or implements. From a certain point of view, this system thereby cripples the labour-power of individual workers by replacing a small number of artisans with a large number of replaceable, low skill wage earners who have no need to increase their skills.​[504]​  Proceeding from this critique, ‘Taylorism’ is foremost a system of aligning workers with the goals of management, a synthesis of disparate ideas of labour management held in the United States and the United Kingdom in the late  nineteenth century which gave management control over every aspect of the ‘labor activity.’​[505]​  Commenting on Taylor’s experiences with workers at Midvale factory, we find that those who work under ‘general instruction and discipline’ retained far too much control over the labor process, requiring an integration of management and worker at every level.​[506]​  But while providing the precise anatomy for a system of pseudo-scientific exploitation, Braverman’s analysis glosses over the more insidious goals of Taylor’s work.  ‘Scientific Management was in the words of its creator, a ”complete mental revolution”.’​[507]​
Taylor believed that scientific management could access all of the worker’s personal resources and apply them during every moment that he laboured.​[508]​  He dubbed the sum of these resources ‘initiative’, defining them as the combination of ‘hard work’, ‘good will’ and ‘ingenuity.’​[509]​  Towards this end and through its intimate partnership with workmen, it was now the duty of managers to accumulate workmen’s practical experience, or ‘traditional knowledge’, in their trades and translate it into ‘rules’, ‘laws’ and ‘formulae’ which could be transmitted easily. Scientific management aimed at a ‘complete change in the mental attitude of the working man’ combined with the scientific codification of ‘rules of thumb’ to scientific laws.​[510]​  So the other part of Taylor’s system was to convert personal reflections into universal axioms regarding discrete portions of complicated events.  The means to this end were ‘close, intimate, personal cooperation between management and the men’ that was ‘the essence of modern scientific or task management’, which management provided through constant, friendly assistance to the workforce.​[511]​  Management must take part in the most fundamental, day-to-day operations involved in a task if it is maintain ‘close, intimate, personal’ operation, and so develop workers who apply themselves to the utmost.  Reality was the farthest thing from these principles, thought.  In practice Taylor’s consultants were far more interested in the efficient operation of machines, resource management and scheduling than the lives of their workers.​[512]​  However, armies can offer their ‘labourers’ something besides the tangible rewards that Taylor’s system depended on, in the form of group solidarity and the thrill of contravening social norms in a violent caricature of industrial practice.​[513]​
Taylor’s contemporary, the American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley, described in similar terms a theory of social organisation he dubbed the ‘primary group.’  According to Cooley, ‘By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation.  They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual.  The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group.’​[514]​ According to Cooley, relations within these primary groups were characterized by a ‘competitive unity’ of self-assertion and ‘various appropriative passions’ mediated by sympathy.​[515]​  Later scholars have placed this structure in military context and identified numerous types of primary groups distinguished from each other by the group members’ desired outcomes.​[516]​  Though he does not mention it, what historian Scott Stephenson describes following a contemporary term as Stammmannschaften, or the ‘dwindling nucleus of tired veterans’ with no interest in politics and who fought on largely to justify their wartime sacrifices and the reputations of their units, fit this mould.​[517]​
The foundations for this belief were buttressed by a willing mental health establishment administered by patriotic doctors who also held reserve army commissions.  The German army’s centre for the treatment of nervous disorders at Tübingen identified as early as the summer of 1915 that ‘friendly chats between comrades’ produced the greatest success in treating shell-shock.​[518]​  Great Britain adopted a similar approach towards shell-shock, agreeing that it was an individual moral failure rather than the result of trauma.​[519]​ Positive results were attained even faster when afflicted soldiers conversed with comrades who came from the same region and spoke their dialect.  The simple conclusion was that in an environment dominated by persistent shellfire, small groups with strong personal ties and a common background would prove the most resistant to nervous shock, stupor, hysteria and various other symptoms of shell-shock.  Such an argument is perfectly in line with the system’s overall ethic of producing viable soldiers for the present and self-sufficient citizens for peacetime society.​[520]​  
Ludendorff observed an increasing ‘individualisation’ of tactics even as the quality of officers, NCOs and enlisted men and their replacements declined.​[521]​  However, he insisted that defensive fighting had built infantry units centered around a light machine gun team that would live and die as a group and whose every action depended on the continued operation of the machine gun.​[522]​   Wilhelm Balck mentions a German preference to operate in half platoons rather than squads, indicating a basic tactical unit of approximately 16 men rather than the preferred four to eight men of the assault battalions.​[523]​
In their organisation, the assault battalions sought to match a potential storm troop’s peacetime occupation with his wartime role, in order to take advantage of his existing qualities.  It should come as no surprise that the first unit to undergo conversion to an assault battalion was a Jäger battalion from Brandenburg.   Jäger battalions were not typically part of any larger military organisation and had their own training, barracks and recruitment infrastructure.  They preferentially accepted recruits with backgrounds in hunting and forestry in the belief that it would foster high levels of independence, physical fitness and unorthodox thinking.​[524]​  Rohr then subjected the Jäger battalion to a two month training course which half the personnel failed to complete.  They were transferred and replaced by younger, fitter men.​[525]​  Capt. Rohr and what became 3rd Jäger assault battalion put quite a high value on physical fitness, a deliberate trade-off between one’s ability to execute tasks and one’s ability to frame solutions to complex problems.  3rd Jäger assault battalion held training courses in patrolling and assault tactics, attended by twelve officers and six squads, lasting three weeks.  Creating an independent assault battalion from scratch and with the aid of hand-picked, veteran troops as recruits, took at least six weeks, as is revealed by German sources concerning the formation of a unit for the Bulgarian army.​[526]​
Still, the purpose of the assault battalion was to lead attacks and so be the first to initiate an assault and engage in close combat.  Through special selection and motivation, assault troops could be trusted to go forward and to execute the task of closing with and killing the enemy. NCOs were now assault squad leaders, rather than men who ‘encouraged’ shirking soldiers to rejoin the skirmish or firing line.​[527]​  When assault squads left their trenches, they did so in a rough line behind their squad leader.  Aside from the assault-instruction battalions, Infantry divisions raised their own units, but then had to develop modes of organisation which meshed their assault troops with tasks like regimental and division sized attacks with hasty reconnaissance, rather than raids or battalion sized attacks planned for weeks.  Resulting could be much more complicated.  The division of labour for an assault unit raised by 56th Infantry division broke down as follows:
1.	A ‘Cleaning Up’ [Aufräumen] squad consisting of an NCO and 4-8 men, recruited from the infantry or pioneers equipped with explosives, picks, axes and wire cutters.  This squad opened or expanded breaches in wire obstacles.
2.	A ‘Flamethrower’ squad from the Guard Reserve Pioneer Regiment of 1 NCO and 6-12 men equipped with a flamethrower to be carried by one or two men, for the ‘fumigation’[Ausräucherung] of enemy positions, dug outs and communications trenches.
3.	A ‘Hand Grenade’ squad of 1 Officer, 2 NCOs and 9 men.  One NCO and three men served as throwers, the rest carried 3-4 sandbags of additional grenades.  This squad had two tasks ‘breaking resistance with grenades and rifles’ and protecting the Flamethrower squad.  They were drawn from the infantry.
4.	A ‘Rolling Up’ [Aufrollen] Squad manned and equipped as the ‘Hand Grenade’ squad which ‘rolled up’ the trench they had penetrated.  They were drawn from the Infantry or Pioneers.
5.	‘Construction’ [Verbauung] Squad of 1 Officer, 3 NCOs and 20 men equipped with spools of barbed wire, shovels, 40 full sandbags and 180 empty sandbags.  They blocked off captured positions, refortified them, and dug a sap toward German lines.​[528]​
For larger operations, such as the one undertaken by the Marine Assault battalion on 10 July 1917, Obstruction squads were dispensed with and that duty left to the marine regiments following the assault battalion.​[529]​  The employment of masses of infantry had no place in this system; in his advice to unit commanders on the employment of storm troops, Rohr stated that the forces committed should be as strong as needed to achieve their goal.​[530]​  Once their task was completed, the storm troops were immediately withdrawn and returned to their barracks deep in the rear.
From the original 15 independent assault instruction battalions grew assault squads, platoons, companies or even battalions in practically every division of the German army.   Indeed, the independent assault instruction battalions had planned obsolescence, and were to be wound up when a sufficient number of assault troops were present in the army in general.  But for a handful of battalions, which were reduced dramatically in strength, all assault instruction units present in the Imperial German army were dissolved in July 1918.​[531]​  Assault troops raised within Infantry divisions remained however, in such strength and disposition as the unit commander desired.  Some divisions, notably the Marine Division, constructed assault units as independent, permanent formations within their division structures.​[532]​  These ‘organic’ assault units do not appear on official reports of outlining their organization for reference by higher commands, and it would be some time before the armies published notices detailing precisely what training courses were held and where.​[533]​  
The headquarters of the 1st Army corps, part of Army Group Gallwitz, later Army Group German Crown Prince, wrote to its division commanders in September 1916 to inform them of the array of new troops that were available, in the form of assault detachments, flame thrower specialists and infantry gun batteries.​[534]​ These independent units were held by the army group, and tasked out upon request with priority given to units that had not raised their own assault troops, or were in the process of raising them.   Their purpose was excellence in carefully planned trench raids or small scale attacks, with the view that every German division should have its own small group of trench warfare specialists.  Until then, the assault detachments provided a useful stopgap.  The headquarters of 1st Army, part of Army Group Gallwitz, later Army Group German Crown Prince, wrote to its division commanders,

1. Divisions which do not possess their own assault battalions may request them from the A.O.K.  Also available for service are three flame thrower companies […] and 2 Infantry Gun batteries.
2.  Every assault group is composed of 1 non-commissioned officer and at the most 1 squad.  Upon request, machineguns, trench mortars, flame throwers and infantry guns can be attached.​[535]​

Further regulations were supplied detailing how the new troops were to be employed.	
The assault troops are trained and equipped especially for trench warfare […].  They  are meant to be deployed only on special operations with extremely limited objectives [ganz bestimmten Zielen].  Dispersion of assault troops along the length of the infantry line in order ‘to stabilise the position’ leads to the fragmentation of offensive power and is pointless.​[536]​  

To get the maximum effect from the new tactics, there was little choice but to deploy men of the assault detachments in the first wave.  However, they were to be returned to the rear as soon as the attack was concluded (Nach dürchführung des Angriffs […] möglichst bald wieder zurückzuziehen).​[537]​ In conclusion, commanders were bluntly instructed that storm troops had ‘no role to play in the defense.’​[538]​  These regulations had the threefold purpose.  First, to preserve the assault battalions in the second stated function, as the training cadres for the German Army.  Second, to preserve on behalf the Army the experience gained by assault battalion members, which could then be employed to modify and expand the training regime.  Finally, to maintain the assault troops as aggressive formations for the purposes of raids and patrols and to lead counter attacks in accordance with changing defensive methods.
Behind the storm troops followed regular infantry with the task of rounding up prisoners, killing any who still resisted, and putting the captured fortifications back into a defensible state.  Behind the infantry, cavalry squadrons waited to transfer prisoners from the battlefield to POW camps.  A French staff officer observed the system in action during the battle for Ft. Vaux in September, 1916,

While the German assault columns in the van fought the French hand to hand, picked corps of workers behind them formed an amazing human chain from the woods to the east over the shoulder of the network of communications trenches, 600 yards to the rear.  Four deep was this chain, and along its line of nearly 3,000 men passed an unending stream of wooden billets, sandbags, chevaux-de-frise, steel shelters, and light mitrailleuses, in a word, all the material for defensive fortifications, like buckets at a country fair…Cover was disdained, the workers stood at full height, and the chain stretched openly along the hollows and hillocks, a fair target for French gunners.  The latter missed no chance.​[539]​





The storm troop programme was a way to increase effectiveness and economize manpower for positional warfare, while providing common soldiers with a wide ranging skillset for combat in defensive positions.  Officers and men were endowed with technical expertise and their comrades were deliberately selected for their desirable qualities.  Paired with specialised weapons and organisation and deployed under carefully controlled circumstances towards readily defined tasks, led by officers who shared their hardships, a taylorised system appeared.  The storm troops had achieved high levels of efficiency and successfully captured the ‘initiative’ of members.  Separated from the rest of the army and its growing discontent, the assault battalions were carefully preserved and constantly trained, permitting every chance to form the ‘primary groups’ which are so foundational to modern theories of combat motivation.   Generalized instruction provided insurance against the reality of mass killing, but the emphasis on training junior officers and NCOs rather than men placed on them a new burden: to disseminate the skills necessary to keep their men alive. To do so presumed the long-term survival of junior officers and NCOs themselves, itself something of a gamble as demonstrated in the previous chapter.
	But as 1915 began, the army was struggling with the issue of casualty limitation, of infantry in general and infantry small unit leaders in specific.  Passive protection measures like helmets and body armour were partially adopted by 1916 in the form of the helmet, but the experiment revealed that on the whole, infantry believed that their survival lay in their skills and physical fitness.  Higher up the chain-of-command, officers added concealment and camouflage to this list of survival traits.  Their goal was slightly more pointed: to reduce the ranges where infantry was visible while also cutting to a minimum the physical distinctiveness between officers and soldiers.  By effectively hiding officers amongst their soldiers, more of them would survive longer, strengthening the unit’s overall performance but most importantly, making it easier to launch an assault.  Fundamentally, the change in equipment was about loss reduction while keeping the army an offensive instrument at the tactical level. However, the paradoxical nature of these ideas was quickly revealed, as the protections afforded by these measures fell away from officers at the instant a unit was called upon to enter Nahkampf, and an inspirational presence trumped all other considerations.  Minimising the deaths of leaders and ensuring that assaults went in were critical, so there is little wonder why passages like the following from the Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie 1916 stating,

Training and education must keep themselves to the wider goal, that in the absence of their officers the NCOs and enlisted men nevertheless execute their assignments dutifully to the end, and with an unshakeable will to victory.​[541]​ 

The storm troop programme was a ready-made template for achieving these aims; it built soldiers’ physical fitness through specialised training in ‘realistic’ conditions, identified the physically unfit for reassignment, and expanded soldiers’ repertoire of skills to include automatic weapons, demolitions and grenade use.   Soldiers were given occupations according to their aptitudes, which would ostensibly reduce casualties and in the eyes of Crown Prince Rupprecht, did so.  Moreover, the responsibility for leading troops into an assault was now split between assault troop squads and small unit leaders.  Through the storm troop programme, units regained the ability to attack while reducing small unit leader’s exposure to danger and increasing the resilience of the unit’s leadership cadre at the point where it was most needed: when an assault was launched.  
Furthermore, the storm troop programme gave infantry units the organisational tools to break down the complicated tasks of positional warfare along functional lines, combined with rough guidelines for how to assign available manpower based on existing traits.  It was, in effect, ‘battlefield Taylorism’ in action: a team of soldier-instructors breaking down complex tasks then joining in their completion with carefully selected and trained labourers in order to complete the task as efficiently as possible.  The result of this cooperation was to make the task (in this case, the tactical offensive) accessible to the greatest number of the least-skilled manpower, eventually rendering the skilled soldier-instructors surplus to requirements.  
	The resulting system I have dubbed ‘battlefield taylorism’  Generally, it is a lens through which to view the outlook of the German army’s highest ranks towards the function and management of its combatants, although the army never mentions ‘Taylorism’ specifically.   But more concretely, ‘battlefield Taylorism’ is a division of labour system embodied by replaceable operators possessing redundant skillsets which they apply with full moral investment, and the process by which veterans were converted into ‘violence specialists.’  Redundant here refers to a basic competence rather than expertise necessary to utilise various implements in positional war, whereby soldiers’ skills were later optimised for a task through assignment to a specific small unit, analogous to a squad or section.  Optimised squads were bound together by platoons and companies in order to fulfil carefully defined tasks identified by the offensive doctrine of ‘attacks with limited objectives.’ Such a doctrine, peculiar to the Western Front, laid out squad roles in a space in which terrain, fortifications, weapon ranges and objectives defined the physical dimensions of an attack.  The storm troops almost substituted their own small units for officers’ example by assuming and managing collective risk through skilled application of physical violence. It was not until the Summer of 1918 that the storm troops would face similar exposure to the war’s industrialized mass killing and suffered in proportion to the ‘Assault Divisions’ then attempting to win the Great War.  That however, was in the future as of 1917, and in 1917 came the categorisation of the army into ‘Intervention’ [Eingreifs-] and ‘Positional’ [Stellungs-] divisions.  Bifurcation would not alleviate soldiers’ needs to fight confusing actions in ruined positions at every sort of range.  Rather, it demonstrated an intention to offset mitigate uncertainty through the now-established avenues of specialisation and superior motivation.  
Furthermore, the organisational ‘battlefield Taylorism’ here described blends seamlessly with a technologically derived Taylorism, rooted in the defensive tactics of the machine gun and the organisation of space through defensive doctrine observed by Peter Berz.​[542]​ Battlefields were reconceptualised as ‘checkerboards’ in official publications, alternating areas of empty space and machine-gun teams.  The gun crews’ jobs were simple; to conceal their guns from easy observation and when an attack came, to keep their guns firing regardless of circumstances.​[543]​  And as Berz observes, the greater the number of guns, the more numerous the gun teams, the broader and deeper the ‘checkerboard.’​[544]​  Given the freedom to change positions by the doctrine of ‘elastic defence’, expendable gunners moved freely among the empty spaces, from one ‘expendable micro-areas’ to another. The lives of the crew and hard-won territory were subordinate to the efficient operation of the weapon.​[545]​  ‘Battlefield Taylorism’ in its fullest form, combining the organisational and the technical, is therefore a system for the absolute subordination of innate and acquired human potential, technology and physical space to the goals of a military establishment.  The products of organisational ‘battlefield Taylorism’, the storm troops and their resistance to fear and casualties, will be further explored in Ch. IV.  However, late war prisoners told their captors that storm troop training bore little weight in maintaining their morale, while hinting that the system of selection could be manipulated to manage individual risk.  Such a strategy was apparently utilized by young soldiers of the 5th Landwehr division to avoid reassignment to elite units.​[546]​  
























Chapter IV:  ‘Small’ Positional War: Patrol Operations and Prisoner Taking, 1916-1917

Though not appearing as a term in the documents of the OHL, the notion of ‘small’ positional war is derived from a Clausewitzian formulation originally referring to irregular warfare in the Early Modern period.  As Beatrice Heuser argues, ‘small’ war was in fact a fluid concept defining a complicated relationship between military specialisation, irregular forces, mobilised populations and central authority.​[547]​  From loosely controlled irregulars, specialists in ‘small’ war became official units of professional armies.  Subsequently, ‘small’ war units drew in individuals who enjoyed the increased danger and a chance to cultivate a reputation for courage and ferocity, but also the opportunity to revel in proscribed acts.​[548]​  
Similar findings arise from the study of modern conflict, where the phenomena of ‘autotelic’ violence served as a basis for establishing soldierly toughness and therefore status.​[549]​  Creating a battlefield where the individual’s physical, psychological and moral qualities were meaningful factors to the waging of industrialised mass warfare has been identified as the chief allure of storm troop service.​[550]​  Applied generally, the storm troop programme seemed to offer soldiers the tools and skills to establish some kind of control over battlefield events.​[551]​ Their aims closely resembled the tactics of the partisan, particular concerning the goal of multiplying uncertainty by severing the connections between leaders and common soldiers, but also in gathering intelligence by means of captives and spoils [Beute]. It was a mode of tactical war-making derived from specialisation, the independent action of small groups, and outbursts of violence which are short in duration and were resolved much the same way as any other.​[552]​   
	‘Small’ positional war is therefore a fusion of Clausewitzian principles of the offensive, particularly in regard to defended positions and irregular warfare.  Of three types of position, the fortified line was considered the weakest, ‘the most ruinous form of cordon warfare’ and completely reliant on firepower.​[553]​  Adopting it was an error that invited attack, as opposed to a correct position which compelled attackers to invest it or go around.  Clausewitz states that when compelled to assault defended positions ‘Only those [attacks] that achieve these aims are appropriate; wearing the enemy forces down whether totally or partially, or neutralising them’.​[554]​  Though attacking a properly constructed defensive position was anathema to Clausewitz, fortified lines were suitable targets for offensive action due to their inherent weakness, but also so long as they caused harm to the enemy.  Deprived of access to the usual targets of irregular war, ‘small’ positional war utilised surprise, active selection and firepower toward many of the same goals.  But its violence took on a regenerative roll, serving to ameliorate fears of growing ineffectiveness alongside prisoner taking, destruction of positions and taking of spoils.
	Thus there was little to separate the behaviour of small bands fighting in trenches from any other type of terrain, in that a great deal of fighting was possible without a great deal of killing taking place. The killing act itself was mediated by the vagaries of military organisation, the use of specialised weapons, the goals of a specific operation and the nature of the battlefield itself.  Moreover, the Imperial German army’s creation of the storm troops built elite groups of ‘violence specialists’, who were depended upon to take up a disproportionate share of the fighting, with implications that will be explored by means of a case study.​[555]​  
	At its heart, this chapter is about combat as viewed through a micro-historical approach.  The first section establishes the basic rules followed by the German army in conducting ‘small’ positional war, and also investigates the manner in which these actions were reported, demonstrating that the army put a disproportionate emphasis on what, in comparison to the Battles of Materiel, seem like quite minor events.  Nor did junior officers feel a need to pass bad news up the chain of command without placing as positive a spin on events as possible, using the army’s same language of physical fitness, mental toughness and a devil-may-care attitude toward close combat. The second examines selected instances of unit surrenders by Allied soldiers and the testimony of German soldiers who escaped Allied captivity.  Persistent rumour on both sides linked captors to the murdering of wounded or noncompliant prisoners while largely sparing the able-bodied.​[556]​  The testimony of German prisoners who escaped Allied captivity forms the basis for an empirical examination of this notion and what use, if any that the OHL made of this resource.​[557]​ The final portion of the chapter presents a case study of an attack with limited objectives undertaken by the German army on 10 July 1917. The case study highlights the intersection of tactics, technology and the rules of war as practiced by the combatants themselves to emphasise an understanding of military violence rooted in the conditions of positional war.  Whereas Chapters II and III demonstrated how the army planned to renew itself and its soldiers through positional war, Chapter IV in effect tests the claims ‘battlefield taylorism’ while exploring the importance of ‘Small’ positional war in both the practice of violence and the trajectory of wartime military thought.  The result was a ‘division of risk’ system, which left close-combat and face-to-face killing to the storm troops, now ‘violence specialists’, and the production of fire-power and defensible positions to common soldiers, the ‘defensive specialists’ who rarely encountered the act of killing except as part of a group and at distance.

Patterns of Behaviour: The Aggressors

In January 1916, shortly before the Battle of Verdun, one German observer of soldiers from Brandenburg noticed ‘Germans held themselves without exception and correctly as superior to the “Frog” in fighting power, fortitude and courage’. ​[558]​ He concluded that February 1916 represented the height of the army’s skill and self-confidence, an atmosphere comparable only to August 1914.​[559]​
	In a speech on 6 February 1916, Crown Prince Rupprecht told German soldiers about to open the Verdun offensive, ‘The iron will of the sons of Germany is still unbroken and the German army, when it moves to attack, stops for no obstacle’.​[560]​  Falkenhayn’s post-war memoirs extolled a similar set of qualities exhibited on the Somme, where supposedly German troops were driven from the positions solely by an irresistible weight of shellfire and were ever willing to counterattack or pounce on the smallest error.​[561]​  The moral underpinnings of attack and defence were not precisely identical, but expressed in the same way; through the willingness to close with the enemy either in attack or counterattack.  Regardless of who ran the OHL, counter-attack was preferred to withdrawal or displacement.  As Timothy Lupfer observes, the real change was in the OHL’s intellectual climate and a more open development of tactics following Falkenhayn’s replacement by Hindenburg on 20 August 1916.​[562]​  
	Falkenhayn, distrusting the willingness of war-raised, undertrained units to do so on their own, demanded that German lines be held to the death, and any ground won by the enemy be reclaimed at any price.​[563]​ His successors at the OHL do not appear to have disagreed when it came to first principles, but rather about the way in which these attacks were delivered.  In the new world of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, local commanders and small units responding to battlefield conditions determined when, where and how the enemy was struck.  Such devolution of command was rooted in the experience, first at the Aisne-Champagne in September, 1915, and confirmed on the Somme in 1916: that counter-attackers had but a narrow window of opportunity to strike assaulting troops.  This was directly after assaulting troops had taken a German position, but before they had fortified themselves within them.  The fundamental premise remained when, where, and how to counterattack, not why or why not.​[564]​ The German army would always counter-attack,   and so even when the army was on the defensive, all soldiers required additional training in offensive tactics, which the army instituted generally in the winter of 1916.​[565]​  
	Counterattacks themselves were conducted using the same tactics and methods used in patrolling. Such combat is borne out by the example of 12th and 22nd Reserve divisions as they fought in the Raven Forest of Verdun, slowly overrunning four French battalions ‘in numerous dugouts and strongly fortified individual bunkers’.​[566]​  On the body of a French regimental commander were found reports that some French companies contained only four or five men, but still took part in a defense characterised by ‘bitter’ resistance.​[567]​  The 11th Bavarian Reserve division joined 2nd Landwehr and the 11th Reserve division to take part in attacks on the trenches behind Avocourt Forrest on 20 March 1916.​[568]​ 11th Bavarian Reserve was extensively reorganised having served largely in the east, with battalion commanders taking the lead in training their men to fight first in squads, then in as part of ‘Squad Lines’ [Schwarmenlinie] supported by assault troops, machine guns and flamethrowers.​[569]​   
	Meanwhile, Ernst Jünger had already successfully led three patrols by the time he reported for his first storm troop training course on 31 July 1916.​[570]​  There he was ‘detained’ by a Lt. Eberwein for a few days to practice assaulting saps and bunkers, throwing grenades ‘and so on, and so on’.​[571]​ In Jünger’s view, there was little new to learn there that 73rd Fusilier Regiment  had not already figured out; use a small number of the best men, give them clear tasks and instructions and arm them solely for close combat.  These things Prussian and Bavarian soldiers had trained in six months prior at Verdun.
	Compounding extent information and guiding the instruction for small unit combat was the Training Manual for Foot Troops in War, published first in January 1917.​[572]​  Running in excess of 150 pages, its first section entitled ‘Exercise Drill’ [Exerzierschule] is aimed at developing physical fitness and instilling the basics of military discipline by means of calisthenics and formation marching.​[573]​  The second section entitled ‘Fighting Drill’ [Kampfschule] devoted the majority of instruction to the practicalities of trench combat from the individual to the regiment.​[574]​  Fighting drill strongly emphasized the squad [Gruppe] which received the most generous treatment with fifteen pages; half the material devoted to ‘fighting drill’ was directed towards the training of company-sized units or smaller.  As Dennis Showalter notes, common soldiers would now fight as small groups, coordinated at the platoon or company level, accepting ‘warriors’ like Ernst Jünger as a useful but unnecessary force multiplier.​[575]​
With these new guidelines, the first section of the Drill Regulations of 1906 were finally replaced, and on the first page the phrase ‘unit cohesion’ [Zusammenhalt der Truppe] appeared twice and the phrase ‘iron military discipline’ [eiserne Manneszucht] once.​[576]​ One passage is worth quoting at length,
A superior has to revive in his subordinates the lasting soldierly virtues and
 moral qualities.   With his words and deeds he must abide the hardest times
 and nurture trust.  He may not permit the offensive spirit [Angriffsgeist] and
 initiative [Unternehmungslust] to degrade, rather [he] must bring to the general consciousness that we fight for our highest principles and may not rest until the enemy, who wants them destroyed, is humbled [niedergezwungen].​[577]​

The sum of these values of initiative and offensive spirit has been described by Isabel Hull as ‘actionism’, or the ‘exaggerated drive to action on the part of officers in order to bridge the gap between risk and reality:…’​[578]​ Hull links the army’s standard procedures, routines and patterns of thought to a self perpetuating, self-defeating spiral of violence, but underestimates the internal power dynamics and the dialectic nature of military innovation.​[579]​  Moreover, as Len Smith has argued in the French case, soldiers’ confrontation with power does not result in domination, but through the formation of new rules concerning how power is exercised.​[580]​ Similarly, soldiers themselves on both sides contravened the orders and practices of their armies to establish mutually beneficial relationships, as demonstrated by Tony Ashworth’s work on the resilient, self-sustaining social systems developed across No-Man’s Land.​[581]​ In Ashworth’s analysis, instances of violence in this context took place primarily to increase or reinforce a unit’s reputation, or at the behest of a high ranking officer to shake up a sector that had grown too passive.
	Raids had functions other than demonstrating values and martial prowess, just as operations had more numerous and important goals than killing.​[582]​ Still officers had a professional and institutional interest in creating a ‘hermetically sealed’ No-Man’s Land in which the exchange of violence was the only permissible mode of interaction.​[583]​  In the conduct of the raid and the fighting undertaken, it is possible to gauge the penetration or indeed resurrection, of the German army’s martial values.  Self-destructive will, and actionism are the foundations of army’s spiralling extremes of violence, but they were not part of common soldierly practice apart from some notable exceptions.  
	The expected role of common German infantry is revealed in the planning and execution of their operations.  By 1917 the army was losing faith in the infantry’s overall willingness to go forward, so attacks increasingly placed more and more picked troops and specialists in the lead.  222nd Infantry division’s preparations for Operation ‘Morgenluft’ on 19 February 1917 describe an older form of attack not by infiltration but by waves, supported by assault troops.​[584]​  Orders stipulated that all light machine guns and assault squads deploy in the first ‘wave’, so that the leading units could break into the opposing position as quickly as possible.​[585]​ Instructions demanded that each man bring a rifle with 120 rounds of ammunition, a knife or dagger, a gas mask with two filters and two sand bags.​[586]​  Sand bags were not for consolidation; instead one was filled with six ‘stick’ grenades, the other with six ‘egg’ grenades. Furthermore, soldiers were admonished ‘Do not just lie down in front of the enemy’s trenches, [but] grenade them effectively’.​[587]​ The prospect that soldiers would not enter the enemy position but take cover and engage in a pro forma exchange of grenades was a side effect of their mode of attack. The old fear that soldiers under fire would find cover and refuse to move had resurfaced and was expressed through new technology.
	 Therefore the conduct of soldiers was a central theme of each after-action report, or at least it should have been.  What was much more likely was an emphasis on the elements of the operation which put the best events in the best light.  On its face, the 28th Reserve division’s approach towards gathering information on the recently conduction Operation ‘Theodor’ seems sound.​[588]​  However in four pages of text derived from interviews with officers, NCOs, enlisted men and men wounded, perhaps half a page is dedicated to lessons learned.​[589]​  A short passage lists the losses suffered, while a page is spent detailing the heroism of three Lieutenants who were killed or went missing.​[590]​
	Another page is devoted to something that occurred but seldom; hand-to-hand combat and how it was conducted.  Operation ‘Theodor’ began at 730 on 29 June 1917 and succeeded in breaking into French positions near The Dead Man, a hill on the old Verdun battlefield, prompting four counterattacks on the night of 30 June to 1 July.​[591]​ According to the Germans, French troops approached concealed by other trenches and repeatedly attempted to surround German troops holding the ‘Worm Sap’.​[592]​  Three attacks were repelled with knives and grenades before the Germans were driven out around 3 o’clock in the morning on 1 July.  The French then repelled a German counterattack after a long hand-to-hand fight.  Neither side had taken any prisoners the report emphasized, but listed German casualties for the night’s fighting as one killed and approximately 40 wounded.  
	Officers behaving in perfect congruence to doctrine, performing their duties in adverse circumstances and in the spirit of self-sacrifice may be simple embellishment.  But hours of hand-to-hand combat in darkness, with no quarter given, resulting in but a single German soldier killed?  Comparing the reported intensity and mercilessness of the fighting with the reported casualties calls the veracity of the report itself into question.  Ultimately the soldiers of 28th Reserve Infantry division lost the ground they had taken near The Dead Man, but the author made sure to convey that their defeat was not attributable to the incompetence or cowardice of their leaders, or a lack of will among the men to come to grips.  The real cause was the enemy’s advantage of numbers.
	In stark contrast is the report of the successful Operation ‘Hannover’ undertaken by the 1st  and 3rd Battalions of 73rd Fusilier regiment  in November 1916, supported by assault troops from the assault companies of 8th Ersatz Division, 111th Infantry division, and 16th Reserve division.​[593]​  Their goal was the destruction of two ‘French-Nests’, or two places in the woods of St. Pierre-Vaast where French troops had broken into the German position, dug in, and were either partially or completely surrounded.  The 9th Zouave regiment, which held these nests, had dug communications trenches linking them together, creating a single strongpoint.  Almost everything went according to plan, and the 9th Zouave Regiment was almost completely killed and captured.​[594]​  Approximately 20 per cent of the attacking force became casualties, primarily from a heavy and accurate bombardment on the German front line and recently captured positions, but also from rounds of German artillery falling short.  Hardly anyone was killed or wounded during the assault, as the enemy was taken completely by surprise.  Moreover, protective artillery barrages were perfectly timed with the advance of storm troops, lifting when the Germans were almost inside French lines.  Such accurate shelling was not a stroke of good fortune. Strong radio communications were maintained between front and rear during the operation augmented by carrier pigeons and coloured rockets.  However, ‘real-time’ updates on the attack were impossible as extremely low cloud cover precluded aerial observation.  Low clouds also rendered useless lamp signals between the attacking troops and observers in captive balloons. 
While operation ‘Hannover’ succeeded due to accurate and constant artillery preparation augmenting the element of surprise, the soldiers of 16th Assault battalion utilised a combination of accurate and persistent artillery and deception in supporting an attack by two infantry regiments, Infantry regiments 147 and 151. 16th Assault battalion undertook a raid against the French 56th Territorial regiment designated Operation ‘210’.​[595]​  Two attacks were planned, one a feint and the other genuine.  The feint attack was carried out by patrols from I Battalion, IR 147 and from IR 151.  These patrols entered the French first line, found it abandoned and returned without loss.​[596]​  The French had not been fooled, and in a common practice, abandoned the sector threatened by the raid, rather than fight a battle for which they were unprepared.
	Storm troops undertook the genuine attack, supported by a concealed field gun which fired directly at any machine guns that survived the preparatory barrage.  As with the feint attack, the storm troops found the front line abandoned and moved on to the second where they found French troops attempting to withdraw.  Many of these soldiers were either caught by the German barrage or shot down from behind.  Three French soldiers, apparently frightened by the assault troops’ flamethrowers, were taken prisoner.  Reporting that a great many French corpses dead from artillery fire were left in the trenches, the assault troops returned with three prisoners, a light machine gun, along with bandoleers, gasmasks and any documents they could seize.
	An almost identical operation was undertaken by 16th Assault battalion in concert with III Battalion of Infantry regiment 170, near the Rhein-Rhone Canal and designated ‘Scheinwerfer’.  The lines here were 100-200m apart, so the assault troops were tasked with ‘cleaning out’ French dugouts and bringing back spoils and prisoners.  Participants noted that French lines were poorly protected by barbed wire belts only 4-5m thick, that sentries were posted only intermittently, and that the French first line contained a number of occupied dugouts.​[597]​  With such flimsy protection, the certain presence of enemy soldiers sitting at practically the text-book definition of optimal assault range away, the French presented the perfect target for raid.  No matter the strength of the dugout’s garrisons, it was a simple matter of holding them underground with a standing barrage until storm troops seized the exits to their shelters.  The storm troops then spent four days practicing and familiarising themselves with the French position with the aid of aerial photographs.
	The operation took place on 19 March 1917, between 5 and 7 in the evening.   Two German patrols broke into the French trenches, and then divided themselves in half with a flamethrower assigned to each ‘half-patrol’.  Flamethrower troops led the advance and quickly overran French light machine guns, ‘fumigating’ [Ausräuchern] and setting afire French dugouts.​[598]​ Flamethrowers were credited with the majority of the operation’s success, which yielded five light machine guns and twenty prisoners belonging to Reserve regiment 300.  No battle casualties were recorded, but a flamethrower operator sent back to German lines when his weapon broke and doused him in unlit fuel disappeared.  So did a Sergeant and four enlisted men.
	Of course, not all operations were successful or even partially successful.  Given sufficient access to artillery and the time to develop dependable communications, defenders easily neutralised raids or patrols.  Such was the case of a patrol operation against the Lerchenberg Outworks, which took place on 27 May 1917.​[599]​  Here storm troops succeeded in closing to within 80 m of the French first line without being detected.  A field howitzer battery began shelling the French first line, which tripped the French response.  According to the Germans, after the detonation of the fourth or fifth German shell, French soldiers fired a green signal rocket and French artillery immediately responded by laying three standing barrages with great accuracy and intensity.  The first barrage was on the French front line, the second walked back and forth across No Man’s Land, and the third struck the German front line.  At least four and probably a greater number of French machine guns then took all likely approaches to their trenches under fire, establishing crossfire in front of the first line.
	Creeping through three barrages and a machine gun crossfire a man at a time, the storm troops retreated, somehow losing only a single man killed.  They then took up defensive positions, expecting that the French would follow, but no counterattack appeared.  Res. Lt. Böhmig, who authored the report, determined that the presence of aircraft during the ranging in trench mortars and heavy artillery announced offensive intentions and goals well in advance.  Such mistakes permitted the French to abandon their front line and lay a trap for their attackers.
	In the event of defeat as in the case of Reserve Lt. Böhmig and his men, the units involved undertook investigations of what went wrong.  As with typical reports on successful operations, individual actions to unforeseen events were the key points of departure. Such was the case of 2nd Württemberg Assault company’s disastrous operation against a position dubbed the ‘Molkenrainweg’, undertaken at the request of and supported by the 26th Landwehr division.​[600]​  
	According to the testimony of Grenadier Kloz, his assault squad left through jumping-off positions destroyed by French counter-preparation and found only empty trenches and abandoned dugouts upon reaching the French first line.  Moving deeper into the French position, the assault squad encountered an empty bunker, and more empty dugouts that were tested for occupants with a few grenades each.  Having reached the a third line of trenches without even seeing an enemy, Kloz remembered the assault squad moving up to a dugout entrance, throwing in a few grenades, finding no-one inside, and deciding to withdraw to German lines.  At this instant an ‘incredibly powerful explosion’ from what was probably a commanded detonation, killed, wounded or buried alive every man in the squad.​[601]​  Kloz and the severely wounded Grenadier Neipp and Corporal Frisch made their way back to German lines individually.
	However, Kloz’s squad was part of a two squad effort with the other being led by Lt. Hofmann and its experiences were recorded in the testimony of a Corp. Bauer.  The Lt. was killed by a bursting shell shortly after breaking into the French position, the same shell burst, wounding two of his men.​[602]​ Six French soldiers holding a strongpoint put up weak resistance before they were taken prisoner.  The process repeated itself at a further strongpoint, yielding ten additional prisoners.  Seeing little value in passing deeper into the defensive system, the assault squad returned to German lines.
	While prisoners were the preferred means of gathering intelligence, anything and everything was collected and itemised.  No Man’s Land was swept for enemy wounded and corpses, who were brought back and thoroughly searched.​[603]​  Among the masses of personal affects; wedding rings, letters home, wrist watches, ‘flasks of brown liquid’ were things of value.  Sketches of local geography and German defences, a copy of the regulations issued in case of gas attack, and arms of every description were kept so that German troops could be instructed in their use.​[604]​
	Raids and ‘Operations’ were first and foremost concerned with establishing or maintaining a superior position and gathering information. Linking the performance of small units to the fundamental soundness of their tactical system, reports emphasized improvisation and the unexpected with detailed recounting of events.  In short, successful attackers were masters of negotiating contingency, which they managed through a steady input of information.  Beginning with the following section, how German and British soldiers behaved when defending in ‘small’ positional war is evaluated, beginning with an offensive action in defence of institutional goals.  In the Spring of 1917, regeneration of morale and demonstrations of military effectiveness joined the functionalist goals which grounded ‘small’ positional war.

Patterns of Aggression: the Defenders

When attackers revealed their intentions too early, defenders refused a struggle of man vs. man, instead laying elaborate traps involving artillery and machine guns.   Such tactics reduced casualties while deploying the most effective weapons to kill the enemy’s best troops.  If taken completely by surprise, the best solution was still to flee deeper into one’s own defensive position, or hide and avoid the attackers by sheltering in dugouts.  But what happened when a defender offered to fight unit vs. unit instead of men vs. fire? 
	Res. Lt. Röhrich, commander of the 10th Company, 51st Infantry Brigade, found himself defending such a decision to his brigade and division commanders.​[605]​  On the evening of the 15 September 1916 between 5pm and 7pm, Röhrich’s company was taken under fire by rifle grenades, one of which struck and killed his company’s artillery observer.  Determining that a raid was imminent, Röhrich ordered ‘increased combat readiness’ across his entire sector, which was 550m wide.​[606]​  The order for ‘increased combat readiness’ meant that each squad of eight left its dugout, and deployed three members as lookouts while the other five waited in the trench with fixed bayonets.  Darkness fell at 915 and Röhrich reported that the sky was completely overcast.
	Promptly at 945, artillery struck 10th Company’s position, falling heavily and with great accuracy to the north, south and west, severing all lines of retreat and reinforcement around the unit.  Trench mortars took Röhrich’s position under fire and soon ‘dominated’ the areas where each of his platoons were located.​[607]​  Lookouts from the 1st and 2nd squads of 1st Platoon soon noticed a group of 30-40 raiders and took them under rifle fire, but could not stop them closing with the trench.  A melee fought with pistols, grenades and bayonets broke out, in which seven Germans were wounded by grenade fragments and bayonet thrusts.  Two more went missing and were assumed carried off by the raiders.  Three raiders were killed, one was severely wounded and left behind while a fifth was observed retreating with the raiding party having splashed a large amount of blood on the trench parapet.  Less than ten minutes passed from the start of the fight to its end and neither platoon deployed near the 1st knew the enemy was nearby until they observed the raiding party’s withdrawal.
General Haas, commander of the 26th Reserve Infantry Division, was not pleased by Röhrich’s report.  His comments, written in pencil in the margins, consist largely of ‘?’.  Most pointedly, he wondered why 10th company’s front of more than half a kilometre was held by at the most 72 men.  General Haas had nothing to say about the conduct of seven men recommended for decorations, including four who had each ‘put out of action’ [unschädlich gemacht] a raider while wounded by both bayonet thrusts and grenade fragments.  Disposition of troops, the decision to fight, the losses suffered, all were subject to question, and by the end of the report, scorn.  To make matters worse, 51st Brigade was raided again two weeks later.​[608]​
	Such incidents as the one recounted had become common by September 1916 and attracted the attention of Grand Duke Albrecht of Württemberg.  In November 1916 he wrote a scathing memorandum to his Army Group, demanding that the links between frontline troops and their artillery be strengthened so as to provide instant responses to both raids and sudden infantry attacks.​[609]​  Attacks after short barrages, and with limited objectives were a new addition to the enemy’s tactics, the Grand Duke remarked, which both undermined German defensive methods and rendered helpless the garrisons of frontline trenches.  Apart from additional artillery protection, the Grand Duke demanded counter-raids to contest No-Man’s Land but also to start evening the score.  In thinning out front-line garrisons to safeguard against artillery, the Germans had created ideal conditions according to recent British doctrine for the conduct of raids, a fact the Germans should have been well aware of, given that a copy of the British army’s raiding handbook, S.S.107 Notes on Minor Enterprises, had been in their possession for four months.​[610]​
From October, 1916 until March 1917, Grand Duke Albrecht’s Army Group [named Army Group Grand Duke Albrecht] responded to raid with raid.  During the winter of 1916-17 the BEF escalated with a tactic that Gruppe Wytschaete described as ‘Preparatory Reconnaissance Attacks’ [Erkungdungsvorstoβen].​[611]​  Each of the ‘PRAs’ was undertaken by 500-600 men and were nearly always successful, producing ‘rich bounties’ of German prisoners and captured heavy weapons.  There was no mention of casualties suffered by the Germans, but a reflexive imposition of the German measures of success on the British, emphasizing prisoners taken and heavy weapons captured, on the German army itself yielding a predictable conclusion.  German troops were in danger of losing their perceived superiority in skill and motivation; in fact they were in the process of ceding it to the British if nothing was done.​[612]​  It is worth noting that two successful ‘PRAs’ brought about this reaction, costing Gruppe Wytschaete a total of 160 men lost as prisoners and five machine guns carried off.  The Gruppe concluded,
It is no longer sufficient to [maintain] the present position with small patrol operations alone. We must also destroy enemy mortar batteries and cause heavy losses through larger operations with the goal of taking numerous prisoners, to nurture the offensive spirit of our infantry and procure its trust and moral dominance.​[613]​

The divisions were subsequently ordered to launch ‘larger scale operations’ utilising their own storm troops and to penetrate British defences to the third (and final) line, so as to get amongst their support troops and to capture valuable spoils.  
	Under these orders Operation ‘Mathilde’ was launched on 9 April 1917 by 414th Infantry regiment  with the stated goals of: locating and destroying enemy mining operations in front of Hill 60 and Hill 59; the destruction of dugouts and associated weapons; and the capture of prisoners and spoils.​[614]​   204th Infantry division’s storm troop company provided offensive specialists, reinforced by men from IR 414 and small units each of 20 combat engineers and 20 miners.  Nine ‘assault columns’ were formed, led by officers and senior NCOs from both the divisional storm troop company and IR 414.  The columns themselves contained between 30 and 60 soldiers, split roughly in half between storm troops, and conventional infantrymen serving as machine gunners, stretcher bearers, radio operators and signal lamp operators.​[615]​
	On the evening of 9 April 1917 at 1845, the assault columns left German lines and the closest thing to a massacre followed.  The attackers penetrated British lines and in three hours they killed an estimated 200 defenders, primarily with hand grenades, flame throwers, and by using demolition charges to bury them alive in dugouts.​[616]​  45 prisoners were taken, of whom three were wounded.​[617]​   Supply depots containing rations and hand grenades were destroyed by combat engineers and new model gas masks, documents, trench mortars and machine guns were carried back.  The combat engineers reported that they entered British lines with 32 demolition charges [geballte Ladungen] each of 12kgs and used all of them.​[618]​ Only three prisoner interrogations appear from the 45 reportedly taken.  All of the interrogated were members of Australian mining companies who were captured in ‘living dugouts’ [Wohngraben].​[619]​
	Unlike other reports of other operations, such as Operation ‘Strandfest’ investigated later in this chapter, no material was provided to 204th Infantry division by the ‘Assault Column’s on the fighting they undertook or how they arrived at their calculation of 200 British and Australian soldiers killed. The storm troop company of 204th Infantry division and the men of IR 414 effectively wrote themselves out of a successful operation by confining their report to their ‘lessons learned’ and information purely technical in nature.  Approximate times that each line of defences was breached, the approximate time when objectives were taken, and a list of lessons learned, which were ex- cathedra judgments without the events on which they were based.  They did not say why they opted to kill four in five of the enemy soldiers they encountered, when both a standing order and an operational order mandated the taking of prisoners.  Taking into account the reports of the Marine Assault battalion as a point of comparison, the actions of the troops, their mistakes and successes and random occurrences are key elements of each document.​[620]​  Similarly none of them produced such a high ratio of killed to wounded.  

Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in ‘small’ Positional War

Surrender in war and the treatment of prisoners is currently the subject of great scholarly debate.​[621]​  That debate now centres on the use of coercive and lethal violence against prisoners, as part of a downward spiral of brutality driven by a radicalizing war culture, or from personal grievances linked to recent events.  In the former camp, prisoner taking, prisoner killing and prisoner treatment are the foundation of a language of violence between belligerent powers, where threats to escalate and promises to deescalate replaced obedience to international law and the norms of pre-war civility.  It is towards an injection of the question of agency into the debate as has been recently put forward by Robert Grauer.​[622]​  While accepting that the war was merciless at times, steady upward or downward trajectories in brutality ought not to frame the debate.  Obscured by this paradigm is the question of how soldiers used the battlefield and military systems to increase their chances of survival by means other than violence, namely by recognizing the valuable labour they could provide.
	For a German army keenly interested in the physical and moral capacity of human beings to act quickly, decisively and according to doctrine, such a point obscures more than it illuminates.  German officers sought to gauge shifts in the morale of their enemies as much as they attempted to trace their technological and organisational innovations.  They were also the tangible symbols of technological superiority, sound planning, and the moral superiority of German soldiers vis-à-vis their enemy’s broken will to resist.
	This section will look a number of instances of collective surrender by British troops in 1917, to establish the three central commonalities in the circumstances of their capture; surprise, poor leadership, and isolation from the larger military system which precluded external relief.  All of the instances put forward here involve groups of British prisoners larger than 15 men, the usual size of a British infantry section. It will then proceed to investigate a selection of testimony from German soldiers who successfully escaped from Allied captivity, having been held for various lengths of time.  
	154 men of VIII Battalion, the Liverpool regiment, 27 men of IV Battalion of the Royal Lancashire regiment and two men of V Battalion, the Liverpool regiment took part in an attack on Guillemont, with the aim of taking the trenches on the north side of the town.  Shelling was light, and hardly any casualties were suffered as the attackers reached the area around Guillemont.  However, haphazard forward progress of the attacking force saw the Liverpudlians and Mancunians lose contact with the main body of the attack.​[623]​  They were suddenly attacked on three sides, and after some resistance gave themselves up.  Their interrogator noted that a number of the prisoners expressed regret at having resisted at all after having been given time to reflect on the situation.​[624]​
Such a large number of prisoners apparently warranted additional scrutiny, leading to another report on the following day which included 120 men of I Battalion, the Liverpool regiment.​[625]​  The Merseysiders reached the eastern edge of Guillemont with few losses and began to dig in, but were taken under fire from left, right and centre by rifles and machine guns.  Breaking the connections between the British units with small arms, German artillery used barrages of smoke shells and high explosives to sever their lines of communication to the rear.  German infantry completed the encirclement, and a German officer came forward with a surrender request that was accepted.  Interrogators noted that many British junior officers were recently arrived replacements for heavy officer casualties sustained on 3 August, laying the blame for this incident on their inexperience.​[626]​
	21 men of I Battalion, the Nottingham & Derby regiment found themselves in a broadly similar set of circumstances.  Sixteen were taken when German raiders overran their forward positions.  Five were taken while attempting to raid German positions, when they were called to from the darkness and a flare revealed a line of Germans with rifles poised. They promptly surrendered.​[627]​86 men of II Company, 5 Battalion of the Lincolnshire regiment shared this experience.  Drawn largely from C company of the 5 Battalion, they drifted out of formation in an attack on hills near Malakoff-Ferme.  Isolated from the rest of the battalion, they were encircled by a German counter attack west of Quennmont-Ferme and forced to surrender.​[628]​  C company was reported to be inexperienced with too few officers, while such officers as were present largely ignored the advice of veteran NCOs.​[629]​
	20 men of XII Battalion of the Suffolk regiment were dispatched on a reconnaissance of German positions near Villers-Plouich.  The original 22 members of the patrol were taken under fire, which killed the officer in charge and wounded two other men.  Scattering into shell craters, they sheltered for a day before surrendering to a German patrol.  No mention was made of what happened to the missing British soldier. 27 Soldiers of XIII Battalion of the Yorkshire regiment and one miner of 178 Tunnelling company were taken in a German raid.  Accurate and heavy artillery fire had driven them into their dugouts, rendering them unable to defend themselves against the storm troops following directly behind the wall of shells.​[630]​  The balance of their unit had withdrawn at the onset of the German barrage to a strong point constructed in their support trenches which German shelling left untouched.
	11 soldiers of Company ‘F’, 16th Infantry regiment of the American Expeditionary Force were taken in a raid conducted by two storm troop squads of the Bavarian Landwehr division.​[631]​  The ten enlisted men and one NCO were taken from a 45 man trench garrison, and counted two heavily wounded among their number.  All of the others were killed in close combat.
	The first commonality of the above interrogations is the importance of surprise.  It appeared in numerous forms, either in a sudden barrage of bullets and shells, the appearance of the enemy in close proximity, the appearance of the enemy on three sides or any combination thereof put immediate and terrible pressure on the next commonality: the impossible position of junior officers.  Surprise demands an immediate orientation of the unit towards the threat and accessing other resources or capabilities which can influence the immediate situation but are not currently agents (requesting artillery or machine gun support through signals, sending runners for reinforcements, etc.).   But it is also the officer’s task to maintain the linkages between his unit and others, a huge difficulty when set against the terrain of First World War battlefields and which all sides recognised and ultimately built into their defensive doctrines.
	Poor leadership was the cause in the case of 2 company of the Lincolnshire regiment, and the men of VIII and I Battalions of the Liverpool regiment.  In the case of the Merseysiders, too many of their officers had arrived in a replacement draft the week prior.  For the men of II Company, they did not have enough leaders to begin with and those present were not interested in learning from experienced but inferior ranks.  There is no statement on the quality of leadership for the men of XII Battalion, but their Lieutenant was the first to die in a surprise fusillade. 
	Units that were surprised, poorly or insufficiently officered were also isolated or removed from the larger military system by enemy action and forced to compare no more than their own resourced to the immediate situation.  This was the case all the recorded instances of surrender analysed here except for the men of XIII Battalion of the Yorkshire regiment.  Theirs was an example of a truly impossible situation, or a state in which there was no way for them to escape, appeal to the larger military system for aid, or to cause harm to their opponents even if they possessed self-destructive motivation to do so.  
	 Confinement in a POW camp did not necessarily end a soldiers’ war.  Over the course of the fighting in the west, dozens if not hundreds of German soldiers escaped Allied captivity and successfully regained their own lines.  Returned prisoners were interrogated by intelligence officers, primarily to ascertain the circumstances of their surrenders, their escape, and the conditions of their imprisonment.  Higher officers sometimes intervened in the process, eager to know if their men had given up under less than honourable circumstances.  With their good conduct established, the next most important pieces of information related to events immediately following the laying down of arms.  It was from this testimony that the army hoped to extract useful material to put soldiers off the idea that surrender was desirable.  1st Army commander Fritz von Below composing and published the document from which the following was extracted,

In the last few weeks numerous German soldiers taken prisoner during the Battle of the Somme have broken out of prisoner camps and have regardless of danger and with great courage found the way back to German positions.  Following examination of their service records, I have awarded these brave men the Iron Cross.  Their compiled testimonies follow and are to be disseminated to the troops.​[632]​  

Most notable among the reported atrocities was the killing of an officer candidate by a French officer after refusing to give up his wrist watch.  An unnamed Jäger testified that after being taken prisoner, he and his comrades were made to carry British wounded to aid stations, while British soldiers killed all German wounded who could not run or be carried by their friends.​[633]​ In their tales of maltreatment lay a failed attempt by the OHL to brutalise its own troops by convincing them that combat was superior to captivity in all cases.
Musketier Twrdy of 8th Company, 10th Reserve regiment, 11th Reserve division was a 22 year old miner from Gross-Tarkowitz in Upper Silesia.​[634]​  While on watch on the evening of 15-16 April, his trench section was raided by approximately 50 British troops in three units.   Twrdy testified that his rifle jammed during the fighting, which also separated him from his unit.  Trying to make his way back to German lines by himself and in daylight, he was seized by the British who took his letters home.  Twrdy reported that he was interrogated by four officers, one of whom spoke flawless German and questioned him repeatedly on fortifications and their garrisons.​[635]​  Ducking the question by saying he was only recently assigned to the unit, Twrdy was moved to a ‘fearful’, windowless room without bedding or amenities and received only water.  After three days of such treatment, he was told on 20 April that if he did not give up the required information, he would be shot the next day.​[636]​
	It was this threat of execution that drove Twrdy to escape, which he did that night by working open the poorly built door of his cell.  He spent the time from his escape until dawn moving towards German lines, sheltering in an abandoned dugout [Postenloch] until nightfall.  He then crept across No-Man’s Land until he was picked up by the outposts of III Battalion, 10th Reserve regiment. None of this was recorded by Twrdy himself, but by the Military Intelligence Officer who interrogated him upon his return.  The officer concluded that Twrdy’s story was believable, and that the story of his treatment was substantiated by his poor physical condition, swollen feet, and exhaustion.
	The case of Musketier Heymann is equally informative.  Heymann was a soldier from 1st company, Infantry regiment 114, 199th Infantry division, 19 years old from Düsseldorf where he worked as journalist.​[637]​  His interrogator noted that he came off as an intelligent young man, and was Jewish. Heymann was part of an eight man patrol sent out on the night of 2-3 June in order to reconnoitre British positions.  Having taken cover at the sound of English-language songs and laughter, the patrol was discovered by five to six British soldiers and fired on from both right and left.  Heymann was the leftmost man in the patrol, testifying that while attempting to reload his rifle, he tripped, fell and was overpowered by two British soldiers.  Taken to the cellar of a nearby house, he was held in a small room and obtained a little bread and water to eat over the course of a day and a half.  
	At 9pm, Heymann was taken from his room by a single guard and conducted across the street towards another house, the guard for some reason carrying two rifles, one his own and the other Heymann’s.  At this point, one of the Guard’s friends called out to him something which the guard did not hear, so he laid the two rifles up against the wall of the house and ran after him.  Heymann immediately grabbed his rifle and struck out through the ruins of the town towards the fields beyond.  Remembering the layout of the British wire, he hid in the space between the British positions and their wire for a day.  Heymann then crept into the German front line on the night of June 4-5, successfully negotiating the machinegun fire of his own side which swept no Man’s Land by loudly shouting the passphrase from the night he was on patrol. Noting that there was very little useful information in Heymann’s testimony, the Military Intelligence Officer observed that in spite of his poor command of English, Heymann did remember hearing the words ‘Dragoon Guards, Yeomanry, Middlesex Regiment and Suffolk’.​[638]​  The officer made no statement endorsing Heymann’s testimony as he had Twrdy’s, merely stating that Heymann himself was prepared to swear to its veracity.
	Twrdy and Heymann shared a story.  First, they had been taken prisoner after losing a fight, or so they reported.  Upon being captured they were conducted to a local jail where they received minimal rations.  Heymann seized a chance to escape, on the contrary Twrdy sought to flee only after his captors threatened his life.  In both cases, the soldiers were gone for three to four days from capture to return, typically spending at least a day hiding in No Man’s Land waiting for a chance to safely regain their lines.
	In contrast, Franz Joseph Schmitz was a prototypical German soldier.  Schmitz was 19 from Coffern, Erkelenz District of the Rhineland, a war volunteer and Realschule graduate who attended the Army Preparatory School in Jülich.​[639]​  Schmitz was a veteran with sixteen months’ service, was wounded in action three times, twice on the Somme where he was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class.  On the evening of 3-4 March 1917 Schmitz and a comrade were guarding a sap extending towards British lines near Lens when they were shelled and attacked by two British patrols.  One patrol cut off their lines of retreat while the other attacked the sap.  Schmitz was in the act of priming a hand grenade ‘when he perceived the number of rifles pointed at him and realised the pointlessness of his resistance’.​[640]​  On the way back to British lines he and a number of other German prisoners taken in raids were deprived of watches, buttons and other ‘souvenirs’ at pistol point. After a cursory interrogation, Schmitz was transported to a POW camp and assigned to labour company of 500 German POWs, led by a British Captain and a German 1st Sergeant.  It was the treatment he received during his approximately three months in this unit that drove him to escape.​[641]​
Schmitz attempted to enlist others in his escape attempt, but testified that the other prisoners had lost their courage.  Schmitz’s labour company was assigned to clean up old trenches near a POW Camp at Lihons and Schmitz slipped into an old shell crater that evening, camouflaging himself with grass.  Schmitz began, by his reckoning, a 12 day odyssey through the rear of the British army.  He crossed the front lines near Louverval and was picked up sentries of the 2nd Garde Reserve regiment. Schmitz then told all of his comrades that they were better off shooting themselves in the head than being taken prisoner by the ‘English’, where the most degrading labour at the front would break even those healthiest in body and spirit.​[642]​
	The story of Franz Joseph Schmitz was compiled for internal consumption and disseminated through the units of Gruppe Caudry.  It carries no endorsement or commentary from a Military Intelligence Officer; in fact the only signature appended to it is from a Captain of the 2nd Garde Reserve regiment.  Whereas the majority of escaped prisoner interrogations are the front and back of a page, Schmitz’s is five, four of which are devoted to his captivity and his escape.  Culminating in a statement of bellicose patriotism, this piece of propaganda sought to aid in the creation of a general conceptualisation of combat among German soldiers rooted in self-sacrifice.  Anchored in the ‘daemonisation’ of the enemy, it appears to have failed here as well​[643]​
	If the motivation of German soldiers to fight as if surrender was not an option was the goal of the OHL, then the publication of Schmitz’s testimony is bizarre when compared to other, much more sanguine reports.  Three Sergeants, Karl Walter, Joseph Hemmerich and Karl Ballnuss escaped from British captivity, providing eyewitness testimony to the murder of POWs.​[644]​  Walter was a holder of the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Classes, the Württemberg Military Service Medal in Gold and had been wounded once.  Hemmerich held the Iron Cross 2nd Class and the Württemberg War Medal in Silver.  Walter and Hemmerich were members of the same regiment, 120th Infantry regiment and had been captured on 18 November 1916.  Their companies were cut off by Canadian troops, and had fought until out of ammunition, whereby about 200 soldiers gave up.
	They reported that in the presence of Canadian officers, the POWs had been robbed and any who resisted were shot out of hand.  Walter referred specifically to the case of Jacob Mehl, who was shot without reason by a ‘young Canadian officer’.  Hemmerich mentioned Lt. Kübler of the 3rd company was shot by a Canadian officer while leaving his dugout.  More POWs died carrying ammunition, grenades, machine guns, supplies and wounded between captured German positions and the Canadian frontline.  The POWs spent the day working, then were sent off towards Albert that evening where they were ‘searched for souvenirs’ by English troops.  
Contrasting were the tales of Staff Sgt. Christoph Löptien, Staff Sgt. Gerhard Lange, Staff Sgt. Josef Hachmöller, Sgt. Gustav Köster and Recruit [Landsturmmann] Martin Möller, were all members of 76th  Reserve Infantry regiment and bearers of the Iron Cross 2nd Class.​[645]​  They had all been taken prisoner on 9 April 1917 during the Battle of Arras along with most of the I and II Battalions of their regiment after losing a five hour fight and being surrounded.   Apart from the now common refrain of robbery and ‘souvenir hunting’, they had no complaints about their treatment.
	Returning to the case of Walter and Hemmerich, the killings of Lt. Kübler, an authority figure, and Jacob Mehl, who resisted his captor’s demands suggest deliberate acts towards a specific end.  In order to establish their authority over a large number of prisoners, and intimidate them into providing unquestioning service as supplementary labour, Mehl and Kübler were killed as part of a standing but unofficial practice.  Prisoners in small numbers may well have been a hindrance, but in large numbers they speedily evacuated wounded attackers, resupplied attacking troops with food and munitions and constructed shelters for their captors.   There was little practical reason to kill prisoners en masse, and so compel attackers to spend time and energy better preserved for a fight. There was every reason to kill a few, cow the rest, and save friendly lives with deeper trenches and quicker trips to hospital.  Single soldiers offered the least threat and hindrance, while groups of prisoners offered a ready supply of supplementary labour which improved attacker’s chances of survival, especially when viewed in the light of late war offensive tactics.​[646]​ As pointed out in Chapter 2 and will be further clarified in this chapter, troops required defenses against firepower in all places and at all times.  The faster and more comprehensively captured positions were restored, the better the chances for the troops that had captured them.  Furthermore, every prisoner put to work replaced and rested an attacker. Prisoner killing was certainly far from uncommon, as Brian Feltman has argued most persuasively, but tactical reform gave attackers a greater incentive to be merciful than earlier.​[647]​  
The most common act taken against an attack with limited objectives was not a determined defense, but a process of avoidance and then retaliation through firepower and counterattacks.  Defenders freely abandoned the parts of their positions closest to the attackers, moving deeper into their defenses where their fear and disorganization were lessened as the space between them and danger increased.  This effect was immediately achieved by sheltering in dugouts, which provided the best shelter from artillery, but also protected avenues of escape if well built.  The unknown however, was that there was very little to distinguish the opening phase of a raid by forty or fifty men to take the occupants of a few dugouts and an attack designed to capture and destroy all defenses in a given space.  If the need to shelter from fire won out over the need to escape from a man vs. man contest, defenders were committed to the notion that the artillery presaged a raid, rather than an attack.  Moreover, with threatened positions abandoned by their troops, or with the knowledge that garrisons were sheltering in dugouts, friendly artillery was free to shell their own lines, particularly their own first line which was now held solely by the enemy.  With sufficient forewarning, defenders ensured that attackers’ operations failed before they were ever launched.  Attackers instead found empty positions littered with booby traps, command-detonated mines and covered by complex artillery barrages tripped immediately by simple signals.
	
Case Study:  Operation ‘Strandfest’ of 10 July 1917

The practice of positional war was well refined by the summer of 1917, a practice involving a complicated division-of-labour system and meticulous preparation.  Complicated artillery preparation isolated the areas to be attacked, before elite assault specialists in positional war broke into those areas to engage in close combat.  Conventional infantry followed the assault specialists to take possession of captured positions either to demolish them or put them in a state of defence.  Given the peculiar nature of the German system, the burdens of close combat were therefore confined to a specially selected and trained minority of those involved.  
	As will be demonstrated, the confining physical structures of positional war were tools utilised by both attacker and defender to provide both threat and protection.  Attacker’s weaponry could easily turn a fortification into a cage, while defender’s precautions could do the exact same.​[648]​  Quite accurate reconnaissance could provide a detailed picture of a prospective battlefield, but these battlefields contained artificial and human elements subject to rapid or unpredictable change.  Opposition could rout, fight while retreating, fight in place, surrender, or simply vacate the positions to be attacked if they thought they were threatened.  Moreover, they could leave behind traps, build false positions, or quickly fill trenches with chain link obstructions or barbed wire.  All of these conditions were problems for attackers and had to be addressed.
	Thanks to an abundance of reports and orders from the participants, Operation ‘Strandfest’ provides a clear view of combat in and amongst the trenches of the Western Front in 1917.​[649]​  Particularly illuminating is the variegated conduct of the defenders and the role played by fortifications in providing not only refuge but also facilitating the violence of trench warfare.​[650]​  Given the extraordinary risks involved in entering dugouts and shelters, specialized weapons were developed which permitted attackers to kill, incapacitate or subdue defenders from a place of safety.​[651]​  Moreover, though they were in close physical proximity there was no need or even possibility for attackers to see the men they were fighting. 
	Bodies in trenches, prisoners being led to the rear and captured weapons were tangible products of a successful deployment of military violence.   So it was that a great deal of fighting and prisoner taking took place, but how much killing was done is another question.  Dugouts and shelters could be empty; alternatively they could be occupied by dozens of enemies.  There was no way to tell for certain for even if men were observed running into them, shelters often had multiple exits to prevent their occupants being trapped underground.  Fighting in trenches rendered special detachment between killers and victims as a product of the technologies and tactics developed to win positional war.  To illuminate the uses of violence in positional war, the particularly detailed records of the Marine Assault battalion provide the basis for the following case study, an attack with limited objectives undertaken in the 3rd Marine division sector on the Channel coast.  The marines were trained and organised according to army doctrines, but maintained naval ranks.
	German army units were built according to ‘division of labour’ principles, but operated on the principle of an inequitable division of risk.  During ‘Strandfest’, five assault groups totalling 169 men supported by artillery were ordered to ‘…push to the Yser as quickly as possible, to break enemy resistance wherever it was encountered along the paths of advance in order to break the central point of the enemy’s defence’.​[652]​  The assault groups were offensive specialists, and were solely responsible for taking enemy positions. In some places British defences were three lines deep, in others four lines, and in many cases they were supported by strongpoints located between the lines. Whatever the particular composition of the defences, attached assault groups were meant to take them and reach the bank of the Yser
On the other hand, common German soldiers were defensive specialists, though some were intermittently trained in offensive tactics.  During ‘Strandfest’, the marine’s task according to 6th Army Command ‘… shall be the total cleansing of trenches, the removal of prisoners to the rear and so on’.​[653]​  Marines following the storm troops would find the physical aftermath of combat, but would do relatively little fighting.  Instead, their tasks were to gather prisoners, complete demolition of the British trenches where necessary, and put captured defences meant to be held in a state of defence.  Combat engineer units were on hand to demolish with explosives any positions the Marines did not occupy.
	The process of ‘cleansing’ [Säuberung] trenches and dugouts was first and foremost a security measure intended to deal with dugouts or strong points which were still occupied, but had not engaged attacking troops.  Instead, they permitted themselves to be overrun or their occupants initiated no hostile action until after the enemy’s first wave had passed them by.  In developing a procedure for ‘cleansing’ trenches, the Germans were given a generous hand by the French, who had already produced extensive guidelines on how to go about the task.  
	French regulations put the task of ‘cleansing’ under the responsibility of the commander of the leading unit with the help of a specially organised group between platoon and company strength and marked with special insignia.​[654]​  Such duties required careful planning and ‘a strong will to see the job done quickly…as the resistance of isolated units was often the cause of greater losses than the attack itself’.​[655]​  More specific instructions were given in the captured document ‘General Instruction for Nettoyage’, or ‘cleaning’ as the French referred to this.​[656]​
	Each ‘Nettoyer’ was equipped with four grenades, plus a trench dagger if they were European and a coupe-coupe if they were Senegalese.​[657]​  Following an attack in squads of at least ten men, they took as prisoners all who had thrown away their weapons, raised their hands and shouted ‘Kamerad’.  Upon discovering a dugout, they threw a grenade into the entrance and listened.  If they heard cries, they shouted for the occupants to come out (and were proffered the phrase ‘Komm komm Kamerad’) and any who appeared armed were instantly killed.  Nettoyers were told ‘under no circumstances is one permitted to enter the dugout, as this means death’.
	Should the occupants be reluctant to come out, additional measures were permitted.  A pair of incendiary or smoke grenades was then hurled into the dugout.  If this did not work, the Nettoyers were permitted to request the aid of a squad equipped with flame throwers who would spray the dugout.  Flamethrowers were only to be used when incendiary grenades were insufficient, as it was only possible to carry one spare tank of flamethrower fuel.  It was then the job of the Nettoyers to separate their prisoners into two groups, one of officers and NCOs, the other of enlisted men and hustle them across No Man’s Land.  Any prisoner who spoke or cried out received a single warning before they were killed.​[658]​
	The procedure utilized by the Marine Assault Battalion for ‘Säuberung’ operations proceeded along the same lines provided by the French, but without explicit instructions on when and how to kill prisoners.  A separate tendency of leaving of leaving such acts up to those on the spot prevailed in the German army, if the latitude given to the reporters of Operation ‘Mathilde’ is any indication.  However, instead of completing the ‘cleansing’ on their own and conducting their own prisoners across No Man’s Land, the storm troops turned them over to following waves of Marines.  

The Events of 10 July 1917: Preparations

6th Army Command sent its first orders on 9 June 1917.  The forces assigned to the operation are outlined below,  

Table 4.1: Assault Group Assignments for Operation ‘Strandfest’
Assault Group	Attached to:	Sector
1	10th Company, 2nd Marine Regiment	Dune
2	11th Company, 2nd Marine Regiment	Dune
3	9th Company, 2nd Marine Regiment	Dune
4	12th Company, 2nd Marine Regiment	Dune
5	12th Company, 1st Marine Regiment	Polder
Source: BA/MA RM 120/324, 23 July 1917, Report of the Marine Assault Battalion on Operation ‘Strandfest’ of 10 July 1917, I. Operations in 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment Sector (Dunes), II. Operations in 1st Marine Infantry Regiment Sector (Polder).

Three factors were used to explain the lopsided deployment of assault groups.  The first was the nature of the terrain.  In the north, the battlefield ended on the coast of the North Sea.  Most immediate to the coast were polders, or areas of reclaimed land and flood plains.  Moving further south, polders gave way to sandy dunes both rolling and steep sided, and covered on top by long grass.  The Yser River flowed throw this topography from north to south, constituting the eastern edge of the battlefield and feeding the polders before emptying into the North Sea. The second was the nature of the defensive fortifications.   Finally, as each assault group was attached to an infantry company, the variances of each company sector had to be accounted for.  In the time leading up to the attack, each assault group trained in practice fortifications with the company to which they were assigned.​[659]​ Given the strategic implications of the attack, ‘Strandfest’ involved no more than 1100 men, 169 in the assault groups, 42 crewmen for two attached light field howitzers and the rest Marines from the Marine corps.​[660]​	
Preparatory exercises for the attack began on 15 June 1917 to impart ‘certain knowledge’ of the most threatening strongpoints, machine gun positions and the layout of the trench system, aided by the photography section of the German Marine corps.​[661]​  Orientation took a now established pattern; German positions were named regions, geographic features, or the units that first built them.​[662]​   Enemy positions and terrain features nearby received much more vivid names, like ‘Turkish Dunes’ or ‘The Witches’ Cauldron’. ‘Practical exercises’ began on 21 June 1917,  where the assault battalions began imparting their tactics to soldiers from the 1st and 2nd Marine regiments, focusing on the units which would be directly supported by assault groups.​[663]​ The exercises were held in replicas of each of the British positions and undertaken by companies and assault groups assigned to take the position.  
	Though there was some moving to be done between the exercise grounds and the front before the attack took place, these Marine companies probably received about two weeks of additional training.  Two week’s training is exactly the amount of time they would have received were they to form their own units of assault troops.  In total, ‘Strandfest’ was scheduled to last an hour and twenty minutes, from its starting time [Nullzeit] to the shifting of supporting artillery to the west bank of the Yser.​[664]​  The short timeframe was possible due to the relatively small amount of terrain to be taken, and the assumption that the enemy, the British 1st Division in this case, would be taken by surprise.    Most dangerous to the attack was a standing barrage [Sperrfeuer] sighted either on No-Man’s land or the German front line, which the garrison could call upon through prearranged signal and the danger of this barrage compelled the attackers to enter British positions no more than two minutes after the appointed start time.​[665]​ 

The Events of 10 July 1917: The Reports of Assault Groups 1 through 5

Assault group 1 arrived at the Dune sector the morning of the operation (7am, 10 June 1917), joining up with the 10th company of the 2nd Marine regiment.  The element of surprise had been lost, as the German positions were bombarded with shrapnel but suffered no casualties.  However things proceeded as planned and the assault group followed its barrage into the British position, finding it filled with British soldiers and completely untouched by the barrage.​[666]​  The defenders surrendered immediately and without resistance, were disarmed by the assault group and sent back in the direction of the German lines, where they were received by the Marines.  Having holed the first line, the assault group split in half, one part proceeding down the communications trenches and the other over the Dunes themselves to attack the second line.
	The attack on the second line was carried out from inside the German barrage.​[667]​  Shells landed at most 15-20 meters ahead of the assault group, near it, behind it and also amongst the first wave of Marines.  Lt. Thomsen, the unit leader, and three enlisted men were killed and Sgt. Petry took over command.  Emerging from their own artillery to attack the second position, the assault troops found many large dugouts filled with British soldiers.  The assault troops located both entrance and exit to a dugout and convinced the occupants of all but two dugouts to give up by throwing grenades in the entrance and taking ‘most of them’ prisoner at the exit.  In two cases no one emerged from the dugouts despite ‘energetic entreaties’, after they were grenaded, so flamethrowers were discharged into the entrances.​[668]​  As in the first line, prisoners from the second line were immediately turned over to the Marines and the advance continued on the third line.  Between the 2nd and 3rd lines Sgt. Petry was seriously wounded and leadership of the assault group fell to Petty Officer Heinze of the 2nd Marine Regiment.
	P.O Heinze ordered the assault group to proceed over flat land toward the third line, ignoring the communications trenches and attacked a garrison of 150 men and one machine gun.  Apparently the German barrage had lifted to the Yser bridges, forcing the assault group to break down into squads and advance from shell hole to shell hole.  German shelling soon destroyed the bridges behind the defenders who were only 100 meters from Yser and forced them to withdraw where they were trapped by the river and the advances of assault groups 1, 2 and 3.  15 attempted to swim to safety while the assault troops pelted them with grenades, but were apparently killed by the detonation of a large shell in their midst.
It was at this moment that assault group 1 found out that their reconnaissance had been less than perfect, as additional British troops sought to mount a defence from two positions which were not marked on their maps.  From dugouts camouflaged against observation from the air and protected against shellfire, the Germans observed the crews of two machine guns readying their weapons to fire from the entrances.​[669]​  PO Heinze noticed these preparations at the same time as a number of his men and they responded by showering the dugout entrances and area nearby with grenades.​[670]​   Prevented from readying their weapons by numerous grenade explosions, the machine gun crews were helpless to prevent the approach of German flamethrowers and ‘fell burning from their dugouts’.​[671]​  
	Having taken all three British lines of defence in their sector, assault group 1’s part in the operation concluded with the turning over of prisoners to the Marines.  Combat engineers then destroyed captured dugouts and communications trenches with explosives.  The Marines of the 10th Company took over the ground captured and the assault group returned to German lines around 9:20.
	For the purposes of this case study, assault group 1’s experience reveals four relevant events, many of which will be replicated in the experiences of the other assault groups.  First, the overwhelming majority of prisoners taken were taken in groups of 20 or more who made no attempt to defend themselves.  Second, opaque language was used to describe what happened to British soldiers in dugouts described as heavily occupied, particularly the two dugouts which received the attention of flamethrowers.  Since no one answered the assault group’s signals to come out and further advances were required, the occupants of these two such occupants as may have been in the dugouts became victims of military expediency. Thirdly, the assault group moved forward inside or through its own artillery barrage.  Fourthly, that the assault group leaders were the first casualties, who were replaced by NCOs from following Marine units.
	Assault group 2 benefitted from the support of heavy artillery and gas, which destroyed the British wire but also made it quite difficult for the assault troops to see opposing trenches.  The British first line was taken without resistance and it can be assumed that this line had no garrison at all as no prisoners were reported. While advancing on the second line, the assault group encountered a strongpoint concealed amidst shell holes and whose garrison resisted their advance with grenades.  Light machine guns and grenades were brought to bear against this strongpoint but had no effect, which stalled the attack as the assault group sought to move around its sides and rear.  Machine gun fire protected a small group of assault troops who moved into grenade range and ‘threw until the position offered no more resistance’.​[672]​
	Assault group 2 was delayed again as communications between it and its artillery support broke down.  Attempting to signal their artillery with rockets, the assault group took a rest until ordered by the commander of the 12th Marine Company to proceed through their own barrage.  They did as ordered and the assault group commander, Staff Sgt. Roggenkamp was severely wounded between the 2nd and 3rd lines and the assault group itself was ‘splintered’.​[673]​  This effectively ended assault group 2’s participation in the operation as the actions of the other four groups combined to destroy British resistance and enable the combat engineers to demolish captured positions.  On its way back to German lines, assault group 2 took eleven prisoners who had been hiding in dugouts.  Of 30 members, all but two were wounded in some way with three men severely wounded including Staff Sergeant Roggenkamp who died later in hospital.​[674]​ 
	As with assault group 1, assault group 2 was ordered to proceed through its own barrage, but lost its commander and all its coherency doing so.   In further parallel of assault group 1, assault group 2 took prisoner some small groups of soldiers found in dugouts, who offered no resistance.
	Assault group 3’s battle commenced with its taking up two locations in the German front line, a listening post on Hill 17 and an armoured dugout near a position called the Witches’ Cauldron.  During the German barrage, the men on Hill 17 received ‘three or four’ direct hits from large shells as British counter-preparation hit the German front line.​[675]​  To these large shells were added numerous hits by smoke bombs and hand grenades.  As the position at Hill 17 didn’t have enough space to hold all the assault troops, some had been forced to shelter in trenches including the leader of this group, Sgt. Hausberger.  Hausberger inhaled so much smoke that he was knocked unconscious for four hours, obviously removing him from command.​[676]​  The report ceases to distinguish between the two groups at this point.  
	Moving from their shelters to the exits of their trench system, at 7:45 the assault troops were struck by another large shell which severely wounded the leader of assault group 3, 1st Sgt. Schauerte and a marine, and lightly wounded Schauerte’s orderly.  Three more assault troops were buried alive.  The remainder evacuated the wounded and rescued the buried men, which in turn prevented assault group 3’s attack from starting on schedule. These events so disorganised the assault group that it had yet to finish reorganizing when the operation started.  Command was taken over by 1st Sgt. Thiel of the 9th company, 2nd Marine regiment.​[677]​  1st Sgt. Thiel led the assault group into No Man’s land and immediately one of his squads was struck by a large shell which scattered and buried its members.​[678]​  
	When the attack finally started, the British listening posts and first line were overrun quickly, mostly because they were not occupied or contained only dead bodies.  Some resistance was encountered between the first and second lines, with the defenders giving up after a short exchange of grenades.  These prisoners were given over to the Marines and the assault group proceeded against the third line of defences across clear ground but for some shell holes.  Here the assault group was taken under fire by a machine gun which caused no casualties.
	Assault group 3 then broke into the third line of defences, seeking out the machine gun and its crew.  Locating them, Private Niermann of the Marines killed the two crewmen in hand-to-hand combat.​[679]​  Nearby was a very well-constructed dugout which contained thirty to fourty British soldiers who gave up without resistance.  The rest of the third line was ‘cleaned up’ and the assault group pushed on towards the Yser River.  On the way, numerous defenders appeared with raised hands and a command post was discovered.  The defenders were made captive and the command post was left for the Marines.​[680]​
Serious resistance was encountered in the fourth line, where a group of more than 30 British soldiers met the assault group with showers of grenades.  The two sides hurled grenades at each other for some time before the assault troops rushed the British and a hand-to-hand fight ensued.​[681]​  Winning the resulting melee, a ‘majority of the unwounded enemy gave up; the rest fled into their dugouts’.​[682]​  Flamethrowers ‘cleaned out these dugouts’.​[683]​  Due to events that are not recorded, Private Niermann had assumed command of the entire assault group and sent back thirty prisoners with two storm troops as guards.  Additional British soldiers came out of the Yser and were made prisoner.  Captain Schmidt ordered assault group 3 to return to the British third line, after establishing contact with neighbouring assault groups, and there it regrouped.  Private Niermann was wounded during this withdrawal. 
	Assault group 3’s experience runs similar to assault group 1.  Prisoners were taken when they surrendered in large numbers and offered no resistance.  Officers were the first casualties and were replaced by NCOs from the following Marines.  Divergently, assault group 3 encountered a large group of defenders intent on fighting.  It won this fight, but the aftermath leaves lingering questions on the fate of the British combatants.
	A specific reference to ‘non-wounded enemy prisoners’ sets them aside.  Taking place in the fourth line of defences, this section of trenches was deeper than most and gave its defenders more time to overcome their surprise.  After their defence was overcome, the British defenders broke down into two groups, the wounded and the unwounded.  These two groups were subject to four outcomes, unwounded who fled and escaped, unwounded who were ‘mostly’ taken prisoner, wounded who were not taken prisoner, and unwounded who were not part of the majority of not taken prisoner.​[684]​  The implications of such careful phrasing require little explanation.  As Ernst Jünger recorded on 28 August 1916, ‘Why take prisoners that must be sent to the rear painstakingly through the artillery barrage. Even more uncomfortable [text crossed out] are wounded enemies’.​[685]​
Assault group 4 arrived at the front only after some difficulty, and its commander, 1st Sgt. Schumacher noticed that his watch was four minutes off the timetable set by the artillery barrage. He was able to correct this mistake before anything came of it.  However, assault group 4 was supported by a large quantity of heavy artillery whose rounds often fell short, landing numerous direct hits on the armoured bunker in which it sheltered.​[686]​  The inaccuracy of heavy guns was not an isolated phenomenon.​[687]​ Consequently, Sgt. Hart of the assault group succumbed to shell shock as a result of ‘weak nerves’ and was removed from the assault group. ​[688]​  Instead, he was given command of the combat engineer unit charged with demolishing British trenches.
	Hart’s treatment is almost perfectly in line with army psychiatry’s views on shell shock at the time as officers appear to have internalised the recent findings of the profession.​[689]​  One had the ability to overcome the battlefield if one chose to; psychiatric diagnoses which acknowledged trauma and therefore an irresistible forces acting against the usual function of the human mind had been discounted.​[690]​ But officers appear have diverged from the psychiatric profession with regard to the potential of men like Sgt. Hart in that he had not proven himself unfit to fight.  Disqualified by his behaviour from setting a correct example of courage, selflessness and skill needed to lead an assault squad into combat, he was still qualified to oversee the work of demolishing British defences.  As an experienced soldier, Sgt. Hart’s past service appeared to buy him a second chance to recover from what his comrades would interpret to be a momentary lapse of courage.  He took command of the demolition squad, leading it for the rest of the operation.  The small group had stepped in to protect one of its own, mitigating the impact of his loss of nerve by reaffirming his status as a veteran soldier and leader.​[691]​
A little before 8 o’clock 1st Sgt. Schumacher ordered his men out of their trenches and across No Man’s land.  As before, the first and second British lines were quickly taken with little if any fighting but for ‘some men found in communications trenches’ who were killed.​[692]​   The assault group took a brief rest before moving on to the third line.  While crossing from the second to third British lines, the assault group was subjected to shelling by British heavy artillery and also German heavy guns whose rounds fell short.  ‘Hit followed hit, obviously from German heavy artillery’ which killed three men and wounded many others.​[693]​
	1st Sgt. Schumacher decided at this point to proceed with two other men, both lightly wounded.  These three men attacked and ‘dealt with’ a British observation post, a battery of trench mortars, then ‘cleaned out’ a group of tunnels and dugouts found among the Yser Dunes.​[694]​  This small party reported that large numbers of potential prisoners were seen escaping towards the British rear. Leaving the British 3rd line, 1st Sgt. Schumacher returned to the second line, where Marines and assault troops were rebuilding the trenches.  The process of returning captured trenches to a defensible state took up the rest of assault group 4’s time.  
	The men of assault group 4 worked with Lt. Martin of the 12th Company of Marines to reconstruct the trenches and bunkers they had captured.  In a short time the Germans had constructed a strong position and begun moving in machine guns.  After the combat engineer demolition group blew up a captured British command post, assault group 4 turned over its ammunition to the Marines of 12th Company, and returned to the rear at 920.​[695]​
	Assault group 4 probably suffered the most from its own artillery out of all the groups analysed here.   Like the others, swift movement through the first and second British lines was halted by German shells falling short.  Unlike groups 1, 2 and 3 however, the group was not ordered to proceed through its own barrage either by its leader or a superior officer.   German shelling was responsible for killing three men, wounding at least half a dozen more to varying severity, and causing the mental collapse of Sgt. Hart.  As for the fighting it did, assault group 4 does not record any prisoners taken, but quickly killed individuals and small groups it encountered.  Also diverging from the conduct of the other groups, assault group 4 took a prominent role in consolidating the ground it captured, helping Marines with their construction work and leaving their ammunition behind.  To conclude, assault groups 4 and 5 were the only units whose leaders made it through the operation alive and uninjured.
	Assault group 5 was the smallest of all and the only group detailed to the Polder Sector.  At 745 the assault troops were forced to leave their dugouts in order to make space for Marines moving into the forward lines, taking position in the break-out positions [Ausbruchstelle].  There they received final orders from the Marine battalion commander which outlined the targets and planned shifts of the artillery barrage.  The assault troops were to leave their trenches at 800, and the artillery would have struck every line of three British lines of defence then moved on to the east bank of the Yser by 820. As soon as the German barrage began, British counter-preparation commenced on the German front line which was initially sporadic but strengthened over the course of an hour to a barrage capable of annihilating defensive positions [Vernichtungsfeuer].  For leading his men into this ‘Vernichtungsfeuer’ fifteen seconds early and for being the first man from his ‘Ausbruchstelle’, the assault group leader Lt. Sattler received high praise.  He was the only assault group leader to receive this sort of commendation in any report.​[696]​
	Almost no resistance was encountered as the assault group crossed the first and second British lines.  German artillery caused the first German losses; severely wounding a corporal, a private and light and medium guns shifted their fire to the British third line while heavy guns continued to shell the second line on contravention of the artillery plan.​[697]​  Another corporal was wounded as the assault group took cover from its own shells.  
	Lt. Sattler ordered his assault group to proceed through the German barrage and attack a group of positions called the Dune Complex.  Apparently passing through the barrage without loss, the advance continued from shell hole to shell hole where two more men were wounded.  Upon reaching the third line, it was found to be destroyed by shellfire which caused more losses whose number and type were not recorded.​[698]​ Moving through the third line and into the dunes and hills beyond, the assault group discovered isolated but well-constructed dugouts that were occupied.  If their occupants surrendered immediately, they were made prisoner.  If they offered resistance they were killed.​[699]​
	Having taken the whole defensive system, the assault troops and the first wave of Marines combined forces and began combing through the British trenches. Little was recorded except that individual positions offered resistance that was quickly overpowered.  During this process one Marine was killed and three assault troops were wounded by German artillery fire.​[700]​  Lt. Sattler fired ten white rockets to signal for a shift in the barrage, which was finally achieved after about ten minutes of shelling.
	While the process of trench clearing was underway, Lt. Sattler moved through a small depression to a position called the Turkish Dunes.  At the end of the depression, the British had constructed a sandbag barricade defended with a Lewis gun and six to eight soldiers.​[701]​  This barricade was set on fire with a flare pistol and the defenders scattered with grenades, fleeing into nearby dugouts.  A grenade was thrown into each entrance and a British sergeant and another soldier appeared with rifles in hand, whereby Lt. Sattler shot both with his pistol. Sattler then fired his pistol once into each entrance and shouted for anyone inside to come out.  36 soldiers emerged and were taken prisoner.
	Assault group 5’s part in the operation concluded with their reaching the banks of the Yser.  Reporting that the banks were flat and sandy but for shell craters, the assault troops moved among the craters, taking additional prisoners from soldiers found sheltering in them. The assault group reassembled, collecting its dead and wounded who were carried back to German lines around dusk.
	The report filed by assault group 5 was the longest of all reports, probably because it was one of two assault groups whose original commander came through the operation alive and unwounded.  As with the other assault groups, the primary cause of losses was German ‘friendly fire’ and the willingness not only of the commander to move through their own barrage, but for his men to obey the order.  Unlike the other four, assault group 5 was not equipped with flamethrowers.  The absence of these weapons may well have prompted the only recorded verbal interaction of the operation, that of Lt. Sattler shouting into dugouts to demand surrenders.  When handling positions that offered resistance or potential prisoners leaving dugouts, assault group 5 followed the same pattern as the others.  Any who appeared armed or offered resistance were much more likely to be killed immediately; otherwise opposing soldiers were made captive.




Technology and organisation were the two most important factors in managing risk, and therefore in determining exposure to the psychological burden of killing.  These forces are inseparable from the complicated defensive systems used to preserve life in positional war.  Thrown into this mix were the reactions of individuals and small groups with different levels of experience, varying access to quality leadership and vast differences in the amount time they had to formulate a response.  In the case of ‘Strandfest’ and particularly of assault group 3, some defenders offered resistance with grenades, fought hand-to-hand or established hasty strongpoints with sandbags, some like-minded comrades and an automatic weapon.  However, as was the case with assault group 5, while 6-8 men improvised a strongpoint, a short distance away, 40 more sheltered in dugouts and took no part in the fighting.  Such conduct reflects a generally acknowledged superiority enjoyed by attackers once they broke into a trench system and made full use of their specialised weapons and training.
	It makes perfect sense therefore that the most common response to the assault groups’ attacks was to retreat.  Defenders withdrew down communications trenches deeper into their own positions, or took shelter in dugouts so as to avoid fighting at all.  Those who entered the dugouts could leave if they had multiple exits; but otherwise they put themselves unknowingly into the hands of the ‘Säuberung’ process.  First and foremost this process was designed to preserve the lives of the assault troops and Marines, but also to facilitate the speed of their attacks.  Because at no point were the attackers to enter the dugouts, there was no chance to initiate a surrender request unless that attackers took an extraordinary risk themselves.   This human element, reflected in the atypical behaviour of Lt. Sattler in the Turkish Dunes was simultaneously an imponderable but also from the balance of evidence, quite successfully managed by a uniform code of conduct.







Based on the microhistory of a range of different operations in small positional war, this chapter has argued that applying violence as an end in itself was not a norm of the German army’s battlefield practice.  Here, specialisation for positional war produced new sets of rules as it developed new ways to take and preserve life.  Violence in small positional war was mediated by the tactical necessity of prisoner taking, and the more than reasonable expectation that surrenders, especially in groups, would be accepted.  Moreover, soldiers themselves added value to act of taking prisoners.  Their letters home were fodder for intelligence officers looking to establish a picture of the enemy’s home front.  Their shoulder straps, collar tabs, cap badges, ration books, gas masks were all valuable sources of intelligence.  Prisoners were murdered in cold blood and in the case  ‘Nettoyage’, as part of standing orders, but ultimately this study agrees that the scope and scale of these atrocities is difficult if not impossible to document.​[704]​  Of the 21 operations analysed and cited in this chapter, the only the case of Operation ‘Mathilde’ leaves us with skewed statistics, glaring inconsistencies and no hard evidence.​[705]​
	Instead, tales of prisoner killing and wretched treatment in POW camps were utilised by the OHL in an attempt to create a ‘kill or be killed’ mentality amongst soldiers.  The foundation of this attempt was the assertion that captivity was the certainty of degrading, dangerous treatment with no end in sight.  All evidence discussed here demonstrates that this effort failed, if for no other reason than the OHL itself told soldiers that their surrenders would be accepted.  The worst thing about surrender was serving time in POW Labour company, and such a stick as this was is only effective so long as fighting on offers a great prospect for reward.
	As far as the German army in 1917 is concerned, it is difficult to determine just who did all the killing, but it seems that the assault troops did a disproportionate share. ‘Small’ positional war was built on the practice of prisoner taking which satisfied each of Clausewitz’s goals for a successful attack on a fortified position. It did so by reducing the effectiveness of defensive positions, killing and capturing soldiers, and accelerating the obsolescence of plans and doctrines through information loss.  
Affirming purely organisational goals as outlined by, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Crown Prince Rupprecht, Grand Duke Albrecht, and compiled in the A.V.F of January 1917 did attempt to establish a norm of offensive action. But if there was a willingness towards ‘self-destruction’ it was replicated only in a narrow strata of the German army; the storm troops.​[706]​ But quite unintentionally they did not create an example worthy of emulation, but a cohort of violence specialists who stood between common soldiers and the worst risks of combat. Far from initiating a long, steady slide towards a war without mercy, positional war seems to have forged a consensus among combatants.  That consensus was that surrender was a process fraught with risk, but soldiers could now trade on their ability to work in order to preserve their lives.  As shown in Operation ‘Strandfest’, the alternative was a close-quarters battle against a superior attacker laden down with weapons especially designed to kill quickly and efficiently in confined spaces.  Once attackers breached a trench line or strongpoint, the resulting fight was theirs to lose and they rarely did.  Besides, defenders had better options than accepting a man vs. man fight, beginning with retreat and avoidance to mitigate damage, then retaliating with firepower.
































Chapter V: 1918: Killing in an Army between Mutiny and Obedience


By the Autumn of 1917, Imperial Germany’s military fortunes appeared precisely balanced between victory and disaster.  The British offensive at 3rd Ypres had caused the same levels of concern as the Somme and France’s counterattack at Verdun, and were resolved painfully but successfully.  Furthermore, the German assaults on Riga and Caporetto had produced lop-sided victories and in the case of the latter, almost knocked Italy out of the war.  Meanwhile, the German counter-attack at Cambrai seemed to demonstrate that the BEF, while formidable on the offensive, was quite vulnerable on the defensive, especially to German tactics rooted in deception and fire-power.  And to cap off the positives, Russia had collapsed, closing the Eastern front in a decisive victory for the Central Powers.  However, the core of the Allied war effort, the Anglo-French alliance, though sorely tested, remained intact and now enjoyed the unlimited support of American industry, manpower and finance.  Based on the lessons of recent events and American mobilisation, a window of opportunity had opened to go back onto the offensive and make a ‘short and lively’ end to the war.  A general offensive effort required a general restructuring of the army, which would have been impossible without the structures and programmes previously described.  So whereas Chapter IV tested the idea of ‘battlefield taylorism’ in the context of ongoing positional war, this chapter does the same, but in the context of the war’s changing nature, from positional to ‘mobile attrition’, as in their turns, Germany and the Allies sought military victory.
 Concretely, goal of this chapter is to determine why and how common German soldiers prepared to fight, fought and killed after the Spring offensives. It argues that decisive military victory entailed the liquidation of the division-of-risk system, and will demonstrate the replacement of division-of-risk with armed avoidance.  Armed avoidance, particularly after July and August 1918 gave those who chose to fight enough of a chance to risk their lives.  Collective risk, but also the psychological trauma and fear attendant to the killing act were managed through performance of roles mandated by the German military system and the weapons used to perform them.  The practice of armed avoidance during mobile war produced the environment and motivation to kill repeatedly and effectively while minimizing the number of participants and therefore psychological trauma. German soldiers’ conduct was unified around the belief that they by and large would no longer fight for a hopeless cause.​[707]​  Soldiers’ decisions therefore rendered the army’s defensive doctrine unworkable, meaning that defensive battle took up a character of fire and retreat, which perfectly suited the dominant skill set possessed by most men.
Soldiers’ morale plays a role in this chapter given the connection drawn between morale, rest and training by the OHL.  As analysed in Chapter II, the OHL in particular and Hindenburg and Ludendorff in specific, responded to fraying discipline and mass surrenders on the Somme in 1916, and the French counter-attack at Verdun in 1917 by leaning on the army’s training system.  It worked, and so they put their trust in training during the winter of 1917 to combat soldiers’ war weariness.​[708]​  Censorship reports provide the best evidence for a ‘typical’ mood amongst soldiers at a given point in time, but must be tempered by the army’s internal bias against reporting potentially damaging information.  Rather than a general decline ending in total collapse, Jonathan Boff has rightly argued German morale rose and fell from July 1918 until the end of the war and relative to a mean of resistance rather than as part of a general downward trend towards mass desertion and mutiny.​[709]​   As late as August 1918 German soldiers had a strong sense of superiority over their opponents, a qualitative advantage which underpinned tactics in the autumn of 1917 and boosted the OHL’s confidence in February 1918 as preparations for the Spring Offensives were well underway. 
That the Germans would attack sometime in the spring of 1918 was an open secret, but not the location or manner of the attacks, and certainly not the intensity with which they were finally carried out.​[710]​  However the Allies were confident that the Germans could be parried with acceptable losses of men and materiel, so that the war could be brought to a successful military end in 1919.​[711]​  By then, the reasoning went, French and British empires’ increasingly mechanized doctrines would mature and the Americans, who had declared war in April, 1917,  brought up to a standard of technical proficiency to match their numbers.  As Robert Doughty has noted, though, the Allies had everything they could reasonably need to meet the Germans but the unified system of command with which to convert information and analysis into effective planning.​[712]​  
Instead Imperial Germany used up its army in a series of five offensives from March to August 1918.  It had spent the winter months identifying the best part of its manpower via active selection, concentrating it in a number of divisions, then establishing in them a high level of technical expertise.  These were the ‘Assault’ divisions, or Mobil divisions as the Germans designated them, ultimately comprising one quarter of the army and produced by combing out elite troops under the age of 30, and later by dropping the ‘elite’ qualification and taking any man still in their 20s. Certainly there were 22 year olds like Wilhelm Riebel who led divisional assault schools and had been decorated repeatedly.​[713]​  But clearly the army had determined that its processes of training and education were so well refined that youth and physical fitness were sufficient and instruction could do the rest.  The manner in which these soldiers were trained had not changed markedly since September 1916 and the ideas that underpinned this training were showing their age by September 1917.​[714]​  Nevertheless, from March to June 1918, the German army achieved unprecedented successes.  But from May to July the Allies blunted successive offensives and in August counterattacked, inflicting repeated and irrecoverable defeats. 
Just as they had in the winter of 1914-1915, soldiers passed a negative judgment on the state of the army’s tactics in order not just to fight but to fight with the minimum possible loss.  But this time, men who no longer cared about winning would be driven towards personal concerns. Pure self-preservation, later referred to by army censors as an ‘egoistic streak,’ a fruitful post-war life and a useable war experience in their own estimation.​[715]​  Therefore, given the amount of material relating to tactics and doctrine which had fallen into Allied hands by the summer of 1918 and the back-and-forth of military innovation, German superiority such as it existed was gone.  Indeed, the Germans’ offensive system moved more and more to resemble that of their enemies.  British methods in particular show their influence on German tactics at the 3rd Chemin-des-Dames battle of June and July.  Trench clearing and ‘bunker busting’ were familiar tasks to both sides,  and when employed to their fullest potential, left defenders with no ability to hit back and little chance of survival.  The complicated tactics and specialised weapons developed to fight positional war created the same lopsided scenarios for defenders as German methods produced in the previous chapter. Movement and firepower were longstanding elements of tactics in the late war, and the means of continuing both resistance and survival once the skills and willingness to go forward waned.  
World War I from July 1918 to its conclusion is the subject of an ongoing debate as to whether the German army fell apart from the inside, or was overwhelmed by superior enemy forces, but within this debate is the issue of German soldiers’ role in the war’s conclusion.  In his work, A Critique of the World War: The Legacy of Moltke and Schlieffen in the Great War, Capt. Hans Ritter, a former staff officer of 7th Army command stated, ‘The moral worth of soldiers is dependent on the quality of replacements and the functionality of their military education.’​[716]​  In particular, he castigated the officer corps’ myopic emphasis on human potential vs. technology, particularly the terrible effects of artillery on soldiers’ nerves: a discovery made by the French before the Great War subsequently dismissed with haughty nationalism by the Germans.​[717]​   Though perhaps somewhat narrow in its focus, Ritter’s argument inspired a key theme in this chapter; German soldiers’ appreciation of the plummeting value of their skills, equipment and organisational practices relative to their enemies.  
The following chapter ascribes German soldiers an active role in bringing down their army, indebted to a pattern of soldier’s conduct first expounded by Wilhelm Deist. Deist’s argument is summarized as follows. The ‘compulsion of peace’ to end the strain of positional war unified Germany’s leaders and soldiers in pursuit of a single goal: victory in the Spring Offensives.​[718]​  Though military objectives were still determined by the army’s elites, the motive force behind the fighting men was not.  Instead, military training provided the means and modes needed to escape their present condition.  Relief from suffering bound soldiers and officers together, renewing faith in the army through a mutualistic relationship, which ended with successive failures that expended the army’s remaining credibility with its enlisted men.  Soldiers responded with a ‘covert military strike,’ first manifested by the replacement of obedience with a risk-reward calculation; illness, shirking and desertion provided easy escape routes for soldiers who saw no point in risking their lives.​[719]​ One central issue with Deist’s argument as Scott Stephenson observes is how a striking army did so much damage to its opponents.​[720]​
Soldiers who chose to fight until the very end of the war are the subjects of a related debate, which seeks to determine the cause of serious allied casualties at the moment when their tactical, operational and material advantages were greatest and when the German army was at its nadir.  This debate is linked to the search for strands of continuity in German history, now centered on the extreme practices derived from a peculiar military culture rooted in the Prussian general staff.  Scott Stephenson links this phenomenon with proud veterans who sought to uphold the reputation of their units and justify the loss of so many comrades over the years, while reserve army soldiers deserted or mutinied.​[721]​  The question of soldiers’ independence in deciding their fate is examined by Alexander Watson as a question of a breakdown of command and ‘ordered surrender.’​[722]​ At issue is the modality of soldiers’ conduct when deciding the outcome of a battle.  Did they act as individuals in a mass movement, as groups formed, structured and given purpose by the military system, or as in the latter case until an officer decided to reject the military hierarchy and so permit his men to give up, or fight on for personal reasons fused inseparable from their military service?  ‘armed avoidance,’ which aligned the goal of the OHL, a fighting retreat,  with the aims of its soldiers, to live through the war.  That is, to survive constant Allied attacks which broke German defences time and again, with skills and technologies readily accessible to the mass of soldiers, rather than ‘violence specialists.’
As argued previously in 1916 the storm troops were the foundation of the division-of-risk system.  When the training regime whose function it was to bridge the gap between the ideal and the possible broke down, the army did not have the coercive means at its disposal to terrify men into obedience.  In this case, Deist’s theme was seized upon by Benjamin Ziemann, who furthered the case for soldiers’ utilization of weapons and tactics for their own purposes with personal survival foremost among them.​[723]​ Soldiers, Ziemann notes, modified tactics to lessen casualties and at the most extreme, self-mutilated to avoid further service aided by a lenient system of military justice.​[724]​  In support of Deist, he states,  ‘The “military strike” is defined as mass movement of individuals who in the war’s last months sought their own way back to a peaceful homeland.’​[725]​  This was a soldiers’ movement rather than a number of ‘ordered surrenders’ as Alexander Watson contends and which Ziemann criticizes.​[726]​  
1917 was a year that had done great damage to the Entente’s cause both politically and operationally.  Victories by the Central Powers and Russia’s defeat were ameliorated somewhat by America’s full support (but not yet full cooperation) with the Entente’s cause.  However there was some good news at the end of a year which had seen the 2nd Chemin-des-Dames and 3rd Ypres.  During the Battle of Cambrai, 20 November to 5 December, the Germans attempted to and ultimately succeeded in neutralising a BEF surprise attack which had scored a dramatic success in its initial phases.​[727]​  BEF commanders noted from their war experience to date that German soldiers’ defining characteristic was their ability to recover psychologically and offer resistance, but this did not mean they were immune to shock which could still prompt mass surrenders.​[728]​  Moreover, the Allies were developing systems of communication which could control mobile operations and preserve the secrecy of those operations from the Germans.​[729]​  By the end of the year, the Entente partners had determined that they could break into the German defensive system whenever then wanted to.​[730]​  But perhaps the greater lesson was that surprise and local superiority could win great successes initially, but that attackers would ultimately have to defend their gains.  Attackers’ improvised defenses could not stand against the complicated offensive systems developed for positional war.  
Conversely, the Germans obtained successive victories marked by previously unprecedented gains in territory and prisoners, offering a tantalising vision of what a reformed army could achieve.  The sum of these successes meant that November 1917 to November 1918 the Western Front was more fluid and consequently more lethal than at any point since August and September 1914. Particularly from the German point of view, the restoration of mobility heralded the chance for military victory if certain lessons from positional war were properly adapted to mobile operations.  German troops assaulted Riga on 1 September 1917, implementing a new mode of artillery preparation, short in length because its goal was to deceive and debilitate Russian troops with smoke, gas and high explosives.​[731]​  Creeping barrages were then shifted in and about Russian positions to cut off lines of retreat, advance, and reinforcement, leaving them easy targets for assaulting German infantry.  Similar preparation was used at Caporetto on 24 October 1917, but mountain and assault troop units carried out the task of worming through the Italian position, to penetrate as far as possible as fast as possible.  Strong positions were bypassed, weaker ones were taken utilizing the fire of light machine guns to cover the advance of grenadiers, preferably around a flank.​[732]​  Furthermore Italian units up to regimental size surrendered en masse when German and Austrian troops got round their flanks or struck them from behind.​[733]​  Numbers and fortifications appeared to count for little if a defence was left blind and fragmented through artillery barrage and defenders assaulted from unexpected directions by elite infantry.  Furthermore, army censors noted that Caporetto and the Bolsheviks’ suing for peace had greatly raised the spirits of German troops.​[734]​
Finally, the Cambrai counter-offensive of 30 November 1917 blended storm troops and debilitating artillery with tactical surprise.​[735]​ But promising initial gains and thousands of stunned British prisoners served to mask other realities; junior officers and senior NCOs still fell in huge numbers, command and control fell apart as assault units went forward, intermingled and leaders died.​[736]​ Disorganisation for want of leaders, and units milling around on their objectives was one issue. ​[737]​ Another one was how famished and exhausted soldiers broke ranks and helped themselves to generous meals cooking on captured field-kitchens; behaviour that was repeated in 1918 with an intensity that halted the progress of whole divisions.​[738]​ Even wrecked tanks were looted as their crews were known for carrying not just liquor and home cooked food in their vehicles, but also high quality firearms lubricants.​[739]​ But for contemporary German commanders, the most worrying lesson was the vulnerability of assaulting troops to counterattacks if the defenders moved quickly and were well-organised.  That is to say, the offensive methods the Germans used at Cambrai were vulnerable to the same ideas which underpinned German defensive thinking.
Still, the nature of the war was changing. Combatants’ modes of warmaking were maturing around a similar set of assumptions.  For instance,  German counter-attacks featuring surprise and storm troops augmented combined arms tactics supported by a short bombardment, to erase the gains made by a British attack on 20 November based on surprise, tank-augmented combined arms tactics and a short bombardment.​[740]​  As William Philpott stated, ‘Now that un-silenced machine guns could no longer be relied upon to halt an infantry advance in its tracks, battle had regained a certain degree of dynamism and decisiveness.’​[741]​  Whereas positional war had been a war of endurance, a second war of movement promised the same as the first, mass killing at an extraordinary rate for a relatively short time.  Thanks to the battles of Autumn 1917, the OHL were confident that renewed war of movement played directly to the strengths of their army therefore entailing a military decision in Germany’s favour.
In homeland depots, despite numerous entreaties, orders and directives to the contrary troop training was still painfully obsolete as all Army Group commanders agreed.  Solutions were bandied about until it was agreed that from time to time, training personnel from homeland depots would rotate through FRDs or storm troop training courses.​[742]​ Rotations of four to eight weeks were suggested by the Graf von Schulenburg of Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht in order to foster competence in weapon handling, rather than a particular set of tactics.​[743]​  Winter offered the perfect time to put these measures in place with the least disruption to frontline units, as fighting normally took place in the warmer months of the year.
During the autumn and winter of 1917-1918, German troops in general were still confident of victory and committed to fight.  Preliminary reports on the contents of soldiers’ mail were done by the Auxiliary Censor’s Office, who forwarded their findings to the Censor’s Office of the army they were attached to, and from there to the various army headquarters, the OHL etc.  One, Censor Office 40, served the 6th Army command, and compiled a report on soldier’s letters in fulfilment of an order from 30 July 1917.  Completing its task by 15 September 1917, 17 divisions and the garrisons of Lille and Tournai were included.​[744]​  Censors found troops foremost worries were for loved ones in Germany, particularly among soldiers of the urban middle class but also farmers.  Their mood was rated ‘generally good’ but there seemed to be some difference in mediums, as soldiers verbal communications were far more negative than their letters.  Censors thought this a critical distinction to make, believing that soldiers gave more candid observations in writing than in conversation where they felt compelled to agree with comrades’ opinions.​[745]​  Most importantly, soldiers’ trust in their leadership and the superiority of the German army was ‘absolute.’​[746]​  Moreover, soldiers were ‘unmoved’ by domestic political upheaval in the censors’ estimation, and displayed a very limited interest in the comings and goings between nations unless they were related to a quick end to the war.​[747]​  Soldiers were well aware of peace entreaties from the Papacy, the Stockholm Conference and ongoing events in Russia, as well as the possibility of voting reform in Prussia but were not personally invested.  
French interrogators, however, were working hard to rob German soldiers of their sense of superiority by deriving its origins and the manner in which it was inculcated. From their work the structure, quality and greater purpose of the assault battalions were now well known from more than just experience.  A prisoner from 7th Assault battalion gave his French captors an outline of his battalion’s structure that was almost word-for-word in accordance with the doctrinal publications disseminated by the OHL.​[748]​  Besides a complete outline of the units’ structure, recruiting practices and equipment, he also gave up its training schedule and who attended, while revealing that 7th Assault battalion had maintained an extra company of 150 men drawn from all over the army for the purposes of spreading ‘Stosstrupp’ tactics.  French intelligence officers noted that the battalion’s morale was ‘very good’ owing to ‘chosen men, rest, special treatment.’​[749]​  It is worth noting that the training undertaken by the assault troops was not mentioned as a causal factor to the good morale.
Though threatened, German soldiers’ sense that they were better than their enemies was still present at the turn of the new year, as the propaganda officer of 6th Army reported on 24 January 1918.​[750]​  Russia’s defeat had greatly increased the men’s spirits and the officer reported that ‘The men wish for peace only as much as the Army does.’  If there was cause for concern, it came from training that consisted of long periods of strenuous formal drill.  He offered a simple formula; where men were trained in the newest techniques and only the newest techniques, morale stayed the same.  When soldiers were drilled pointlessly or strenuously ‘taking little concern for the physical condition of many men and decreased rations’ poor outcomes and profane backtalk were likely.  An officer’s job was to shepherd his soldiers’ goodwill and high spirits through mutual respect and pragmatism.  Besides, the officer reported, nurses at base hospitals would readily testify that the first wish of every sick and wounded soldier regardless of age, to return to the front as quickly as possible.  They knew an offensive was coming and they feared to miss a chance to take their shot at the English.​[751]​ Furthermore, the OHL ordered every man fit for duty was to be sent to the front with special effort made to send convalescents back to their units if nearby. Otherwise men of the same unit were collected and sent back as a group once their unit’s location was fixed.​[752]​ The OHL stated unequivocably that these men were to be sent on quickly and under no circumstances could rear area commanders or collection points hold onto these men for their own use.  
As it turned out, 6th Army’s propaganda officer was not simply shouting into the wind.  On 30 January 1918 the OHL brought to light troops’ vigorous complaints that their training often continued to the point of physical exhaustion.​[753]​  Ludendorff saw fit to remind officers from the divisional level downwards that tactical success was their responsibility, and that the foundation of their units’ good performance lay in the in their men’s  self-confidence and sense of duty.  These two virtues, Ludendorff insisted, were the best defence against the shocks of the modern battlefield and should be fostered at all times.​[754]​   Superiority over enemies also coloured the men’s views of domestic events.  Disinterest in the problems of the homefront persisted, censors reported on 24 February 1918, specifically regarding growing strike action.  The men at the front could not fathom the wave of strikes in Germany and wrote continuously on the subject.​[755]​  Over and over again, German soldiers wrote in support of two themes, that the strikes served to needlessly prolong the war and to harden the resolve of Germany’s opponents.  If there was a negative to soldiers’ responses, it was that the upsurge in concern over domestic affairs drove what was for the army quite a useful discussion on Russia’s surrender from soldiers’ minds.​[756]​  Such were the views from the ranks, which while positive in this instance, could no longer be dismissed out of hand if cohesive units resistant to the stress of industrialised mass war were to be built.  
But the OHL also had to find a way out of the strategic jam it had gotten itself into, which meant that the war had to be decided militarily before the United States made its presence felt fully.  Preparations grew more acute as the spring campaigning season neared, and were in fact already well underway. OHL orders were apparently sent to each of the army groups on the Western Front tasking them with gathering information regarding the plausibility of a breakthrough in their sectors.  On 25 December 1917, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht responded having tested two operational concepts, operation ‘St. George,’ an attack in the region of Armentieres, and operation ‘St. Michael,’ an attack in the region of St. Quentin.​[757]​  It was the latter which ultimately became operation ‘Michael,’ or the first spring offensive.   Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht attached a list of general aims in preparation for the offensives but also outlining the type of army needed to fulfil them. The aims listed in this document guided the organisation of the German army through the Spring Offensives.
Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht wished that the entire army be evaluated and reorganised to enhance mobility.  All training was to be directed towards the same goal, first to ‘breakthrough’ fighting and then manoeuvre warfare.​[758]​  Any training deemed irrelevant to these two competencies was to be abandoned.  Similarly all divisions save those designated Landwehr were subject to evaluation in their suitability for mobile operations.  The point was to establish which units were ready for mobile operations as they presently were, and whether or not it was possible to convert the entire army into a mobile force.​[759]​  Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht remarked that it was up to the OHL to choose between the ‘St. George’ and ‘St. Michael’ operational areas, but that once they did, the army required six to eight weeks’ time for a period of general preparations [Allgemeine Vorbereitungszeit].   Afterwards, a period of final preparations [Engere Vorbereitungszeit] lasting approximately four weeks was needed to assemble forces, establish final dispositions and communications, and position supplies.​[760]​  A timetable of ten to twelve weeks had therefore emerged, beginning around Christmas Day 1917.  No training was to take place during the ‘period of final preparations’ so from the OHL’s decision there were approximately two months with which to create the 1918 incarnation of the 1914 field army.  
Officers had little excuse in omitting modern techniques from their training programs.  Lists of available training courses were available at least from the beginning of January, 1918 in Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht.​[761]​  Courses in assault troop tactics, small unit leadership from the company level down, weapon maintenance, signalling, radio operation, trench mortar and machine gun use, machine gun use against aircraft and artillery ammunition handling were all available.  Frequent movement of units to other areas of the front was usually cited as an excuse, but perhaps the long duration of some courses; four weeks for company and platoon leader school, eight weeks for radio operation were the most likely causes.​[762]​  Army commands occasionally stepped in to order their units’ enrolment in particular courses deemed critical, as in the case of 2nd Army’s drive to establish a broad cadre of qualified radio operators and signallers.​[763]​  
But first and foremost the army required machine gunners, specifically men trained to operate light machine guns.  Indeed, tactical firepower was now emphasised in the structure of assault divisions.  As 18th Army was built up to conduct break-through and mobile warfare, its access to firepower was increased at every level.  The outlines of two of its divisions, the 242nd division and 14th division are accurate representations of the whole.​[764]​  Whereas in 1914 a division’s infantry could reckon on the support of perhaps three dozen machine guns, ‘Assault’ divisions in 1918 had more than 180 of the MG08/15 weapon, an unknown number of the heavy MG08, and attached companies from MGSs [Maschinengewehr Scharfschützen, or machinegun-marksmen] units, also trained in indirect fire tactics alongside more conventional uses and who brought yet more weapons.  MGSs battalions’ whereabouts were carefully tracked, and every ‘Assault’ rated division had a MGSs unit attached.​[765]​
Time and clear goals were required to build up the army for what lay ahead.  On 21 February the OHL ordered that all ‘Assault’ divisions were to be pulled off the line so as to devote themselves completely to the task of training.​[766]​ It is unclear whether this is the three to four weeks’ training mentioned by Zabecki and it seems likely that training times were much longer.​[767]​  Moreover 18th Army ordered on 19 February that division commanders were to structure their training around the recently published ‘The Attack in Positional War’ and its 1 February 1918 published appendices.​[768]​  Such an intervention was necessary, as it appears that soldiers were supposed to train in the same skill sets they had previously; they were just to train harder in mobile operations.​[769]​ Ludendorff’s memoirs agreed with ‘The Attack’s first general principle, in that the ‘Development of a vigorous offensive spirit and the will to victory with which we entered the present war is the first condition of success.’​[770]​  More likely at that late date that 18th Army wished to reduce the workload of its officers to 32 pages of text rather than parsing the relative importance of evolutions in a 160 page book like the A.V.F of 1918.​[771]​
Though set aside by the 18th Army, January 1918’s A.V.F was still the army’s primary doctrinal text, and diverged markedly from the 1917 version. ‘Assault Troop’ training received three pages; fifteen were given to instruction in the use of light machine guns and none to formal drill.​[772]​  The OHL assumed that storm troop tactics were utilised in enough breadth and depth that they required little further mention.​[773]​  Much more important were light machine gun squads consisting of nine men: a leader, and eight men one of whom carried the gun and the others who carried spare parts, range finders, and eight or more boxes of ammunition along with their personal gear and weapons.​[774]​  Four men were tasked solely with carrying extra ammunition and providing additional protection for the gun with their rifles or carbines. Company commanders were personally responsible for keeping their weapons in good order as well as the proper training of their men to use them, since six of 18 of the company’s squads were ‘l.MG’ squads.​[775]​  All officers and NCOs in the company were to be proficient in using light machine guns, ensuring that a large number of competent operators were present in each company.  By summer, the machine gun ‘had become the main arm of [the] infantry and formed the skeleton of each battle formation.’​[776]​
Preparedness for ‘breakthrough battle’ and a renewed war of movement were the new focus of training.  Breakthrough battle assumed a defence based on trenches arranged in depth, to be entirely in German hands by the end of the first day of operations.  As noted in Chapter IV, this was quite a reasonable expectation assuming the enemy adopted a linear rather than a zonal defensive scheme.  However, as of January, 1918, France began adopting a zonal system of defence by borrowing liberally from German ideas.​[777]​  Not understanding the ideas behind zonal defence, British units occupying French positions around St. Quentin where operation ‘Michael’ was to take place thought the spider web of outposts, bunkers, forts and shellproof dugouts were remnants of a very poorly maintained trench line and set about fixing them.  In doing so, they unknowingly converted a defensive system ideally suited to repel storm troops to a type of defence which had been compromised over and over again during positional war by attacks with limited objectives.  ‘Small’ positional war could easily win tactical successes but more importantly it proved scalable. With great confidence the Germans would attack these obsolete defences according to a simple schema; break through the enemy’s trench lines on day one, defeat enemy reserves in a manoeuvre battle on day two.​[778]​  63 ‘Assault’ divisions were ultimately constructed for breakthrough battle and a renewed war of movement to begin in March 1918, also the traditional endpoint for tactical analysis of German army training.​[779]​  The creation of elite assault divisions put a new emphasis on training, leading to the creation of a formal Field Recruit Depot inspectorate alongside the extant Representative Generals of the OHL.
The Representative Generals of the OHL were the first then to provide reports on training, and their observations were largely critical.​[780]​  The conscription class of 1899 had not been trained separately but mixed with recruits from other classes and most notably with convalescents.  Troops went forward in thick skirmish lines and displayed a tendency to bunch up. Troops failed to use formations which made the best use of terrain when moving between combats and had no skill whatsoever in the use of light machine guns.  Perhaps most worryingly, light and heavy machine guns provided for training purposes went unused when they were present at all.  Certainly this was symptomatic of the final complaint, that instructors, officers and NCOs possessed only a cursory understanding of the newest doctrinal texts which emphasized machine gun firepower and the importance of dependable communications.​[781]​  Events proved that sufficient elite units were generated to bring about exceptional progress.  But this is due to the fact that their training regimes were in place and running efficiently as a result of good unit management and the successful exercise of German officers’ privilege and obligation to train his men as he saw fit.  Still, these concerns would not stop the Spring Offensives, which went off in accordance with Crown Prince Rupprecht’s timetable.
	When the morning of 21 March 1918 arrived, the start of operation ‘Michael,’ soldiers’ moods were closely linked to the events of the day.  Many shared a desperate hope that the coming battle would be the last battle that would not only end positional war, but the war itself.​[782]​  However, some had already decided that enough was enough, for German deserters confirmed the completion of offensive preparations and provided a rough sketch of the manner of the first day’s attacks to the Allies a few days beforehand.​[783]​  However nothing came of this intelligence coup, as British forces in particular already believed themselves to be well-prepared.​[784]​  In taking stock of his men just before the start of Operation ‘Michael,’ Ernst Jünger observed famously the officers and enlisted, Prussians and Bavarians, infantrymen, radio operators, combat engineers and artillerymen looked upon the opening barrage with a sense of joy he had never seen before.​[785]​  But while crossing 800m of No Man’s Land it was quite another matter, as Jünger gazed out over companies moving forward in single clumps rather than skirmish lines, as the Assigned Generals had warned.​[786]​  The dominant feeling among soldiers and officers was of not knowing how to feel and a ‘peculiar tension’ [seltsamer Spannung].​[787]​  Officers fortified themselves with swigs from their hip flasks, lit pipes or cigars and attempted to banter with their men, but very few were convinced.  Going over to the assault ‘in mixed feelings brought about by anxiety, bloodlust, courage and drunkenness,’ Jünger’s men moved through empty trenches, opposed largely by gunfire from unknown sources and meeting the occasional wounded Briton.​[788]​ Whatever joy had come from realizing the final act of the war was underway dissipated once soldiers came to grips with the task itself.  
	For Jünger however, the trepidation soon gave way to the work of killing.  First he witnessed other members of 73rd Fusilier regiment as they shot down the fleeing occupants of a British trench, ‘hunting them like rabbits’ as they ran over open fields.  Other British soldiers took up arms in the trench and were ‘processed’ [bearbeitet] with grenades.​[789]​ He wrote, ‘I felt and untameable need to kill something’ and seizing a rifle from a nearby Sergeant, he shot a British soldier 75m away, before joining his men in the massacre of those fleeing still on their feet.  Jünger recorded that very few of the runners survived, but summed the incident up by stating ‘After the whole job was finished, on it goes.’  Jünger and his men ran forward, trying to keep up with their protective artillery barrage.  They succeeded, waiting in shell holes for the barrage to move forward and uncover the next British position to assault.  Defensive machinegun fire began as soon as the artillery lifted, the Germans springing ‘like rabbits’ to be shot at by the British ‘as if they were on a hunt.’  Two machine gun teams held up the German advance, until Jünger snuck around the side of one and shot the crew, killing one with a bullet to the head that drove out the gunner’s right eye.  Entering nearby trenches, Jünger came upon a British soldier ‘sorting ammunition’ (possibly a member of the machine gun crew selecting loose cartridges to fill empty ammunition belts), and made the mistake of calling out.  The soldier looked around then dashed into a dugout, followed swiftly by a stick grenade thrown by a Fusilier.  No-one entered the dugout, but another Fusilier soon arrived; he had killed the British soldier as he had attempted to utilise a second exit, and said, ‘those that shot are dead’ [erledigt].​[790]​
	Bereft of ‘violence specialists,’ the 73rd  Fusilier regiment’s attack was dependent on its creeping barrage for protection, and its men had to perform their own close combat and Sauberung.  But broad similarities emerge between 73rd  Fusilier regiment’s assault and the assaults of Operation Strandfest.  When the Germans broke into British trenches, a good portion of the defenders responded by fleeing.  No German soldier entered a dugout without first throwing in a grenade and waiting beside the entrances and exits for survivors.  The crews of British strongpoints, like the machine gun nests encountered, were killed quickly along with anyone else who resisted.  Like those who fought, fleeing troops received scant mercy while they remained in sight, even though they had offered no resistance.  Blown up with grenades as they sought to swim to safety during Strandfest, here it was the same, with the exception that those who fled were shot at when they left grenade range.  Jünger, though citing his own bloodlust and evoking the imagery of the hunt, retained enough self-control to shoot running men at a distance of 75m or more with a bolt-action rifle.  More than a few of his men did as well, given the stated results, while others utilised grenades despite the close range.  In technical terms, Jünger’s men had conducted a ‘pursuit-by-fire,’ in the best traditions of the peacetime army and both killing and being killed by bullets more often than shells.  It was not an isolated incident.
Mobility’s creeping back into the war made bullets their chief means of killing.  Germany suffered 420,000 total casualties by the end of April, 312,275 of them were the result of firearms, or approximately 74 per cent of all losses.​[791]​  An additional 288,411 German soldiers were wounded by gunshot from May to July 1918.​[792]​  In total, the army suffered 1.41 million casualties from August 1917 until July 1918, and 894,638 of them were caused by gunfire.​[793]​  Since the majority of small-arms firepower was derived from automatic rifles and light and heavy machine guns on both sides, crew-served automatic weapons were most likely the cause of these losses.  Germany’s overall army strength had peaked in June 1917 at 5.4 million men and had declined somewhat to 5.2 million by February 1918.​[794]​  Numbers declined again in March and April, recovered in May then plummeted in June and July from 5.03 million in May to 4.23 million in July when records cease.​[795]​   However, the strength of the army in the west peaked at 4 million in May 1918, before declining to 3.58 million in July.​[796]​  During the same period, the strength of the army in the east fell from 1.14 million to 589,995.​[797]​  The vast majority of the killing took place at distance; as a whole, the German army suffered 2,811 casualties from edged weapons from August 1917 to July 1918 or 0.56 per cent of the total losses for that time.​[798]​  
	Advances in artillery likewise put the burden of killing in the hands of soldiers.  ‘Neutralization,’ but also ‘deception’ and ‘destruction’ were the goals of German artillery tactics in 1918, whose chief proponent, Col. Georg Bruchmüller, designed his barrages to leave enemies helpless against infantry assaults.​[799]​  Gas shells, smoke shells and high explosives, mixed in carefully considered percentages as part of creeping barrage, provided concealment for advancing troops while forcing defenders to don gas masks and shelter in dugouts.  However, the real service done by Bruchmüller’s artillery on behalf of German infantry was to render down complicated defensive systems to their individual components by severing lines of communication and also observation, as they had at Riga.   Fighting would ostensibly proceed along the lines of many small engagements where a well-organised attacking force engaged stunned defenders with little hope of relief from own guns or friendly counterattacks.  Bruchmüller’s artillery tactics followed the logic grounded foremost on the qualitative superiority of the German infantry arm vis-à-vis their opponents, seeking to generate the ideal circumstances for the infantry to utilize their expertise, rather than replace the infantry’s military skill with firepower.  Dead enemies were value added, rather than the overall goal, while prisoners had well-established utility to the military system at almost every level.
Between the end of March and the end of April was a span of time sufficient for each ‘Assault’ division in the army to pass 1200 basically trained men through their FRDs then begin training the next group.  63 ‘Assault’ divisions should therefore have been able to generate about 76,000 trained replacements per month, or not nearly enough men to make good the losses they were absorbing.  Declines in real effectiveness grows even larger when factoring in the replacement of soldiers basically trained to positional war standards against soldiers trained and conditioned for positional war and the war of movement.  Furthermore, the massive disparity in unit quality was noticed by the BEF and confirmed by an Australian raid on Malancourt in 10 June 1918, as ‘Assault’ divisions were withdrawn from the British front that May to fight the French.​[800]​ Though not comprehensive, surviving evidence from FRD inspectors demonstrates that an FRD running to OHL specifications was a rare thing.
The absence of preparation and the limits of reform and oversight in the army were laid bare in the reports of the FRD inspectorate.  What relationship there was between the FRD inspectorates and the OHL’s Representative Generals is unclear, though their missions overlapped.​[801]​  There is some evidence that the OHL’s Representative Generals and the Army Group’s FRD inspectors shared their findings, but only infrequently after the summer of 1918 and never before then.​[802]​  The majority of FRD Inspector 22’s reports have been lost, but what are left demonstrate wide discrepancies between the ‘theory & practice’ of the Field Recruit Depots.  
Formal FRD inspection at the Army Group level was mandated by the OHL as late as 6 March, and Army Group Grand Duke Albrecht complied on 29 March.  Army Group Grand Duke Albrecht came under the purview of FRD Inspector 22, who issued a general report on the state of divisional recruit depots which appeared on 21 April1918.​[803]​  Units varied widely in quality.  Good results were obtained by 26th division, a peacetime army unit and the Alpenkorps, a division drawn together from elite mountain and light infantry battalions. Poor units appeared usually but not exclusively from the Landwehr, whose designation supposedly removed their access to quality training and the best weapons according to the schema originally produced by Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht on Christmas 1917.   Overall, the general report gives the impression as one of lax discipline, wasted time and substandard instruction contributing to an unacceptable result for the majority of recruits.​[804]​  However, the instructor noted that while formal drill was lacking, combat drill, especially the skills of grenade throwing and utilisation of terrain during movement and attacks, was good.  In general it was found that troops were more and more skilled in positional war, but that the most recent intake of conscripts lacked even the smallest education in the tactics of manoeuvre warfare. 
Particularly, soldiers displayed great aptitude with light machine guns and light trench mortars, but lacked the skills for evaluating terrain and the ebb and flow of battle to make the most of these weapons.  In essence, they lacked the experience or methods to move themselves and their weapons safely about the battlefield.​[805]​  For the army this was a matter of concern, as so long as the men were ‘only’ fine shots, they would not be able to apply their skills according to a plan and so convert their units into something more than the sum of their parts.  At fault were small unit leaders who had not developed a sense for terrain and ‘were uncertain over the art of combat leadership.’​[806]​  Marksmanship with personal weapons, a goal of the winter training period, was of little interest to the recruits and also required improvement.
Individual reports offering greater detail concerning recruit training in various divisions were also supplied and their contents demonstrate a similar broad disinclination towards OHL guidelines.  When the army mandated  twelve week’s training from homeland depot to deployment to a fighting unit, the men of 233rd infantry division had spent an average of six months training in Germany and two months in the depot [!].​[807]​  Of 284 recruits present, 206 were from the conscription class of 1899, seven from classes of 1896-98 and 71 from older classes with the eldest recruit aged 48.  Seventeen recruits were ready for deployment, always important given the army’s habit of skimming off the best replacements for emergency use, 211 would be ready in ‘3-4’ weeks, taking their average training time to approximately nine months. 39th Bavarian Reserve division was much the same; troops had received three months’ basic training and two months’ training in the Recruit Depot.​[808]​  Neither 233rd infantry division nor 39th Bavarian division were elite units or even above average. Reports on sixteen other divisions survive covering the period of 8 April to 9 June 1918. For ten divisions the FRD inspector could not determine how long recruits spent in basic training, for the other six divisions, basic training had lasted between four and six months though sometimes as few as three to as many as eight.  There was no information for how long the recruits of five divisions spent in their depots and for the other eleven depots recruits spent anywhere from two weeks to four months in the FRD.​[809]​  96th Infantry division and 21st Landwehr division were inspected twice having failed the first time around though their soldiers spent an average of six to seven months under basic or FRD training, or twice the doctrinal time allowance.  Reports in June and July emphasized the need to increase basic skills in weapon handling, especially in the improvement of individual rifle marksmanship and rate of fire.
The FRD of 2nd Garde Infantry division stands out as one that actually ran the way it was intended.  Approximately four hundred recruits were present for each infantry regiment, 1203 to be specific with 367 members of the conscription class of 1900.​[810]​  Men received two to three months’ basic training and two to three weeks’ additional instruction in the recruit depots before deploying.  The depot’s instructors were models of their trade and accommodations, rations and morale were reported as excellent.  Such excellent results were apparently products of an ideal training environment.  This is all that we can assume for each of these reports was a simple narrative of conditions in the FRDs with cursory assessments of each aspect of training and whether or not it was poor, standard, or good.  No penalties were apparently assessed for non-doctrinal training times nor were exemplary conduct interrogated to distil broadly applicable lessons.  Excellent depots were left to their own devices, as apparently fulfilling the published requirements were enough.  The real purpose it seems of the FRD inspectorate was to make sure the OHL’s goals were met rather than developing a better system overall. This was an example the OHL’s myopic ‘rationalism,’, as Jonathan Boff as argued,  which extended through the length of the war and was especially apparent in 1918.​[811]​
From the comments of the FRD inspectorate, a basic outline of the 1918 German soldier emerges.  German soldiers were good grenade throwers, adept at using fortifications, and skilful in the operation of crew served weapons.  However, soldiers were less likely to obey orders or make the best use of rifles and carbines.  Nor were they in a hurry to get to the front.  Instead they were quite satisfied to train skills which kept themselves safe or exposed themselves to danger as part of a small group.  Did standards of marksmanship drop when the Assigned General or the FRD Inspector came around, knowing that insufficient skills were enough to prevent certification for deployment?  Perhaps, but soldiers’ training for service in the later Spring Offensives and beyond were building a repertoire of skills to see the war out when they were finally compelled to join the fighting.
Why this was the case is illuminated by the reports of 5th Army’s censorship office, filing on 31 August.  5th Army’s censor’s noted. Censors described a complete reversal in morale from the attitudes described in the report of February of 1918, but making no mention of recent events, particularly Germany’s defeat at the Battle of Amiens (8 August 1918).​[812]​  As censors noted, the supply of young, single men had dried up, leaving the army composed of soldiers who were increasingly middle-aged or older and far more likely to be married fathers.​[813]​  The OHL had grown keenly aware of a ‘growing indiscipline,’ particularly among replacements in transport to the front, and soldiers being transferred between battles.​[814]​  The problem had apparently become so severe by this point that Ludendorff questioned openly whether transport commanders and escort personnel were doing their jobs.  He warned that courts-martial must be brought to bear against transgressors, and if units themselves lacked sufficient legal personnel, the War Ministry was ready to intervene.​[815]​  In seeking to enforce obedience, the OHL transgressed the principles laid out by 6th Army at the beginning of the year, but in terms of a ‘crackdown’ of military justice, the OHL maintained a comparatively lenient stance.  
Come September, censors again reported a continuation of August’s poor morale, whose causation varied by unit but always entailed war-weariness.  Reporting on soldiers’ views in the 2nd Bavarian Reserve corps, from the middle of September, Auxiliary Censorship Office 1151 began with sobering news.  Censors stated, ‘The numbers of cases are increasing, wherein even NCOs speak openly of their discontent with the length of the war.’​[816]​  Of greater concern were the censors’ discovery that some soldiers’ complaints were phrased in the precise language of Allied propaganda leaflets.  A particularly insidious leaflet told soldiers nothing, except that a ceasefire would take effect in six weeks. Others described plainly the theft of army stores during the evacuation of Douai, while some soldiers mailed their families packages full of food, toiletries and army issue clothing. To be taken prisoner was welcome, numerous soldiers wrote to the astonishment of the censors. Censors recounted the joy of a truck driver whose brother was taken prisoner, and so escaped the ‘Scam of the trenches’ [Schwindel des Grabens]. Auxiliary Censorship Office 1153 handled the letters of 6th, 20th, 21st and 113th divisions, 49th and 52nd Reserve divisions, and the 3rd Marine division.​[817]​  
Soldiers of the 14th Reserve corps were far less affected by short supplies and Allied propaganda but shared their comrades’ war-weariness. They also suffered from a sense of apprehension concerning the ongoing peace negotiations and fighting with little relief.  Soldiers were well aware of Austro-Hungary’s peace proposal and which ‘had been met generally with great joy’ as an indicator that the Allies were ready to negotiate and peace was near.  Soldiers’ apparent desire for peace prompted a response from the OHL who demanded that army group commanders take action to prevent ‘flagging’ in soldiers’ will to fight.​[818]​  The Allies’s rejection, however was more damaging than the offer itself, as apathy took hold among most, with a small number becoming despondent over the course of events.  A mood of ‘peace by any means’ took hold, demonstrated by a censor’s quote of an unnamed Warrant Officer [Offizierstellvertreter]‘I know exactly how everything is.  We long for peace, the rest is details.’  Soldiers were deployed repeatedly, seeing little point in it.​[819]​  Similar views came at the same time from other parts of the front, this time from 18th Corps that contained the 12th, 35th and 187th divisions, the 1st Garde Reserve division and the 7th Dismounted Cavalry [Kavallerie-Schützen] division.  Soldiers were dismissive of the Austrian peace proposal on the grounds that they were both used to being lied to when deployed and that it offered little by way of improvement.  Furthermore, the peace proposals themselves were referred to over and over again as ‘cons’ or ‘scams.’​[820]​  But instead of focusing on the extremity of their situation, soldiers decried the conduct of the Allies in general and Britain in specific, speculating now that the real goal was Germany’s annihilation.  Soldiers still blamed British intransigence for scuttling the Austrian’s peace offer, holding them responsible for the prolonging of the war and compelling German soldiers to fight on.  One Guardsman wrote ‘Nothing has come of the recently announced proposal to negotiate.  We must fight to the finish in order to beg for peace’ [Wir kämpfen noch solange bis wir kniefällig um einen Frieden bitten müssen.].​[821]​ Another was quoted as saying ‘One becomes bitter over the refusal and believes more fighting is inevitable.’​[822]​   
By late September, censors had appreciated an improvement in the army’s morale from late August but that morale was again decreasing due to ‘war weariness’ and ‘frustration’; indeed these feelings had ‘regained the upper hand.’​[823]​  A light had appeared at the end of the tunnel though, in that German soldiers blamed their enemies for the war’s continuation, referring to Wilson, Balfour and Clemenceau by name when speaking of who was at fault for the collapse of Austria-Hungary’s request for negotiations.  Moreover, foreign leaders had, for the time being, replaced domestic elites and war profiteers (insofar as soldiers noted the difference) as the target of the men’s ire. The previous report by Auxiliary Censor Officer 1152 on enlisted men’s mail was followed by a second on officer’s mail, in response to an OHL order of 25 September 1918.​[824]​  Officers had varying opinions over the rejection of the Austrian peace proposal, but censors noted ‘Most of the writers doubt it and say that there’s nothing more to do but to fight and to endure,’ and added one officer’s view that ‘I believe so long as France, Britain and America keep their present leaders, a turnaround [of the preceding opinion] is out of the question.’​[825]​  
October saw the continuation of September’s sentiments. German peace proposals had given rise to a general opinion reported by censors with the quote ‘We can’t do any more, we don’t want to do anymore, we want to go home.’​[826]​  Whereas during the winter of 1917-1918 peace was acceptable but peace by any means was not, the former was now desired if it produced the latter. ‘Egoism’ now reigned as the censors uncovered common sentiments exemplified by a soldiers’ quote ‘I’m done sticking my neck out, I’m not that big an idiot to risk my life for nothing’ [Ich halte den Kopf nicht mehr hin, ich werde nicht so dumm sein, noch zwecklos mein Leben auf’s Spiel zu setzen].​[827]​  Many soldiers anticipated what peace by any means promised for a post-war Germany but it did not seem to matter, as one soldier wrote ‘Everybody wants peace and screw Alsace-Lorraine, nobody wants to die for it.’​[828]​
17th Army command reported to Ludendorff on 20 October 1918 on the mood of 18th Corps and 2nd Bavarian Corps in a report compiled from Auxiliary Censorship Office 1152.​[829]​  Censors noted a dramatic decrease in soldiers’ morale compared to earlier reports, attributed to ‘continuous enemy attacks, severe casualties and infrequent relief’ among other but unnamed complaints.  After periods of rest, the condition of 3rd Reserve division and 214th Infantry division improved noticeably; 26th Reserve division and 113th division did not and therefore require ‘the most serious attention.’​[830]​  26th Reserve division had built up a formidable reputation in positional war; now its infantry complained bitterly against the failure to provide rest which had been promised.​[831]​  Moreover they spoke openly in favour of peace by any means.  As one soldier was quoted in the report, ‘We have had to go through so much recently and if it could only end at some point, we could be people again.’​[832]​  On the bright side, heavy artillerymen, were in much better spirits than the infantry, showing pride in the fact that their division’s performance warranted mention in army communications.  Reports concerning the mood of 113th Division did not have to account with so long a fall from grace, but repeated that soldiers did not care about a fair peace, just a swift one.  Censors decried soldiers’ increasing ‘egoism’ displayed by growing frequency of statements like that men were still just trying to stay alive [nur sein Leben dabei noch zu retten], as Benjamin Ziemann has observed, a drive to get through it in one piece.​[833]​  
By September 1918 the general sense of superiority held by German soldiers was gone, not just because they had failed in the Spring, but also because they were being outfought and could not respond in kind.  Indeed, censors in September and October complained of ‘egoism,’ or the triumph of self-interest over military goals and of enemy attacks causing heavy losses. They still possessed some belief that fighting was necessary, demonstrated in earlier reports, that some divisions recovered their morale following rest, but also had sense that they were the victims of a fight much more about which of the Allied powers would dominate the post-war order than anything else.  That soldiers contemplated life after the war is hardly a novel idea, but first they had to see out their present time on the front line. Formerly the storm troops had served as a buffer between common soldiers and the enemy, the fundamental element of the division-of-risk system, but largely expended in the Spring Offensives, soldiers were left to re-establish a way of fighting which preserved their lives.  They had done so during the winter of 1914-1915 in what the OHL adopted as the storm troop programme.  In July-August 1918, German soldiers did so again to avoid the personal shame of defeat, manage the prospect of survival against a superior enemy, and so enjoy the rest of their lives.   The resulting form of disobedience I have termed armed avoidance, alongside desertion, self-mutilation and insubordination.​[834]​
Michael Geyer has argued that the killing power of German infantry in the late war hinged on collective aggression, typically in small groups as a means of overcoming fear.​[835]​  However this explanation runs into trouble when confronted not just by uncertain adherence to military authority, but wildly divergent experiences in training, an ever-present concern for ‘what comes after the war,’ and motivation pulled up and down monthly by local events, global politics and all things in between.  Killing was a collective act, but in the closing months of the Great War, military goals were no longer soldiers’ goals, as Wilhelm Deist has argued.  Still, the German army continued to deal out tremendous losses despite a tremendous decrease in their average quality.
However the primary culprit was German artillery.  According to the best available data, 60.7 per cent of British deaths were from artillery, along with 76 per cent of French deaths up to the end of 1917 and 58 per cent afterwards.​[836]​ Applying these percentages to the British and French death tolls respectively, yields approximately 550,000 British and as many as 1 million French fatalities caused solely by German artillery.  Subtracting those killed by artillery from total Allied losses means that 13 million German soldiers produced perhaps 3.9 million total Allied fatalities through firearms, grenades and edged weapons, if one discounts the rest of the Central Powers.  The Central powers were the more efficient killers of soldiers, but not because their infantry was markedly better at killing than their opponents, and certainly not because German troops in particular possessed superior motivation to fight.  
German statistics cease in July; however the BEF’s continue through from July to the end of the war and beyond.  In January and February, average losses in killed, wounded, missing and prisoners were about 10,000 men per month.  In March, predominantly after 21 March 1918 we can safely assume, the BEF suffered about 173,000 casualties, and about 143,000 for the entire month of April.​[837]​  Loss totals then plummeted, about 69,000 in May, 32,000 in June and about 32,000 in July as the Germans shifted their offensives towards the French.​[838]​ The counter-offensive at Amiens of 8 August 1918 signalled the beginning of the BEF’s ‘Hundred Days,’ and 122,000 additional casualties; from August to November BEF casualties never fell below 110,000 men per month.​[839]​  Comparable losses over a three-month span are found from July to September 1916.​[840]​  With the German army’s elite units largely expended in the Spring Offensives, and widespread shirking, illness and disobedience taking hold in the German army, only the most widely available skills and broadest motivations can be used to explain the expertise in violence of soldiers who fought on.​[841]​  
	Here it is necessary to backtrack somewhat to the Spring Offensives, and the analysis undertaken by both the French and British which ultimately lead to their mastering of the German tactical system based on storm troops.​[842]​  Allied powers undertook not just a systematic evaluation of German tactics but also the documents which expounded them, making central German ideas accessible to small unit leaders.  First in the series was an explanation of German victory on 21 and 22 March where fog and overwhelming numbers, what Martin Samuels dubbed the ‘Mist and Masses’ thesis, were supposedly the main factors underpinning the BEF’s defeats.​[843]​  Something of a disconnect exists between this conclusion, and a document entitled ‘German Methods in the Attack, And Indications of an Offensive’ from 16 February, 1918 with two sections, ‘German Offensive Methods in Trench Warfare, Compiled from a Study of Recent German Publications’ and ‘Notes on a Study of the German Orders for the Riga Attack, 1 September 1917.’​[844]​ The quality of analysis soon improved and remedies were available by the summer.
This ‘Notes on Recent Fighting’ series included a facsimile of the captured German publication, translated into English with a brief commentary and summary of key ideas.  Starting in early April, of particular relevance is ‘Notes on Recent Fighting No. 7: German Attack Near Givenchy, April 9th 1918,’ in which British forces adopted a zonal defensive scheme based on the platoon.​[845]​  Knowing that German storm troops would seek weak or undefended sections of the line to move through, the British laid barbed wire perpendicular to their front line and channelled assault squads into areas where they were easily flanked or surrounded. Such barriers also prevented the assault squads from establishing secure areas which would allow reserves to come forward.  Meanwhile, some British platoons were given strong points to defend ‘at all costs’ but were equipped to resist attack from all sides and promised relief through counterattacks if surrounded. Relief would come from nearby platoons emplaced with orders to move and counterattack as they saw fit. ‘We employed the same tactics against the enemy as he was endeavouring to employ against us’ the authors noted correctly and with a justifiable sense of triumph.  The success at Givenchy was local and tactical but it was the shape of things to come.
German offensive methods in May still relied on the storm troops, but ideas were changing as to their exact use, moving towards a British model for platoons on the offensive.  Usually, storm troops’ tactical formations were composed of a few assault squads scattered ahead of a company of infantry, itself divided into three loose lines composed of specialised infantry squads and a fourth line providing messengers, replacements and carrying construction materials.  In other instances, the infantry led and storm troops were organised into ‘shock groups’, apparently as a response to the Allies’ increasing adoption of zonal defensive schemes.  The 7th Army ordered a reorganisation of its storm troops into ‘shock groups’ on 15 May 1918, replacing the storm troop squad with a platoon of 40 storm troops equipped with all the specialised weapons of positional war and strict orders that they would only fight as a unit.​[846]​  That is, 7th Army forbade its officers from breaking down the shock groups into squads and using them to lead attacks as had been standard practice.  Shock groups were instead kept in the second and third waves to be deployed against strong points [Widerstandsnester].​[847]​  In this manner 7th Army’s shock groups fought at 3rd Chemin-des-Dames from 27 May to 18 June 1918 to little avail.​[848]​  The French were still refining their zonal defensive ideas, and considered 3rd Chemin-des-Dames a setback, making 7th Assault battalion’s experience something of an outlier.
Four shock groups reported a common experience of advances barred by machine guns and standing artillery barrages, French counterattacks that drove off the shock groups and prevented the recovery of their wounded, and attacks by shock groups and common soldiers alike ‘shot apart’ by machine guns.​[849]​  Further shock groups drawn from divisions’ assault troops were brought up, and where they managed to close with the French they won quickly in fighting dominated by rifles and hand grenades.  Though they had won a fight here and there, the French defence was up to task and the Germans had almost nothing to show for their losses.  Nor was the ‘shock group’ a new idea on the Western Front, as its basic concept reflected BEF tactics which debuted in 1917; effectively the British platoon doctrine shoehorned into the German system.  However, the Germans reproduced with storm troops what the BEF did with platoons of common soldiers.
The tactical organisation and formation of platoons was not foreign to the Germans, as they had captured a complete diagram, drawn in the diary of a British soldier taken in May 1917.​[850]​  But for a few omissions, it was a copy of a diagram included in SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, published by the BEF in February 1917 as a codification of successful ‘bunker busting’ techniques developed during the Somme.​[851]​  Missing were a small group of scouts and a sharpshooter nominally included in British formations, but the primary elements were there.  Four sections were utilised, two manoeuvre sections consisting of a rifle section and a section of grenadiers, and two fire sections, one of riflemen equipped with grenade launchers and one  light machinegun section with a Lewis gun and plenty of ammunition.  All told, 44 soldiers were needed for such a platoon.  Once the fighting started, the light machine gun squad fired at the bunker’s embrasures to keep the garrison away from the firing slits while grenade launchers shot at the same target to stun and kill them.  Rifle and bombing squads went around both sides, passing out of the bunker’s field of fire and closing to point-blank range to finish off the garrison with bullets and grenades or in hand-to-hand if need be.  Man portable ‘Stokes’ mortars were often added, to blanket defenders with smoke shells or blow up lighter positions with high explosives, but if counterattacking forces appeared, smoke shells would blind the bunker while the fire sections shifted to the new targets.
Not to be outdone, the French army adapted and improved on German ideas, building a defensive system which bested its creators.  Adaptation of German principles proved something of a struggle between proponents of linear (the ‘Foot by Foot’ school of defensive thought, to quote Tim Travers) and zonal defence until German success at 3rd Chemin des Dames in May 1917 settled the debate in favour of the zonal camp.​[852]​  The effectiveness of their work was demonstrated against Operation ‘Marneschutz-Reims,’ the fourth Spring Offensive of 15 July-3 August 1918.​[853]​  After and because of the success of French defences against the opening round of assaults, ‘Notes on Recent Fighting No. 18: The German Attack on the French 4th Army east of Rheims’ received by the AEF on 28 July 1918.​[854]​  France’s answer to German tactics was a sparsely held forward position, two to three km deep and garrisoned by single battalions.  Behind the forward position was a main line of resistance ‘to be held at all costs.’  Three to four km behind the main line of resistance was a second defensive position, with selected battalions deployed between the main line and second line for immediate counterattacks.  In this French version of Elastic Defence, divisions were deployed in pairs with one division responsible for holding the forward zone, the main line of resistance, and providing the troops for local counterattacks.  A second division held the second line and played the part of the ‘Intervention Division,’ except that it was permanently stationed, never more than seven km from the enemy and therefore given the chance to gain an intimate knowledge of local geography.  
Unlike Operation ‘Michael,’ preparations for the offensive were observed well in advance of its planned start date of 15 July.  Measures to counter the Germans began on the 7th, as the French army started blowing up ammunition dumps it could not move, raided daily for prisoners and documents and brought up additional artillery which was not to fire until the offensive hit.  A raid at 9pm on the night of the 14/15 July yielded confirmation of an offensive on the 15th as well as 27 prisoners.  French artillery began shelling German positions starting with the frontline and moving backward to a depth of two and a half km all the while shifting batteries to fool German observers. It becomes clear from the document that France intended for its artillery to do most of the killing; German storm troops achieved some limited successes but were quickly contained or repelled by French counterattacks. Meanwhile, German reserve troops moving in columns across No Man’s Land (for speed and ease of control) were spotted and had ‘great execution’ done to them by French artillery.  If the storm troops could not rupture the front in depth, putting their enemies on the back foot and giving following troops the space to deploy and their enemy’s positions to shelter in, reserve forces were perfect targets for any heavy weapon in range.  Without the firepower and construction materials provided by reserve troops, assault troops were isolated in wrecked positions with predominantly short-ranged weapons and a tenuous link to the rear. When German troops took a portion of the French zone without threatening the overall integrity of their defence, the French let them keep it and spared their own soldiers’ lives.​[855]​  
Not only did the system evaluate recent instances, but it also accounted for change over time.  In the case of OHL document Ia/II No.9135 ‘The Defence of the Outpost Zone,’ a timeline emerges which demonstrates just how quickly the German army gave away its ideas and tactics.  The OHL modified their principles for establishing and defending the ‘Forward Zone,’ changing a publication issued on  25 June 1918, modified by the OHL on 6 July, captured and translated by the British as of 28 August, and published with commentary as ‘Notes on Recent Fighting No. 20’ on 6 September 1918.​[856]​  ‘Forward Zone’s were a critical component of German defensive thinking, representing the area more commonly known as ‘No Man’s Land’, held by small groups of sentries and a handful of light machine-gun squads.  A ‘Forward Zones’ purpose was to protect defending troops against infiltration, raids and surprise attacks, and to begin breaking down the coherency of an attacking force by forcing them to traverse rough terrain while taking casualties.  To do so, the Germans reckoned a ‘Forward Zone’ had to be at least 500m deep, and much closer to 1km if possible. But the key points were that the weaker the German position was, the deeper its forward zone had to be, but if faced with overwhelming odds, the forward zone garrison could abandon the whole zone without fighting.  British tacticians consequently developed a counter; using a large number of small attacks in many places, frequently supported by tanks, they could shrink the depth of many forward zones to uselessness while concealing the location of targets for future offensives.  Tactically, British goals were twofold: force the Germans into an unsustainable state of perpetual withdrawal and fortification; or to strengthen their garrisons and increase the number of targets from the BEF’s heavy artillery,
The enemy will then be compelled to adopt one of two alternatives.  He will either be obliged continually to give ground and to prepare new lines of resistance in rear [sic]-a policy which he could not adopt indefinitely-or he will be compelled to strengthen the force in occupation of his outpost zone and to accept battle in that area.  Whichever course he may adopt, the result will be that he must eventually fight in circumstances which will permit of the development of a decisive attack under conditions favourable to the attacking force, holding his defences in strength with his troops exposed to the full power of the attacking artillery.​[857]​

Three weeks after the publication of this document, German mail censors provided a quote from a musketeer of 36th Infantry regiment. He said, ‘We’ve all had it. When we are deployed over and over and the Tommies attack and we can do nothing to stop them, our leadership should take careful notice. Our division has been deployed to four major offensives in six months and it’s a raw deal.’​[858]​  With this in mind, the OHL got back to first principles with regards to training.  Soldiers should be able to deliver firepower and resist the sensory experience of the battlefield.  Not everyone agreed with the shift in focus which Ernst Jünger had encountered in mid August.  He recorded, ‘I tried to bring my company to some kind of order and began assault squad training according to my hard won experience that success in war can only be achieved by individuals, everybody else put forward materiel and firepower.’​[859]​
	On 25 August, Jünger’s beliefs received a firmer rebuff.  On the old Cambrai battlefield 73rd  Fusilier regiment took up defensive positions.  ‘We had to put out lookouts, so as to be ready for a surprise tank attack,’ Jünger wrote, continuing ‘After I set up my lookouts and situated my squads in old British artillery shelters, I lay down and fell fast asleep.’​[860]​  At 6 pm that evening, Jünger’s commander gathered his officers and said ‘Gentlemen, I bring you sad news.  We will attack.’  The conditions for the attack echoed his commander’s attitude; 73rd Fusilier regiment had 50 minutes to march ‘a good ways,’ make a plan of attack and put itself into formation.​[861]​  Jünger had had no time to train new assault squads, and put his company into lines of squads with 20m’s space between each line.  Artillery preparation was ‘very weak,’ but by 7 pm the regiment was attacking, ‘in skirmish lines over clear ground.’  As part of the second wave, Jünger’s company simply followed the first wave for no good reason, passing over them as they took cover.  Shortly thereafter, Jünger was shot in the chest, the bullet exiting through his back, and taking refuge in a crater, he observed that British artillery began a barrage ‘like I had never heard before, apart from 21 March.’​[862]​  British troops appeared, attacking the centre and left of Jünger’s company, who fought back with rifles and machine guns, causing casualties ‘here and there’ and forcing the attacking troops into cover.
	Not everyone was in I Battalion, 73rd Fusilier regiment was in the mood to fight it out, and from what follows it seems that Jünger’s regiment were defeated by the Entente’s version of elastic defence.   A combination of barrages and local counterattacks halted Jünger’s men and methodically cut his unit into pieces; even though they had been halted in Jünger’s immediate area, other British forces had succeeded in breaking through the 73rd Fusiliers’ front and drove into the regiment’s rear, cutting off reinforcements and sowing confusion.  The moral effect was as pronounced on the German army of 1918 as it had been on the French army during the Chemin-des-Dames in 1917 or the BEF at 3rd Ypres.  From his shell hole, Jünger noticed German prisoners streaming towards the British line from directly behind his position.  More and more prisoners appeared, asking the men of Junger’s company to surrender as well, while two of Lieutenants ‘ranted at the shitty situation.’  A company [Haufen] of Germans appeared heading for British lines, arms swinging, escorted by two British soldiers.  Jünger lamented, ‘Unfortunately I couldn’t command a single rifle to shoot down the entire rabble.’​[863]​ Jünger’s desire became legal practice by the end of the month, as the OHL and Prussian War ministry permitted officers to turn their weapons on troops in cases of cowardice.​[864]​ Taking Jünger at his word, at least a quarter of his unit, I Battalion, 73rd  Fusilier regiment, had surrendered enthusiastically to the British.  The primacy of materiel and firepower had taken hold of Jünger’s battalion, as Nahkampf became a threat to all German soldiers, rather than the realm of ‘violence specialists.’
On 10 September 1918, the OHL declared that ‘It its essential that every infantryman is trained to operate light machine guns.’​[865]​ Apparently divisions without the required number of ‘extra’ weapons were either to ignore the order or withdraw working guns from frontline units for use by recruits; a highly improbable scenario.  The same order revealed mass disobedience to the OHL’s training schedule which had since come to OHL attention through the FRD Inspectorate and Assigned Generals.  Reserves were no longer sufficient to permit men ‘four months or more’ of FRD training, the OHL stated, four to five weeks were considered sufficient to render recruits ‘front ready.’​[866]​  With no attention to irony the OHL stated in the next paragraph that recruits were frequently overwhelmed psychologically by the sights and sounds of the battlefield, particularly tanks, artillery and air attacks.  In other words, combined-arms attacks had a profound shock effect on German soldiers alongside such attack’s material effectiveness, especially in the later war, though artillery was still the main threat to soldiers’ minds and bodies.​[867]​  Therefore FRDs were specifically instructed to train in concert with artillery batteries using live ammunition and fighter squadrons as well as live hand grenades to get used to the sounds and to practice taking cover.​[868]​  In case the notion that speed was of the essence had passed readers by, the OHL reiterated that the entirety of a soldier’s training should take three months and no more and even that time was subject to the requirements of the service.​[869]​  
Material conditions seemed to support them.  Army corps regularly provided reports of their current situations, noting recent casualties, current troop strength, the lack of important equipment and the general health of the troops.​[870]​  18th Corps’ divisions reported an average battalion strength of about 330 men with between 200 and 300 replacements training in their FRDs. Though Influenza was making its presence felt, infectious disease was effectively quarantined; the overwhelming majority of troops were free of illness, but those batteries or companies in which flu had broken out were ill almost to a man.  All divisions also reported that they were well-equipped with the artillery of all calibres not to mention light and heavy machine guns.  One division reported a lack of light machine guns, but that replacements had been requisitioned.  Other units, like 197th Infantry division, were not so lucky. Having recently fought, 197th Infantry division reported eight officers and 146 men killed, 28 officers and 680 men wounded and 22 officers and 1341 men missing.​[871]​  The division had lost equally in materiel, lacking dozens of machine guns of all types as well as 11 pieces of artillery.  If there was a ‘positive’ it was that 1233 replacements were training in its FRD, but only 80 were deployable. 
On 2 October 1918 American troops raided the lines of the 1st Garde division, providing an opportunity for an unnamed polish soldier to desert.  The German empires’ minorities were among the first to abandon the fight, as Alexander Watson has argued, but a veteran of the Prussian Guard was still greeted with enthusiasm by American interrogators.​[872]​  Born in Posen in 1896, he mustered into the 4th Garde Replacement battalion on 29 September 1915, to the field recruit depot of 1st Garde division on 17 July 1916 and deployed to the 4th Garde regiment in September 1916.​[873]​  He spoke freely on the dissolution of German divisions to provide replacements, and the dissolution of companies for the same purpose.  Companies remaining in his regiment averaged 50-60 men who were organized into light machine gun squads due to lack of manpower.  Eleven days later an unknown number of prisoners were taken from 28th Infantry division, speaking freely not only on the subject of dispositions but also on its organisation and strength.​[874]​  He told a similar story, of companies with 60-65 men including one officer, twelve NCOs and six light machine guns.  
 This testimony reflects the state of the army in two regards.  First, battalion strength in the German army had decreased to an average of 635 effectives by September 1918, or about 50 men per company.​[875]​ [CHECK OUT THIS REF] Secondly, that companies were originally composed of 16 squads, six of which were equipped with light machine guns per the A.V.F 18.  As replacements failed to keep pace with losses, manpower was prioritized to light machine gun squads, to the point where they were the only squads left.  Furthermore, all late war tactics required a manoeuvre component and a fire component as the Germans outlined in the A.V.F. 18 and ‘The Attack in Positional War’ and the BEF determined in SS 143.  Yet when push came to shove, German troops abandoned the manoeuvre component, and with it their ability to counter-attack or assault the enemy.
Still, should the men feel like putting up a fight, there was little to distinguish a full strength unit from a damaged one when it came to firepower.  Instead, the shortage of men would be keenly felt in trying to operate defensive systems built on counterattack.  Battalions and divisions no longer had the numbers to risk the losses entailed in counterattacks or to man defensive positions adequately and train at the same time. What they did have was access to varying levels of skill with machine guns and plenty of guns themselves.  Artillerymen were similarly well-supplied and much less prone to casualties and when combined with the infantry’s durable firepower, could still produce fire in volume and accuracy to keep the risks entailed in attack much the same as in earlier times.  However, the case of 197th division seems to indicate that units would collapse at least partially if the battle turned against them.  Divisional survival appears to depend on the avoidance of close combat; the men would fight as long as they could tip and run. If orders or circumstances demanded a fight to the finish, soldiers might think better of it.
October brought the German army face-to-face with the reality of the battlefield.  As Michael Geyer has argued, though the OHL had prevented a total collapse of the German army by 6 October, and there was some indication that soldiers’ morale had recovered to point where they were likely to obey orders to fight.  However, their willingness to fight was now irrelevant; the Germans no longer had the ability to halt Allied offensives and never would again.​[876]​  Furthermore, German soldiers deployed repeatedly and short notice to counter-attack Allied successes would be well aware of this fact, and cited their shortened leaves and growing frustration at the war’s conduct in censor’s reports. 
	A link has been drawn between giving up and soldiers’ experience by Jonathan Boff, who characterizes the negative assessment of a poor tactical situation as an ‘Involuntary surrender.’​[877]​  Small groups of defenders widely spaced were more likely to by outflanked by attackers (or find the spaces between infiltrated by attacking troops).  Combined with an absence of leaders they were more likely to give up.​[878]​  But experienced soldiers could also take flanking as a sign that they had done their job and having deliberately reorganised their units to eliminate the ability to assault or ruthlessly optimizing firepower, no-one could rescue them if surrounded.  Outnumbered and outflanked satisfied the conditions for a defender to give up without shame.  Besides, if the odds were too long they had other options before the enemy established a superior position.  And as always, retreat in the form of planned withdrawal or rout remained an option. 
Ludendorff seemed at least somewhat aware of this state of affairs, a balancing act between the desperate need for men and requisite skill to implement tactics.  It was shades of 1914 when he ordered in October 1918 that the best of the conscription class of 1900 were approved for deployment in the field starting 1 November.​[879]​ Even then, this order only applied to those sufficiently trained and who were capable of bearing the physical and psychological burdens of fighting. However 1918’s recruits left much to desired. 6th Army’s inspector of Field Recruit Depots reported that the training of the conscription class of 1900 was ‘in general satisfactory’ [in allgemeinen befriedigend].​[880]​  Their spirit was ‘good on the whole,’ the inspector went on, and the class of 1900 ought to be ready for deployment sometime around the middle of November.  It was a deficiency in training on machine guns that held the men back and the reasons for it were the same as ever.  The recruit depots lacked sufficient numbers of machine guns and quantities of ammunition with which to train, but also for qualified instructors.​[881]​  Another problem was that Corps Administrative Staffs had sent replacements to the front simply to make up the number required and with no concern for how far along they were in basic training. 




Technological and tactical innovation in the German army had reached its peak in late 1917 with the battles of Cambrai, Riga and Caporetto.  There was every impetus to bring the storm troop programme to its natural conclusion, pouring the whole army into the mould established by approximately two years of experience and refinement, vindicated by recent success.  However the constraint of time appreciated by the OHL’s adoption of Crown Prince Rupprecht’s timetable did not permit the conclusion of universal reform. Instead the army was reorganised as if it were one enormous infantry division.  The best quarter received the best weapons and offensive training.  The rest continued as before.  By locating where the best training was conducted and the finest arms were concentrated, the German army rendered it easy to locate the soldiers it expected to demonstrate ‘willingness to action’ and ‘offensive spirit.’-  in other words, the men the army thought it could trust to do most if not all of the fighting and dying.
	In this the OHL were mistaken in that military instruction could not claim hegemony over soldiers’ needs and wants, so that training had first to be deemed useful by the men themselves in order to maintain an existing willingness to serve. Other factors, primarily personal and political from the reports of the censors determined its up or down trajectory. Well-informed soldiers required a proven set of skills which rendered fighting an acceptable risk so they could enjoy future lives as civilians. Subsequently, soldiers viewed training as a place to acquire the skills they needed to survive the battlefield.  For a brief time, late autumn 1917 to Spring 1918, the prospect of decisive military victory bringing an end of suffering was enough. But from March to July 1918, steadily accruing Allied skill and mastery over German methods, not to mention the aimless leadership of the OHL produced catastrophic losses among the assault troops. 
 	Two broad consequences of this new reality appear. Firstly, their loss signalled the end of the division-of-risk system, whose by-product had been to shield the majority of the army from psychological trauma. With the final destruction of the assault troops and ‘mobile divisions’ from July to August 1918, the burden of killing and its attendant traumas could no longer be dumped on a select cohort.  Secondly, the destruction of the army’s elite troops and their ongoing exposure to the latest Allied offensive methods particularly after August, 1918, persuaded soldiers that the army’s repertoire of skills could not ensure survival and there was no prospect or interest in developing countermeasures from soldiers’ own resources. Exacerbating these conditions were fluctuating political considerations regarding the post-war settlement and rapidly degenerating conditions on the home front.
With no means left to continue the division-of-risk system and increasingly aware that the balance of skills taught by the army were declining in value, soldiers instead adopted what I will call armed avoidance. Armed avoidance is defined as the instrumentalisation of division-of-labour principles as manifested through tactics and weapons to mitigate feelings of shame and possibility of wounds and death, a conjecture in the mould of Alexander Watson’s.  It requires distance, mobility and is therefore dependent on certain types of weapons which in the German army were readily available.  Light and heavy machine guns were the keystone of defensive tactics, providing the matrix into which assault troops were embedded from early 1917 onwards.​[885]​  With expertise in the use of light machine guns emphasized at every stage of the training process, an obvious means to keep the enemy at distance while minimizing one’s exposure to danger appeared. Moreover, light machine guns as well as other heavy weapons were still readily available, permitting companies that had suffered large losses to maintain their firepower. 
Once again, the army reconstructed ideas of what was possible, with its cornerstone as the  the machine gun squad maintained the physical and psychological space between the mass of common soldiers and the killing act, assuming the role formerly maintained by the storm troops and the nature of positional war. Distance from targets, the miniscule number of weapon operators relative to the total number of men engaged and the ability to fulfil a military role in combat without having to take part in the violence were the chief factors.  If compelled to take over the role of gunner, then distance and repetitive instruction reduced psychological impediments to killing along with the sensory experience of killing, which otherwise decreased both the efficiency of the act and the willingness of the killer.​[886]​  Soldiers no longer had to brave the ‘empty battlefield’, instead now they took shelter in it, as they had trenches, bunkers and forts during positional war.​[887]​  It is perhaps something of a paradox that armed avoidance practiced by German soldiers in the First World War was vindicated by later research as an effective structure for turning soldiers into killers.
Moreover, far from being fanatics, the devoted products of a hyper-militarised society or irredeemably brutalized, soldiers fighting in these squads were more likely to fall prey to the steadily refined tactics of positional war for eliminating small strong points.​[888]​  Without the manpower to counterattack or the protection of mutually supporting concrete forts which had marked Germany’s system of defence-in-depth, machine gun squads caught by Allied troops were easy prey. Subsequently, casualty reports from German units indicate that when things got tough, large numbers of soldiers ‘went missing’ by refusing orders they viewed as likely ending in death. Instead, they took advantage of the battlefield and their skills from positional war to limit danger and escape, or limit danger and surrender.
Such actions were completely in line with the strengths of each recruit class as noted by Field Recruit Depot Inspectors and Representative Generals of the OHL.  FRD training emphasised the use of the machine gun, and complemented soldiers on their use of terrain and positional war skills.  That is, on their ability to keep the enemy at a distance, minimize their own exposure to danger and fulfil supporting roles in combat.  German soldiers thought themselves better than their enemies, until August-September 1918, when censors noted that war-weariness had merged with a shift in soldiers’ appreciation of relative effectiveness.  What skills they had or were introduced to, they put to work keeping themselves alive, something that was increasingly difficult as their enemies gained mastery over German military system.  French and British armies had almost ready access to German doctrinal publications while prisoners of war spoke freely on organisation and tactics.  Their answers to German methods were incredibly effective, so that by summer 1918 the German army was comprehensively outmatched.  
In late 1917 and early 1918, battlefield performance and political events combined in the minds of German soldiers to produce a new faith in themselves and a renewed belief in victory.  Training, quite contrary to the OHL’s beliefs, did not itself renew morale, but could sustain a general trend put in motion by other factors, or damage soldiers’ faith in the army.  Events of late 1917 demonstrated to German soldiers that the war was winnable, and so they drew some strength from the skills, weapons and tactics vindicated at Riga, Cambrai and Caporetto.  Victory and relief from present suffering drove the army of the winter of 1917-1918 to the Spring of 1918. However, the experience of the Summer and Autumn of 1914 was about to repeat itself, and with it a renewed encounter with the experience of being killed.  Circumstances were broadly similar: a carefully trained and equipped minority supported out of necessity, but a majority whose skills, leadership, equipment and physical conditioning ranging from simply different (emphasising construction, fire-power, and the defense), to insufficient by every standard the army had in place. Given a new experience of killing and being killed, German troops would make use of available weapons and manpower to develop new organisational principles.  The OHL wished to ‘Taylorise’ the battlefield, while soldiers wished to extract a sense of personal achievement from their service, which of course they had to be alive to enjoy.  By the winter of 1917-1918 German soldiers again believed they could win, and they had the tools to beat their enemies.  The stars had aligned.
However their enemies thought the exact same, for most of the same reasons.  The Allies had the weapons, the soldiers, and especially the know-how, developed on their own with some aid from the Germans’ inability to keep secrets or change basic assumptions. Existing domestic political consensus was the only question that threatened military victory, as demonstrated by France’s fear that Germany’s expected 1918 offensive would be a rerun of Verdun. [when training is poor, morale suffers] 
 In August of 1918, however, German troops lost their sense of belief in the justness of their cause, hardly a revelation, but fused their loss of belief with the act of being killed.  Shifting their rationale for fighting to the personal, rather than the national, their perception of tactics, weapons and training followed.  So instead of adhering to a military system rooted in aggression, surprise and destruction, common soldiers improvised a new system with weapons they had, and the skills they were best at, and we can assume, valued most. Mobility, collective cohesion and fire-power were the roots of their new system, all well-known to the army of the winter of 1917-1918, but they were now shorn of any offensive purpose as soldiers who chose to fight sought escape from an irresistible Allied war machine.  The task of closing with and killing the enemy was largely abandoned to steady retreat behind a wall of shells and machine-gun bullets.








In the years following the Great War, former officers, but in some instances local archivists, took it upon themselves to produce detailed narratives of their regiments.  Included were meticulous tabulations of casualties for both officers and enlisted men. A sampling of their work drawn from the army of Württemberg summarises their findings, bringing into starker relief the effects of the German army’s peculiar organizational practices on its soldiers’ survival and the importance of specialisation.

Table 6.1 Fatal Losses in the Great War from 10 Württemberg regiments, 1914-1918
Unit	Officers killed	NCOs and enlisted men killed










Sources: O.v.Brandenstein, Das Infanterie-Regiment ‘Alt-Württemberg‘ (3. Württ.) Nr. 121 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1921), p. 137;  Stühmke [Benjamin, even WorldCat does not know his first name-Brendan], Das Infanterie-Regiment ‘Kaiser Friedrich, König von Preuβen‘ (7. Württ) Nr. 125 (Stuttgart, 1923), pp. 277-278;  A. Schwab and A. Schrener, Das neunte württembergische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 127 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1920), pp. 176-180; A. Vischer, Das Württ. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 180 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1921), p. 105;  M. Gerster, Das Württembergische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 119 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1920), p. 132; G.v.Holz, Reserve-Inf.-Regiment Nr. 121 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 89-91; C. Scheer, Das Württembergische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 413 im Weltkrieg 1916-1918 (Stuttgart, 1936), p. 154;  M. Rölsch,  Das Württembergische Landwehr-Inf.-Regiment Nr. 119 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1923), p. 158;  K. Stein, Das Württembergische Landw.-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 121 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1925), p. 181; K. Laepple, Das Württembergische Landw.-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 125 im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1926), p. 187.

The first six regiments were all units of the pre-war army.  IR 413 was raised in 1916, and the Landwehr units served primarily as security forces in rear areas and as garrisons for ‘quiet’ sectors of the frontline and later conquered portions of Russia.  Taken together, a peacetime regiment that set out in 1914 suffered fatal losses nearly equal to and often greater than its established strength among NCOs and enlisted men.  Officer compliments were killed off entirely then half again, leaving officers in a pre-war army regiment who mustered into service in 1914 had practically no chance of living through the war.  Indeed, the longer a junior officer lasted, the greater the drop-off in quality when he was killed or wounded, something which was almost inevitable.  The organisation of the Imperial German army had a dire impact on its soldiers, and was more complicated that a division of storm troops and everyone else, which has long been neglected.
The central aim of this dissertation is establish just how the German army worked before, during, and after the killing and being killed.  In doing so it has blended a micro historical approach with institutional history to assess the continuities, discontinuities and contingencies at work within the wartime army. For the balance of the First World War, the tactics of the German army were dominated by the need to survive, moreover to survive firepower from multiple directions applied with such intensity that even a self-destructive level of motivation had little practical worth. At first it was a matter of frontline units attempting to gain a sense of control over the battlefield and halt terrifying casualties, but later the imperative to economise manpower and make war more efficiently took over.  Finally near the war’s end soldiers twisted the tactical system as a means to stay alive against continuous Allied offensives and satisfy their overwhelming urge to go home.​[889]​   In this reflection on how the German army killed and learned to kill, my aim has been to establish the importance of specialisation and military organisation on combat survival.  It is through this investigation that the regenerative character of violence in the German army is revealed, as proximity to the fighting front became the unquestioned truism of the army’s training scheme, and veteran soldiers became its most valuable resource.  
	At all points except the very last months, the German army’s tactics were driven by the tactical offensive and Nahkampf, or close combat.  In the pre-war reckoning, close combat ended with the rout of opposing soldiers, their surrender, or their deaths in hand-to-hand combat.  Wartime experience showed that a rout or a retreat were much more likely, robbing close combat of its decisive quality.  Instead, fleeing or retreating enemies were shot with rifles and field guns in an act known as ‘pursuit by fire’.  But with the onset of positional war, the importance of close combat remained, almost unaltered in the minds of German commanders leaving soldiers the task of developing new ways of fighting a new type of war.  Seldom used during the ‘Schlieffen’ offensive, bayonets gave way to grenades, machine guns, mortars and flame-throwers, technologies which deprived the act of killing of its intimacy while providing greater security for their operators.  Still, the weapons of close combat, the skills to use them effectively and the motivation to use them at all were irrelevant if the enemy remained alive, uninjured, or retained the courage to use his own missile weapons.  Moreover, German soldiers acknowledged the growing Vielseitigkeit, the versatility and multiplicity of the defender’s supporting weapons that killed more efficiently than attacker’s weapons, and from beyond the attacker’s ability to retaliate.  Soldiers determined this on their own, and the experiments of Maj. Calsow and Capt. Rohr confirmed it after the fact to the OHL, as Gruβ observed, and the German army changed its approach to the problem to reemphasise close combat.
The rationalised carrying-over of an old, familiar way of doing things to a new problem is clearly evident.  Since the most common and most effective means of defence were fortifications designed to resist shellfire, close combat received new importance by altering the equation rather than solving it.  Instead of shelling the enemy to the point of annihilation and occupying ground as was standard practice from Spring of 1915 to the Summer of 1916, the army created violence specialists who sought face-to-face confrontation inside Entente positions.  War became active, with fortifications being isolated, then captured or ‘mopped up’, rather than obliterated and occupied, and such active warfare required more of German soldiers than was generally available.  German thinking pivoted from an almost structural conception of violence dominated by overwhelming firepower to a regenerative violence, in which carefully managed and human-centered combat was fundamental to the restoration of unit quality and therefore the essential belief in qualitative superiority which underpinned German military thought.  But where before the war and in its earliest months, qualitative superiority formerly grounded on superior preparation it was now built upon a demonstrated mastery of the self in combat.	
Self-mastery was not a new concept, appearing in the literature of the pre-war army, but its rise from a desired value to the foundation of soldierly quality was a product of positional war.  Such a turn was impossible without the ‘mutual mass slaughter’ of the Schlieffen offensive and the frantic expansion and reorganisation of the army that went on from November 1914 through 1915.  The lynchpin of the new German military system was the ‘veteran’, soldiers with proven abilities to overcome the sensory experience of the modern battlefield.   Though the lists of particular traits varied greatly in their specific choices of attributes, they amounted generally to the same thing, and reflected a desire for consistent action under varied conditions. Highlighted by Rommel’s post-war accounting, war was frightening, exhausting on the mind and body, and won first by individuals’ refusal to let such stresses overwhelm their reason or more importantly, to impair their ability to use what they had learned.  More pointedly and paradoxically, only war created the best soldiers.  So it was that the army sought the means to manage soldiers first among its ranks before taking further steps, looking to ‘veterans’ in order to offset declining skill with a mastery of the self.  However ‘veterancy’ on its own proved insufficient given the increasingly technical nature of the war and a desire for soldierly proficiency in offensive warfare even when fighting defensively.  
So from the middle of autumn of 1915 until the summer of 1916, a process of extracting greater commitment, raising motivation and increasing technical ability among veterans was developed which became the storm troop programme.  With the identification of veterancy as the most important single component of fighting a new type of war, battle took on a sort of utility.  Sociologically, combat’s purpose is to deprive the enemy of resources, encompassing soldiers, weapons, raw materials and so on rendering battle a fundamentally self-destructive act redeemed only by the infliction of greater deprivation on the enemy than one receives.  But by scrambling to embrace veteran status as starting point for mending all of the army’s ills in every respect, the German army extracted great benefits by making combat itself an asset.  Veteran status was the single characteristic that did not rely on time outside of combat to develop, in fact the exact opposite was true and terribly important.  Time after time, Gruß notes, units complained  that frequent transfers or sudden recall from rest and retraining  had ruined their training schedules, preventing them from raising or fully preparing their storm troops.​[890]​  In essence, the German army attempted to harness the nature of the war itself in order to provide a permanent solution to what appeared a permanent problem.  That is, to provide an experienced cadre which restored and maintained a unit’s ability to fight and win close combats.  Combat, carefully planned and managed, provided not just victories critical to maintaining institutional self-worth, but a site for practicing violence so as to foster the regeneration of skills and abilities lost to mass killing. 
‘Battlefield Taylorism’, was the chief means for both shaping units to fight, and for extracting all possible benefit from combat.  Violence specialists themselves proved or questioned tactics and modes of military organisation by fighting under carefully controlled circumstances.  Moreover, in joining conventional infantry units for attacks with limited objectives or raids, they brought with them the carefully managed mode of battle and specialist training.   With setup times identical in length to the offered training courses, to wage ‘small’ positional war not only improved German fortunes on a given sector of front, but gave the units taking part their own cadre of ‘violence specialists’.  The ‘regenerative’ nature of violence was foundational to the German army’s practice of positional war, and comes to the fore only when the absolutely crucial importance of veterancy to the army’s overall structure is realised.  Its most direct application, the creation of ‘violence specialists’ was completely successful.  Storm troop units were practically immune to casualties amongst their leaders, placed organisational goals ahead of personal survival, and demonstrated the ability to pass on their values and modes of organisation in relatively short lengths of time given suitable candidates for training.  They did precisely what they were asked to do regarding training, while transforming combat in positional war into the school of positional war.
Here, the Summer and Autumn of 1916, encapsulating the Battle of the Somme and France’s counter-offensive at Verdun were critical, as their aftermath lead to the fusion of the FRDs training in endurance with the storm troop programme’s training in the tactical offensive.  It was in part, a means of separating good soldiers from bad, but also in mobilising the most everyone who did not possess increased levels of training or experience by offering them decreased risk on the battlefield mated with a demand for collective rather than individual action.  This ‘division of risk’ system gave the balance of the army a very clear idea of what it was expected to do, but also not to do.  While training materials continuously evoked the spirit of self-sacrifice, they were not handbooks for indoctrinating recruits, but technical manuals on the changing practice of positional war and on building soldiers’ trust in their abilities.  Soldiers’ abilities were linked to a specific battlefield role, and through that, to their overall function in the unit.  Asking them to do something different was asking them to re-evaluate the manner in which they assessed risk on the battlefield.
But from the start of 1917 and until the winter of 1917-‘18, the practice of ‘Small’ positional war, ‘regenerative’ violence promised a raft of organisational benefits and improved local circumstances for German units. Working in tandem with Field Recruit Depots and assault battalion instruction courses, common soldiers now had clearly set boundaries between their individual exposure to interpersonal violence, delineated by a finely parsed division-of-labour.  Maintaining this division-of-labour amongst common soldiers was the job of the FRDs and assault battalions, in order to keep units capable of the tactical offensive and casualty-resistant.  Reports from the Assigned Generals and FRD Inspectorates confirm two persistent forces; the reliance on veterans as instructors and the maintenance of a central, rationalised standard of conduct rooted in close combat until the very last days of the war.  In their mission as the brokerages of frontline experience, the FRDs and instruction courses succeeded and by the winter of 1917-1918, the system which had begun in the winter of 1914-1915 had fully matured.  For years, recruits, convalescents and elite troops had trained in roughly the same way towards the same goal, the efficient implementation of the same tactics and routines devised years before.  Frontline reforms based on self preservation, the elevation of veterans, their co-opting by the OHL under the heading of the storm troop programme, the conversion of veterans into violence specialists according to ‘battlefield taylorism’, the dissemination of new tactics, organisation and improvement of units through ‘Small’ positional war, all had combined to create the division-of-risk system.  
Germany cobbled together a system of military organisation I have identified as division-of-risk which balanced the rationalised goals of its leadership with the fundamental goal of its soldiers; living through the war.  Two distinct strands of improvisation provided the foundations for this system.  First, the FRDs, a top-down initiative established to navigate a collapse in basic skills brought about by the losses of the war of movement.  Secondly, a bottom-up programme of reorganisation and innovation originating in front-line units in response to mass killing but prompted by local experiences.  Fundamentally, the combination of these two strands by the 2nd and 3rd High Commands constituted a regenerative process when viewed by the army’s elites, a means of re-establishing the army’s basic notions of the possible and impossible.  From August 1914 until the winter of 1914-1915, a force dominated by peace-trained soldiers demonstrated the willingness to attack, albeit with an ever-decreasing skill in offensive operations.  The changeover to an increasingly mechanised, positional war established the importance of veterancy as the foremost quality of an effective soldier, not just because it displayed a desirable set of traits, but because veterancy required no special investment of time or resources by the army.  
Given a demonstrated ability to withstand the sensory experience of the battlefield and act rationally, the army divided its veterans into offensive and defensive specialists, simplifying the dissemination of new technologies and new modes of organisation.  Furthermore, a sifting of the most skilled and the most experienced troops occurred within units themselves, down to the level of companies, platoons and squads.  Such a persistent dedication to identifying the very best soldiers for the very worst tasks constructed barrier after barrier between soldiers and the experience of killing, and these walls between personal confrontation in the context of ‘kill-or-be-killed’ were made high and broader by technology.  Skilled riflemen of the pre-war army were trusted to utilise their abilities on their own, but even then the army hedged its bets.  Range-finders, junior officers and NCOs moved freely amongst their men and ensured not just that they fired accurately and at the proper rate, but that they fired at all.  With the decline in both the number and quality of small-unit leaders but also the relative importance of the rifle, oversight of this kind disappeared.  Instead the grenade and the light machine gun rose to prominence, evoking the consternation of high-ranking officers who bemoaned what they saw as individual’s decreasing willingness to fight.   What was actually reflected in the complaints of military elites was a tension between desire for the same universal standards of the pre-war army and the purposely differentiated functions and expectations of an army rationalised for positional war.  In the storm troop programme they had received something they did not want, an acknowledgement of what was possible rather than the replication in a new form of the army that had died in 1914-1915.
In training its soldiers, the ideal goals of the army are represented by the concept of the ‘battlefield taylorism’, developed and refined from the Summer of 1916 to the autumn of 1918, which cleaves much closer in its aims to Taylor’s stated goals than Scientific Management’s true practice.  To produce a team of workers and managers required extensive training and meticulous task preparation, hallmarks of the German army’s attacks with limited objectives.   With a clear knowledge of means and objectives, the importance of individual’s physical or moral qualities was deemphasised in practical terms.  However, the heavy use of NCOs’ leadership, brought about by the storm troop programme’s splitting of responsibility for leading attacks, demonstrates the importance of accomplished veterans.   Veterans helped secure soldiers’ moral investment in the task via a respect for his achievements, and a belief that his practical knowledge and proven temperament. For ‘battlefield taylorism’, the ideal final product is an offensive military unit immune to the loss of its leaders, a self-sustaining collective of violence specialists removed from dependence on the qualities of any single member.  Multiplication of specialities at the level of squads added to the durability of the collective, for in most cases the death or injury of numerous soldiers was required to remove a specific capability.  Certainly for instance, a machine-gun squad at partial strength could not spot targets as effectively, move as easily, or carry with it the generous supplies of ammunition and spare parts to operate at peak efficiency.  However as long as a gunner and an assistant were present, the weapon worked for the benefit of the whole.  Successful ‘battlefield taylorism’ in the German army would therefore produce units which would require near annihilation in order to halt their production of violence.   However the real outcome was an army within the army and units within units, which nevertheless performed a critical role as the division-of-risk system.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the division-of-risk system is found in its manner of specialisation, and the way in which specialisation shaped not just the production of physical violence, but also the experience of combat.  Violence was less and less the province of individuals, and more and more the product of small groups, that were further subdivided between those who fought and those who support them.  Therefore, whereas the riflemen of the 1914 field army faced an ambiguous killing act as a function of distance and mass action, identical to the soldiers of positional war and broken down into three categories.  The first is proximity, or a soldiers’ ability to link cause and effect through direct observation.  Second is functionality, or the soldiers’ job within a small group, the squad, which itself has a single task.  Third is redundancy, representing the individual’s efforts to kill or intimidate within a larger military system operating simultaneously and with the same purpose, and whose function persisted even if he became a casualty.  Thus, soldiers such as those who took part in Operation Strandfest were insulated against the trauma of killing by poor proximity (the throwing of explosives into a bunker or dugout), functionality (the assignment of an overwhelming percentage to supporting operations), and redundancy (the effects of artillery and trench mortars, multiple grenadiers bombing the same trench section).  What Generals saw as a renewal of the old ‘wild drive to advance’ and risk one’s life, soldiers saw as an awful but necessary job performed much along the lines of ‘better safe than sorry’.  
Even the brutal fighting in and around fortifications did not frequently produce bouts of face-to-face killing.  Combat instead composed largely of group vs. group encounters where fight and flight were equally valid choices and readily available, or group vs. individual encounters, where the individual was made prisoner or more frequently, quickly killed by the group.  Soldiers’ reasoning for why this was done appears completely arbitrary but for the fact that individuals are most often encountered and killed either in the No Man’s Land between trench lines, or immediately following the attacker’s breaking into a position.  A calculus of military expediency based on the quickest possible approach or a swift resolution of an assault becomes obvious.  The refusal to accept surrenders from individuals was therefore based on soldiers’ understanding of a relationship between time, risk and location.  Safety was found inside fortification networks, belonging either to one’s own side or the enemy’s.  The areas in between were the zones of greatest risk as they were purposely constructed for easy observation and the use of defender’s weapons.  Soldiers’ means of controlling that risk were speed and their ability to counter nearby threats with violence.  Once immediate danger had passed, prisoner taking became a more attractive option, both to fulfil orders and to utilise prisoners’ labour for the construction of stronger defences.  Though the manner in which the war was fought changed utterly from 1914 to 1918, the sources of ambiguity between soldiers and a concrete acceptance of killing remained the same.  
German soldiers were trained, equipped and organized from the start to undertake no action on the battlefield without simultaneously presenting a threat to the enemy, a threat they provided with missile weapons in an act known as ‘suppression’.  Suppression is entirely dependent on the response of target; if the threat posed generates enough fear in its target, the person or people under threat will cease to shoot back and seek shelter.  If they do not, then the severity of the threat offered is increased, usually through the use of additional weapons of greater destructive power. Normally this taking of shelter provides immediate remedy from the original source of danger, but in the First World War, short term safety swiftly changed into the opportunity to bring more effective weapons to bear.  Therefore, the defender quickly converted failed attacks into massacres, or attackers entered trenches to bring their specialist close combat weapons and well rehearsed routines of Säuberung to bear on defenders helpless underground.  As has been argued, killing even at close range frequently involved a limited number of killers using area-effect weapons against unseen targets.  Simply enabling assaulting troops to go forward provided their supporting troops an important task which often involved shooting at an area where a soldier might be, or was spotted in earlier.  Whether it was the old Field army’s long ranged rifle and machine gun fire, or 1918’s calculated ‘hurricane’ barrages and light machine guns, the act of killing was indistinguishable from the act of attempting to kill.   




Lying at the heart of present research on the German army is the theme of extremity, based on the apparent willingness of German soldiers to die in the act of killing for a hopeless cause.  Toward this end, Michael Geyer has argued that Germany learned how to make war in 1917. Having encountered the first mass employed of tanks army inculcated a collective will to self destruction among small groups of soldiers for the purpose of defending against them.​[893]​  Self-destruction has been given equally importance in Isabel Hull’s work, to delineate the threshold at which the means of violence overwhelm any rational goal.​[894]​   All of these assertions have been made without a substantive investigation of how the army was trained, how the training process changed and the role it played in teaching soldiers how to survive the contemporary battlefield.  Killing, likewise, is the end toward which training supplied the ‘how’ and ‘when’ by locating soldiers within an increasingly complicated military system. Furthermore, a deeper look into how the German army was organised alters the trajectory of Geyer’s arguments and questions the chronology they establish.  If there was a pivotal year in Germay’s practice of war, it was 1915, where the hurriedly mobilised and barely trained were combined with the remnants of the professional army under a new set of tactical assumptions and learned new tactical forms.  The resulting division-of-risk system blended the elite with the average to confine the effects of the physical violence of combat, shrinking the number of violence specialists to a minority of the overall army, and ensuring that the closer a soldier was to the mean of courage and physical ability, the better his chances to live.  
	It took about three months for the character of the First World War to pass beyond any pre-war prognostication.  For those first three months, Germany had possessed a well motivated and technically adept army, where most every soldier was trusted to attack and defend skilfully. But the losses sustained in August and September dealt crippling blows to the army’s confidence by depriving it first of experienced leaders, and second of hundreds of thousands of peace-trained troops.  Moreover, the expansion of the army set in stone the fundamental changes wrought by mass killing.  The average quality of soldier and the average quality of officer in frontline units could only ever decrease from October onward.  Mitigating this slow process of decline was the fact that none of the combatants were prepared for the war they were now fighting.  As pre-war thought and doctrine were left behind by the pace of events, frontline units took the lead in developing new tactics, based on mitigating the effects of firepower.  The OHL had broader goals though, namely the transmission of new tactics from frontline to home front, as well as spreading a new concept of the nature of war to recruits. These measures were critical to maintaining the army’s qualitative superiority, its only trump card against an opposing coalition superior in all other respects. 
	From the winter of 1914 through 1915 the German army searched with near desperation to escape the ad-hoc measures used to navigate an ongoing manpower crisis. The OHL’s goal was to re-establish a viable system of offensive tactics and useful training but most importantly to inoculate new recruits against the horrors of the industrial battlefield in a modest amount of time.  Field Recruit Depots were created, derived from the existing replacement depot appended to each German division, taking root in February 1915 and operating until the end of the war.  Here the army placed the responsibility for up to date, practical instruction in trench warfare on the army’s 251 divisions, but also army corps, armies, and huge establishments like the permanent facilities at Beverloo and Warsaw.  Huge deviations in training practice occurred, but need to rotate veteran officers from front to home front was mitigated.  Through veteran instructors, the Field Recruit Depots took up their central function as brokerages of experience, sites where the army provided an up-to-date concept of war to all of its new recruits.  A top-down inspection regime responsible to the OHL was instituted almost two years after the FRD system was put into place, and even then only to ensure standards set out for the Spring Offensives were met.  Not only did they like for oversight, but the FRDs utilised their freshly arrived replacements as labourers and emergency reinforcements, a practice that went on for years before being quashed by the OHL.  That the OHL’s ‘Assigned Generals’ and the FRD Inspectorates established by armies and army corps duplicated each other tasks while hardly ever exchanging notes was one fault of the system.  Another was the focus on standards rather than standards and process.  Rather than query or reproduce the methods of the most successful depots, success was judged by the meeting of timetables and adherence to doctrine.  Just as well, for the FRDs were not sites of innovation, instead they were the hubs of the army’s military education.  Veteran instructors displayed by personal example that war was something to be mastered and through texts like the A.V.I, A.V.F 1917, A.V.F 1918 and ‘Attack in Positional War’, ostensibly they demonstrated how to do so.
Following experiments held from mid 1915 to early 1916, tactical innovations were institutionalised as the storm troop programme.  These ‘violence specialists’, lay at the heart of German war making from their inception until the summer of 1918.   As the best soldiers, they were granted the best weapons and training so as to perform the most dangerous task, breaking into and through a fortification held by an unsubdued enemy.  However since their worth came from the accumulated experience and expertise, they were also removed from frontline duties.  Tactics, technologies and organizational reforms practiced during their raids and ‘attacks with limited objectives’ were freely disseminated to common soldiers through training courses.  At such courses, contingents sent from various units received a truncated version of assault troop training, normally between two and three weeks long before returning to their original units where they served the same function.  Additionally, assault troop techniques were demonstrated to officers of the corps administrative staffs [Stellvertretendes Generalkommandos] who governed military districts, and therefore homeland depots, in time of war.  Through the assault troops, a useful auxiliary was constructed, not just to augment the offensive power of German units, but to augment the dwindling quality of the officer corps.  This was achieved by removing the task of initiating and leading the assault from officers and placing it on the assault groups themselves.  
Furthermore entailed to the programme was a basic model for the practice of violence in Positional War, built on active selection of assault troops and division of labour principles. As such the weapons they employed and the carnage they wrought are inseparable from the terrain in which they fought.  In a fully equipped and independent assault unit, specialized close combat weapons were mated with specially trained operators.  Combined under the auspice of an assault group, they provided two essential functions.  First, the means to overcome the physical barriers entailed to trench warfare and second, with modes of killing that maintained physical distance between killers and killed.  Furthermore, by matching specialized weapons with specific tasks, the burden of killing was further isolated within the organization of the assault group itself.  So as to limit danger, combat in trenches was dominated by procedure whenever possible, reflected in the Säuberung process.  Since fortifications were constructed to restrict lines of sight but for a few select areas or provide shelter, terrain itself became an enabling factor in the killing process by creating physical and psychological distance between aggressors and defenders.  Moreover, additional specialization among the violence specialists permitted the burden of killing to be transferred within the unit, from a Lieutenant to his ‘Fumigation’ squad for instance.  Killing in positional warfare was conducted in such a way that the connection between killers and killed was rarely clear and undertaken as part of a routine of lethal demolition subject to local circumstances.    
From mid 1916 to mid 1917, the ‘Storm Troop’ program spread throughout the army, propagated by Assault Battalion training courses and fusion with the Field Recruit Depots.  ‘Intervention’ divisions in particular, the elite counterattacking units reserved for battles of materiel lead the way in embracing the now tried and tested methods.  Through active selection process, meticulous internal specialization (See Ch. II and Ch. III), and willingness to elevate mission over men, these ‘violence specialists’ came the closest to realizing a ‘battlefield taylorism’, or the subordination of an individuals’ physical talents, mental aptitude, and expertise to the military mission.  Once the ‘violence specialists’ completed their tasks, common soldiers arrived to construct defences, collect prisoners and defend against counter-attack.  The preceding are the basic operations undertaken during raids and ‘attacks with limited objectives’, whose function was to eliminate a potential or present threat, capture prisoners and take ‘spoils’; waging ‘small’ positional war in other words. Common soldiers resumed their normal duties of fortification, maintenance and establishing dependable communications with their supporting artillery.  Speed and surprise were key.  Incautious or poorly prepared operations were taken as opportunities by the intended victims to turn the tables.  French troops in particular proved adept at coordinating artillery, engineers and common soldiers in order to kill their attackers with explosives or well planned barrages of shells from places of total safety.
Just as a ‘live and let live’ system made a mockery of the army’s attempts to define an impermeable frontline or an absolute enemy in ‘quiet’ sectors, ‘small’ positional war did the same for active ones (see Chap. IV).  The wholesale slaughter of prisoners deprived attackers of a labour source, a direct benefit to those most at risk, and precluded interrogation, a near universal desire expressed in orders for raids and ‘attacks with limited objectives’.  As substantiated by an examination of numerous operations, fighting in raids was often close-quarters and due to the attackers’ many advantages, quite one-sided.  Resistance was countered immediately with all the means at the attackers’ disposal in focused eruptions of physical violence which left no survivors in the bid to quickly remove threats.  Once attackers removed threats and took control of the immediate area, prisoner taking began.  Apart from their utility, ‘small’ positional war provided the basis for the tactical conduct of large battles, while reaffirming the army’s qualitative superiority to its commanders.
By the latter half of 1917, the effectiveness of the division-of-risk system in structuring the army’s training regime and unit organization firmly fixed a sense of qualitative superiority.  Such a view was demonstrated as more than reasonable given the clear victories won in the latter half of 1917 and Russia’s total defeat. Soldiers’ sense that military victory was attainable in 1918 seemed firm to the OHL, even though there were not just clear weaknesses in the current state-of-the-art, but evidence that the enemy had appreciated them and was finding ways to take advantage. But as strategic incompetence and recent tactical/operational success pushed the OHL to seek decisive military victory, the whole army was reformed under a single concept which replicated the organization of the ‘division of risk’ system on a grand scale.  The result was great initial successes, but between March and July 1918, the ‘division-of-risk’ system was liquidated along with the majority of the assault troops.  At heart of the catastrophic losses again suffered in a new war of movement was Allied knowledge of German war making.  Accumulated from captured documents and provided willingly by German deserters and POWs, Allied tacticians nullified Germany’s advantages.  This they achieved through their own ideas, and from adapting German doctrines.  Having utterly mastered Germany’s methods of both attack and defence, both based in offensive action by violence specialists, the Allies counter-attacked in August 1918 and crushed the German army.
It is with the view of numerous, negotiated crises behind them and the known human cost of a mobile campaign waged with modern weapons that the Spring Offensives take on a truly bizarre and extreme quality.  Though German commanders never included projected casualties in the plans and reports analysed in this dissertation, the scope of what the OHL was willing to sacrifice and how those sacrifices ought to be made was clear.  Two explanations offer themselves based on the arguments of this dissertation.  First, that a victory-or-death campaign removed any future demand for veterans as either leaders or instructors.  Secondly, that in the event of failure, with the storm troop programme now fully mature, divisions had the know-how and personnel to create their own violence specialists.   Battles of truly enormous size and intensity would simply produce the next cadre of veterans ready for conversion into violence specialists.  In either case, the present number of violence specialists were destined for death or wounds, with the 3rd Supreme Command rather underestimating their soldiers’ willingness to obey orders, particularly during months of clear defeats.  As much became clear when the violence specialists were no longer present to augment the officer corps in battle, and provide insulation between common soldiers and the war’s worst.
Deprived from the protection of the ‘division-of-risk’ system, the burden of survival came full circle in July and August 1918.  The German army was left to fight a series of delaying battles with units that were grossly under strength but still relatively well equipped with arms and munitions.  Common soldiers who did not join the shirkers and deserters devised new tactics which placed central importance on the light machine gun.  Such a decision was common-sense, as the light machine gun was a weapon with which they were quite familiar, maintained distance between shooters and their enemy and ensured combat was between small groups, not man vs. man.  But it also performed a similar function for the killing act, collectivizing responsibility and guilt, establishing physical and psychological space, and establishing the gunner as the sole agent.  Combat with the light machine gun in a delaying action was the central feature of the behaviour of German soldiers which I have termed ‘armed avoidance’.  ‘Armed avoidance’ was a compromise between posturing and fighting which gave participants the best chance to perform their military role and live to enjoy peace for which they longed and knew was coming.  It permitted individuals to maintain a sense of pride and avoid shame, making sense of a desperate situation while enabling them to fight and kill.
In the end, the storm troop programme provided the backbone of a system of organization and tactics which gave German soldiers a reasonable chance of surviving an increasingly technical war.  But furthermore, it was adopted and maintained because, when fused with Field Recruit Depots it offered a panacea to the grave threats perceived by the army in 1914-1915, when loss rates were unparalleled.  A storm trooper was in effect, an auxiliary to the officer corps, performing officers’ roles on the battlefield with groups of 4-8 men who initiated assaults and demonstrated a remarkable will to self-sacrifice.  Unlike an officer however, they did not share and manage risk burdens with their soldiers, but assumed risk on behalf of the troops following.  Moreover, their exposure to combat was carefully managed until quite late in the war to prevent the loss of veteran soldiers well versed in fighting techniques.  Furthermore, the skills they offered were based not on a high standard of individual conduct, but instead rested on fighting in small groups. Specialization through division-of-labour principles lay at the heart of the ‘division-of-risk system, isolating those who aided in the killing from those who committed the act.   It was the blend of specialized weapons, small group organization and the nature of the war itself that both preserved common soldiers from the psychological trauma of killing, while permitting a minority to kill effectively when called upon.  
Therefore, from September 1918 until the end of the war, intense war-weariness, a concomitant desire for peace at any price and the mass casualties sustained during the Spring Offensives smothered personal resentments borne by soldiers against their enemies.  Those who had fought long enough to build up a list of grievances were largely killed off.  Moreover, when such sentiments were given voice, it was against the Allies’ political leadership rather than their soldiers.  Survivors took a hold of tactics and improvised a system of ‘armed avoidance’ to fulfil their duty as soldiers but also to keep the enemy at arm’s length. In the Second World War, as Omer Bartov has argued, an abiding faith in Hitler and the Nazi world view kept the Wehrmacht fighting.​[895]​  In the First, there was no world of absolutes to threaten and inspire those on the frontline, or to combat the possibility of a ‘normal’ future.  Largely helpless against the Allied war machine, the OHL’s strategies of avoidance and delay paralleled the desire of the remaining frontline soldiers.  These men, spared the psychological trauma of killing, returned home as veterans who had done what was asked of them, but above all as civilians who were done with war, ready to begin the task of constructing a useful war experience.  With plenty of jobs to be had, they readily rejoined the civilian world while leaving a heroic recasting of wartime service to the political right.​[896]​
Modern German history cannot escape the search for continuity or the concomitant identification of ruptures in continuity.  In the study of the modern German army this trend too persists, in no small part because military practice now offers the most powerful links between the Empire and the Third Reich.  Matthias Strohn’s interpretation of the 1923 Ruhr Crisis deserves special attention, as its aftermath brought about the recognition of diplomacy as the only viable strategy of defence.  The army in turn accepted that its sole function was to purchase as much time for the diplomats as possible before being destroyed.​[897]​  Subservience to civilian authority alongside the acceptance of a hopeless delaying action represent a paradox in German military history worthy of additional study.  Indeed, apart from a maintenance of the Imperial army’s offensive tradition, more work on the army’s evaluation of means and ends from 1919-1939 is required. Where the army acquired the confidence in its soldiers to accept such a task is similarly worthy of study, alongside excellent performance during field exercises, or the identification of visionaries’ well-executed policies.​[898]​ 
Self-preservation as well can be extended with a view towards 1939-1945.  Nazi Weltannschauung added hellish connotations to the notion by rooting individual aspiration and individual action in the health of the racial community.  Whether as the murderous apogee of western imperialism or as a millenarian crusade, to survive became analogous with the absolute destruction of an irreconcilable enemy: the Jews and ‘judeo-bolshevism’ manifested in the Soviet Union.  Some resistance to this new mission appeared from individuals in the upper ranks of the Wehrmacht, but was weak and short lived, so that by 1941 the Wehrmacht and the NS were intimately if not perfectly aligned.​[899]​   Once begun, the mass murder served as a foundation, not just for building a stronger folk community, but for a logic of reciprocity which took for granted that what the murderers did would be done to them and their dependents. Defeat, hesitation and weakness were the same in a world where the certainty of identical slaughter perpetrated by a victorious enemy existed.  
For instance, in OKW Chief Walther von Brauchitsch, NS ideology found a ready advocate from the first as displayed by his exhortations to the troops on 19 September 1939.​[900]​ Uniforms gave indifferent protection to Polish soldiers as Timothy Snyder’s work demonstrates, identifying no less than 63 instances of German troops murdering POWs and wounded.​[901]​  A little less than two years later he put a finer point on his thinking in a statement in July, 1941.  The ‘absolute security of the German soldier’ he said, was secured through the speedy and ruthless pacification of the civilian population: ‘weakness’ and ‘softness’ in these matters only put more lives at risk.​[902]​  Some units moved to ‘soft pedal’ these orders as Mark Mazower observes, building positive relations with civilians.  But in the early days of Operation Barbarossa it was a matter of time before they moved on and Security Divisions, police units and Einsatzgruppen arrived.​[903]​  The anti-partisan war itself applied a veneer of legitimacy to what was by the autumn of 1941, a concerted effort by the Wehrmacht, SS and local volunteers to annihilate the Jews of occupied Russia.​[904]​
Self-preservation lay at the heart of soldiers’ drive to change the way the war was fought in 1914, and their drive to abandon or instrumentalise military service in 1918.  By 1941, aggregated murder had produced the Manichean world which had stirred during the Great War before fully emerging in the Second.  Soldiers in 1918 could contemplate ‘peace at any price’, while soldiers on the eastern front in 1945 could not, as it would signal a betrayal of the faith they had placed in the Führer apart from the surety of revenge acts by the Soviets.  Between these realities, an internal norm of brutality and a brutal system of military justice, the National Socialist warrior was also the apogee of ‘Battlefield Taylorism’, producing small groups whose motivation to fight and kill transcended their own experiences.  Apart from skills, his acceptance of and adherence to the NS worldview rendered his experience of combat and occupation into plain and easy to follow rules with tangible rewards for efficiency:  community, prestige, furlough, a reputation for ‘toughness’, but also justification.  Violence, as Thomas Kühne has observed, built a new community and a new order, governed not just by a system or organization, but all those things welded together an ideology which closed off all other alternatives.​[905]​ 
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